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Abstract 
 
The aim of this thesis is to explore whether employee voice in an employee-owned enterprise 
is different to that in conventional businesses. Employee voice encompasses the different 
ways employees can express their ideas or concerns at work. Contemporary knowledge tends 
to draw empirical evidence from conventional businesses where ‘efficiency’ is a key objective 
of voice mechanisms. However, there is growing evidence suggesting that voice which does 
not correspond to this objective can go ‘unheard’. There is a gap in the literature; less is 
known about alternative mechanisms through which voice may be heard, such as employee-
ownership. 
 
Employee-ownership differs to conventional business. Differentiating factors include 
employees having a ‘right’ to a voice through its ‘embeddedness’ in the governance structure 
expressed through ‘sophisticated’ processes. This suggests employee voice is part of an 
organisation’s ‘fabric’. However, employee ‘compliance’, ‘organisational hierarchy’ and 
‘management resistance’ are factors which can hamper voice in such enterprises suggesting it 
is a ‘fabrication’. All of these factors are explored in the thesis which adopts a subjectivist and 
interpretivist philosophical approach and uses a qualitative single case study of an employee-
owned organisation providing social care services. The research methods were semi-
structured interviews, observations and documentary evidence.  
 
The empirical evidence suggested mixed findings. Employee-ownership did provide 
opportunities for voice to be heard as part of its fabric. However, the pressures on, and 
dominance of, senior executives counteracted and weakened voice suggesting it was a 
fabrication. Employee-ownership was regarded as a management tool that would achieve the 
objective of company efficiency. A key finding is that, even when voice did reflect this 
objective, it often went unheard. The conclusion is that the way employee voice is heard is not 
because of a mechanism, but in the way it is valued. The contribution to knowledge of this 
thesis is; the difference in employee voice is created because of the way in which it is valued. 
 
Keywords: Employee voice, employee-owned enterprise, value of voice, unheard voice 
iv 
 
 
 
Dedication 
 
This thesis is dedicated to all of those who lost their jobs through Thatcherism and to the 
subsequent generations who lost the possibility of work. 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
 
Acknowledgements   
 
 
There are several people I would like to thank for supporting me whilst undertaking this PhD. 
 
Those who took part in this research and made it possible – I enjoyed hearing your voices and 
appreciate the time you gave to this study. 
 
My supervisors, Drs Stewart Johnstone and Jo McBride and Professor Stephen Procter for 
their support, encouragement and guidance through the process.  
 
My Annual Progress Review Panel, Dr Clare Butler and Professor Stephen Procter for 
providing advice and enthusiasm for the subject. 
 
Newcastle University Business School for funding this PhD and providing excellent advice, 
support and guidance through its highly experienced and knowledgeable staff team. 
 
The faculty of Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences programme staff and staff on the 
Researcher Development and Training Programme. 
 
My old friends Professors Tony Chapman and Rob Wilson who have endlessly supported me. 
 
My new friend Carolyn Watkin. 
 
All those I’ve had ‘co-operative conversations’ with: John Atherton, Jane Byrne, John Stirling 
and Professor John Wilson. 
 
Professor John Budd for many interesting conversations about football and employee voice. 
 
The (Industrial) Employment Relations giants whose shoulders I am standing on. 
 
Doreen and John Foggin, my mam and dad, for always saying ‘of course you can’. 
 
The rest of my family, especially my brothers: Paul, Michael and Neil. 
 
My beautiful dogs, Themba and Freddy. 
 
Finally, I’d like to acknowledge Anthony Watson, my lovely husband for being utterly 
fantastic and amazing and at times showing more intellect, patience and interest in this PhD 
than I did myself. We climbed the mountain together, and reached its peak. I do love you. 
Forever. 
vi 
 
 
  vii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‘…employee voice is a fragile plant that needs care and attention to 
allow it to flourish’. 
 
New Times for Employee Voice? 
Adrian Wilkinson & Charles Fay 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  viii 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Chapter One: Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Overview of the study .................................................................................................................... 1 
1.2 Background to the study ................................................................................................................ 3 
1.3 Relevance of the thesis ................................................................................................................... 4 
1.4 Research questions ......................................................................................................................... 5 
1.5 Theoretical framework ................................................................................................................... 6 
1.6 Structure of the thesis ..................................................................................................................... 7 
Chapter Two: Literature Review ....................................................................................................... 12 
2.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 12 
2.2 The meaning of employee voice .................................................................................................. 13 
2.2.1 Employee voice through different academic disciplines....................................................... 13 
2.3 Employee voice and Employment Relations ............................................................................... 15 
2.4 Employee voice and Human Resource Management ................................................................... 17 
2.5 The varieties of employee voice .................................................................................................. 19 
2.6 Contemporary debates: silent and unheard voices ....................................................................... 28 
2.7 Employee voice through employee-ownership ............................................................................ 31 
2.7.1 Development of employee-ownership .................................................................................. 31 
2.7.2 Employee-ownership through employee-share-ownership plans ......................................... 33 
2.7.3 Contemporary employee-ownership ..................................................................................... 38 
2.8 Characterisitics of employee-ownership ...................................................................................... 36 
    2.8.1 The right to a voice……………………………………………....... ……………………….36 
    2.8.2 Embedding employee voice…………………………………… ....... ……………………...37 
    2.8.3 Sophisticated employee-voice processes……………………… ...... ………………………37 
    2.8.4 Employee compliance…………………………………………… ....... ……………………39 
    2.8.5 Organisational heirarchy………………………………………… ....... ……………………39 
    2.8.6 Management resistance…………………………………………… ....... …………………..41 
2.9 Summary……………………………………………………………… ...... ……………………42 
Chapter Three: Theoretical Framework ........................................................................................... 44 
3.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 44 
3.2 The frames of reference and employee voice .............................................................................. 45 
3.2.1 Unitarism ............................................................................................................................... 45 
3.2.2 Pluralism ............................................................................................................................... 46 
3.2.3 Radical .................................................................................................................................. 46 
3.3 Developments to the frames ......................................................................................................... 47 
  ix 
3.3.1 Hard unitarism, HRM and employee voice .......................................................................... 51 
3.3.2 Soft unitarism, HRM and employee voice ........................................................................... 53 
3.3.3 Collaborative pluralism ........................................................................................................ 57 
3.4 Summary ..................................................................................................................................... 62 
Chapter Four: Research Methodology .............................................................................................. 63 
4.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 63 
4.2 Research ontology, epistemology and methodology ................................................................... 64 
4.2.1 Ontology and the nature of reality ........................................................................................ 64 
4.2.2 Epistemology and the nature of knowledge ......................................................................... 65 
    4.2.3 Methodology: quantitative and qualitative ........................................................................... 67 
    4.3 Research methodology and employee voice ................................................................................ 69 
4.4 The research approach ................................................................................................................. 73 
4.4.1 A single case or multiple cases? ........................................................................................... 73 
4.5 Research design: Context, mechanism and outcomes ................................................................. 76 
4.6 Research process ......................................................................................................................... 78 
4.6.1 Selecting the case ................................................................................................................. 78 
4.6.2 Accessing the case ................................................................................................................ 79 
4.6.3 Selecting respondents ........................................................................................................... 80 
4.6.4 Familiarising with the case ................................................................................................... 80 
4.6.5 Methods of data collection ................................................................................................... 81 
4.6.6 Withdrawing from the research ............................................................................................ 86 
4.6.7 Data analysis ......................................................................................................................... 86 
4.6.8 Principles, ethics and reflexivity .......................................................................................... 89 
4.7 Limitations of the research methodology .................................................................................... 91 
4.8 Summary ..................................................................................................................................... 92 
Chapter Five: The Social Care Sector ............................................................................................... 94 
5.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 94 
5.2 The context of social care ............................................................................................................ 94 
5.2.1 The history of social care and its marketization ................................................................... 95 
5.2.2 Contemporary social care and social care organisations ...................................................... 99 
5.2.3 Contemporary social care and social care employees ........................................................ 103 
5.3 The mechanisms of employee voice in social care .................................................................... 105 
5.4 Outcomes of employee voice in social care: why ownership matters ....................................... 108 
5.4.1 Recruitment and retention .................................................................................................. 108 
5.4.2 Employment in social care ................................................................................................. 110 
5.5 The paradox of social care ......................................................................................................... 111 
 
  x 
5.6 Summary .................................................................................................................................... 115 
Chapter Six: Findings ........................................................................................................................ 116 
6.2 Organisational profile: Vivo-Co .................................................................................................... 116 
6.3 Organisational features .................................................................................................................. 118 
       6.3.1 Organisational structure and actors ...................................................................................... 118 
       6.3.2 Organisational space ............................................................................................................. 120 
       6.3.3 Organisational values............................................................................................................ 123 
       6.3.4 Organisational communications ........................................................................................... 123 
       6.3.5 Organisational employee voice mechanisms ........................................................................ 126 
6.4 The context of employee-ownership .............................................................................................. 129 
6.4.1 Reducing funds…………………………………………………………… ....... ………….129 
6.4.2 A strategy of growth ........................................................................................................... 130 
        6.4.3 The ‘recruitment and retention problem’ ............................................................................. 132 
6.5 The mechanism of employee-ownership ....................................................................................... 136 
6.5.1 The type of employee-ownership ........................................................................................ 136 
6.5.2 Electing the General Council .............................................................................................. 138 
         6.5.3 The role of employee representatives ................................................................................. 140 
6.6 The outcomes of employee-ownership .......................................................................................... 144 
        6.6.1 Governance processes .......................................................................................................... 145 
6.7 Summary ........................................................................................................................................ 166 
Chapter Seven: Discussion ................................................................................................................ 168 
7.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 168 
7.2 Employee voice literature: key aspects .......................................................................................... 169 
7.3 The frames of reference: key aspects ............................................................................................. 170 
7.4 The context of employee voice: national, sector and organisational pressures ............................. 172 
7.4.1 The national context of employee voice ............................................................................. 172 
7.4.2 The social care context of employee voice…………………………………… ...... ……...173 
7.4.3 The organisational context of employee voice .................................................................... 174 
7.4.4 The choice of employee ownership..................................................................................... 175 
7.4.5 Employee preferences for employee voice mechanisms..................................................... 175 
7.5 The mechanism of employee ownership ........................................................................................ 176 
7.5.1 The strengths of employee-ownership ................................................................................ 177 
7.5.2 The philosophy of employee-ownership ............................................................................. 183 
7.6 The outcomes of employee-ownership on employee voice ........................................................... 184 
7.6.1 Employee-ownership and employee compliance ................................................................ 184 
7.6.2 Employee-ownership and organisational hierarchy ............................................................ 190 
7.6.3 Employee-ownership and management resistance .............................................................. 196
  xi 
7.7 Unheard voices .......................................................................................................................... 199 
7.8 Employee-ownership: fabric or fabrication? ............................................................................. 200 
    7.8.1 Collaborative pluralism and the fabric of employee voice…..……………… ...... ……….201 
    7.8.2 Hard unitarism and the fabrication of employee voice…………………… ....... …………202 
    7.8.3 Fabric, fabrication and the value of employee voice………………………… ...... ………206 
7.9 Summary ................................................................................................................................... 208 
Chapter Eight: Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 210 
8.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 210 
8.2 Key points from preceding chapters .......................................................................................... 210 
8.3 Limitation in the employee voice literature ............................................................................... 214 
    8.4 Addressing the limitation in the literature ................................................................................. 215 
8.5 Main findings and conclusions .................................................................................................. 217 
8.5.1 The context of employee voice ........................................................................................... 217 
8.5.2 The mechanism of employee voice .................................................................................... 218 
8.5.3 Outcomes of employee voice ............................................................................................. 219 
8.6 The fabric and fabrication of employee voice through employee-ownership ........................... 221 
8.7 Contribution to knowledge: the value of voice ......................................................................... 222 
8.8 Areas for future research ........................................................................................................... 223 
 
 
Appendix One: Access process ......................................................................................................... 225 
Appendix Two: Six-S configuration ................................................................................................. 229 
Appendix Three: Schedule for observations ................................................................................... 230 
Appendix Four: Interview schedule ................................................................................................. 231 
Appendix Five: Informed consent form .......................................................................................... 234 
Appendix Six: Analysis process ........................................................................................................ 235 
References .......................................................................................................................................... 236 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  xii 
 
 
Index of Tables and Figures 
Table 1.1 Employee voice as fabric or fabrication ........................................................................... 2 
Table 2.1 Voice types and forms .................................................................................................... 20 
Table 3.1 Summary of developments of the frames of reference ................................................... 49 
Table 4.1 Differences between positivism and interpretivism ........................................................ 68 
Table 4.2 Types of case study ......................................................................................................... 75 
Table 4.3 Criteria for assessing the quality of documentary evidence ............................................ 85 
Table 4.4 Data analysis phases ....................................................................................................... 88 
Table 5.1 Average price paid for social care by UK region/nation............................................... 100 
Table 6.1 Demographics of the General Council .......................................................................... 139 
Table 6.2 Summary of each employee representative .................................................................. 141 
Table 6.3 Topics for discussion at the General Council ............................................................... 155 
Table 7.1 Key features of the frames of reference ........................................................................ 171 
 
Figure 2.1 Employee involvement escalator ................................................................................... 22 
Figure 2.2 Employee voice continuum ........................................................................................... 25 
Figure 4.1 Context, Mechanism and Outcome configuration ......................................................... 77 
Figure 5.1 Downward pressures on employee voice .................................................................... 111 
Figure 6.1 Vivo-Co organisational structure ................................................................................. 119 
Figure 6.2 Vivo-Co conventional voice mechanisms ................................................................... 126 
Figure 7.1 Vivo-Co governance structure ..................................................................................... 181 
Figure 7.2 Similarities to the collaborative pluralist frame in Vivo-Co........................................ 201 
Figure 7.3 Similarities to the hard unitarist frame in Vivo-Co ..................................................... 203 
1 
 
Chapter One: Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Overview of the study 
The aim of this thesis is to explore whether employee voice in an employee-owned 
enterprise is different compared to that of conventional businesses. Employee voice 
encompasses the different ways employees are able to express their ideas or concerns at 
work. Much of what we know about contemporary employee voice is based on empirical 
evidence which has been drawn from conventional businesses. A characteristic of some 
conventional businesses is the objective of maximising company efficiency (Budd 2004). 
Reflecting this objective, the processes through which employee voice is expressed are 
likely to be an ‘employer choice’ (Croucher et al 2010).  
 
In conventional businesses, it is typically managers who are the architects of 
contemporary employee voice (Wilkinson et al 2015). The choices they make tend 
towards mechanisms which are regarded as ‘low-level’ (Wilkinson and Fay 2011) such as 
newsletters and team briefings. The purpose of such mechanisms is to contribute to the 
efficiency objective of the company. Voice is of value inasmuch as it achieves this 
purpose. However, there is growing evidence that voice which does not correspond to this 
objective can go ‘unheard’ (Gunawardana 2014; Wilkinson et al 2018). The risk of voice 
going unheard helps to reveal a gap in the literature, less is known about alternative voice 
mechanisms, which may enable voice to be heard. This study will explore employee 
voice in an unconventional business: an employee-owned enterprise. 
 
Employee-owned enterprises differ to conventional business vis-à-vis employee voice. 
Factors which can enable employee voice are through employees having a ‘right’ to a 
voice (Pendleton 2001), the ‘embeddedness’ of voice in the governance structure 
(Bernstein 1976) and voice which is expressed through ‘sophisticated’ governance 
processes (Flanders et al 1968; Salaman and Storey 2016). These factors suggest that 
employee voice will be heard as it is part of an organisation’s ‘fabric’. However, there are 
other factors which can hamper employee voice in an employee-owned enterprise. These 
include ‘employee compliance’ (Cathcart 2014), ‘organisational hierarchy’ (Atzeni 2012) 
and ‘management resistance’ (McCarthy and Palcic 2012), which, it is argued here, 
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suggests employee voice may be little more than a ‘fabrication’. The differentiating and 
hampering factors are summarised in table 1.1 below. 
 
Fabric Fabrication 
Right to a voice Employee compliance  
Embeddedness of voice Organisational hierarchy  
Sophisticated governance processes Management resistance 
Table 1.1 Employee voice as fabric or fabrication 
 
 
All of these factors are explored through the methodological approach of the study. The 
study adopts a subjectivist and interpretivist philosophical approach and uses a qualitative 
single case study of an employee-owned organisation providing social care services. The 
methods of research were semi-structured interviews, observations and documentary 
evidence.  
 
The empirical evidence suggested mixed findings. Employee-ownership in the studied 
case did provide opportunities for employee voice to be heard which were created 
through it being part of the organisation’s fabric. However, the pressures on, and 
dominance of, senior executives counteracted and weakened voice. Senior executives 
regarded employee-ownership as a management tool that would achieve the objective of 
company efficiency. It was used to constrain employee-owners restricting who could 
speak and on which subjects which was reinforced through the ‘organisational hierarchy’ 
and ‘management resistance’ suggesting it was little more than a fabrication. 
 
A key finding of this study is that, even when voice did reflect the efficiency objective, it 
often went unheard, though, importantly, this was not an outcome of the mechanism. The 
conclusion is that the way employee voice is heard is not because of a mechanism, but in 
the way it is valued. Employee voice will not spontaneously appear through employee-
ownership because of the right to a voice, its embeddedness or its sophisticated processes. 
Rather, it is a philosophy which relates to the value we place on the right to be heard. This 
leads to the contribution of this thesis; the difference in employee voice is created not 
because of a mechanism, but because of the way in which it is valued. 
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1.2 Background to the study 
Employee voice in the UK was traditionally expressed through trade unions (Budd 2004). 
Trade unions, via representatives, were the primary way employees expressed their voice 
at work during much of the twentieth century. Some defining characteristics of employee 
voice expressed in this way were that it was collective and independent of management 
and its primary concern was equity; fairness in the workplace was a key principle of 
employee voice during this period. Trade unions provided a level of protection to 
employees, acting to correct or mediate the employment relationship when necessary 
(Benson and Brown 2010). Reflecting the point that they were the key voice mechanism 
during this period, the membership of trade unions was at its peak in 1979 with thirteen 
million members (Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy 2016). 
However, a change in the political environment led to what Dundon et al (2017) refer to 
as a transformation of employee voice.  
 
During the 1980s, employee voice in UK workplaces changed dramatically. A 
contributing factor to this transformation was the election in 1979 of a Conservative 
government. The new government created a political and economic environment which 
was underpinned by a ‘neo-liberal’ philosophy (Hall and Soskice 2001) that included 
privileging the market and emphasising individualism (Legge 2005). A particular 
characteristic of this philosophy was an emphasis on efficiency. The new environment, 
underpinned by a philosophy emphasising efficiency, provided the conditions for changes 
to employee voice and was the opposite of the collective, independent and equity-focused 
voice expressed through trade unions. However, whilst the new environment provided the 
conditions for change, a further development was to crystallise the changes to employee 
voice. This was through a process which, though at the time was prevalent in the US, was 
new to the UK: Human Resource Management (HRM).  
 
The growth in interest in HRM was attributed to various factors. These included a growth 
in national interest in new management methods to stimulate productivity and industrial 
performance, gain competitive advantage in the world economy as well as a perception 
that American management methods were ‘best practice’ and should be imported and 
emulated (Kaufman 2007). Characteristics of HRM were that it was proactive and 
integrative and formed part of an employee commitment and participation system (Beer 
and Spector 1984). As it relates to employee voice, through an HRM function, it is 
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typically managers who are the architects of contemporary employee voice (Wilkinson et 
al 2015).  
 
In conventional businesses it is usually managers who choose employee voice 
mechanisms and those choices are influenced by their concerns for company efficiency 
(Budd 2004). Whilst 40% of UK workplaces reportedly have no voice mechanisms at all 
(Van Wanrooy et al 2013) and as there is no legal obligation for companies to implement 
voice mechanisms, when managers do implement mechanisms, the choices they make 
tend towards those which are regarded as ‘low-level’ (Wilkinson and Fay 2011). 
Examples of low-level mechanisms include newsletters and team briefings. They are 
considered low-level as they confer limited ability for employees to have any influence; 
information is provided to employees who have no involvement with, or influence over, 
that information. Yet it is these mechanisms which are more likely to populate UK 
workplaces (Marchington et al 1992). The use of low-level mechanisms can have a 
negative bearing on employee voice.  
 
Employee voice exists within a political and economic environment that prioritises 
efficiency. Efficiency is one of the main objectives of conventional businesses (Budd 
2004). Reflecting this objective, the processes through which employee voice is 
expressed are likely to be an ‘employer choice’ (Croucher et al 2010) and are typically 
‘low-level’ (Wilkinson and Fay 2011) meaning employees are afforded little opportunity 
to express their voice about anything beyond that prescribed by managers. This means 
voice is of value inasmuch as it contributes to this objective. However, there is growing 
evidence that voice which does not correspond to this objective can go ‘unheard’ 
(Gunawardana 2014; Wilkinson et al 2018). The risk of voice going unheard helps to 
reveal a gap in the literature, less is known about alternative voice mechanisms, which 
may enable voice to be heard.  
 
1.3 Relevance of the thesis 
Whilst much has been learnt from the existing literature about employee voice, much of 
the contemporary literature is by HRM scholars who tend to draw evidence from the 
mechanisms used in conventional businesses. Such mechanisms are typically 
management-led, considered as being ‘low-level’ (Wilkinson and Fay 2011) and reflect 
an objective of company efficiency (Budd 2004). Given that such mechanisms are 
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determined by managers, they are susceptible to practices such as agenda-setting 
(Donaghey et al 2011a). Practices such as agenda-setting can limit the scope of topics 
employees are able to discuss and are therefore considered to be ‘weak voice systems’ 
(Dobbins and Dundon 2011). Within this environment, employees have only limited, if 
any, opportunities to express their voice over matters of concern to them. As such, there is 
a risk that some voices may go unheard. 
 
A recent debate in some of the Employment Relations literature relates to ‘unheard’ 
voices. The argument is that the prevalence of managers’ concerns with efficiency, and 
their choices for low-level mechanisms, can lead to employee voice being unheard. In 
other words, voice which does not comply with that prescribed by management can go 
unheard (Gunawardana 2014; Wilkinson et al 2018). There are a number of negative 
outcomes of this such as ideas being missed, or employees leaving the organisation 
bringing costs to themselves and to their employer. By highlighting the issue of unheard 
voices, the debate has drawn attention to a limitation in the extant employee voice 
literature. Though we know much about employee voice in conventional businesses we 
know less about it through alternative mechanisms which may offer greater potential for 
it to be heard. An alternative mechanism is employee-ownership. 
 
Employee-ownership is different to conventional businesses. The differences include 
factors such as employees having a ‘right’ to a voice through its ‘embeddedness’ in the 
governance structure and it being expressed through a range of ‘sophisticated’ processes. 
These factors suggest employee-ownership provides the potential for voices to be heard 
through it being part of a company’s fabric, the ‘organisational infrastructure’ (Dundon et 
al 2017). However, several opposing factors could inhibit employee voice through 
employee-ownership. These are ‘employee compliance’, ‘organisational hierarchy’ and 
‘management resistance’. All of these factors mean employee-ownership provides a 
fruitful site for further investigation of employee voice and have helped to inform the 
research questions of this study. 
 
1.4 Research questions  
To address the gap in the extant literature regarding alternative employee voice 
mechanisms through which voice may be heard, this thesis explores employee voice in an 
employee-owned enterprise. The aim is to understand whether employee voice in such an 
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enterprise is different compared to that in conventional businesses.  To achieve this aim, 
the following questions were used to guide the research process:  
 
1. What contextual factors influenced the choice of mechanism in the studied case? 
 
2. How did the mechanism differ to those in conventional businesses? 
 
3. How did employee voice operate through the mechanism? 
 
4. What were the consequences of the mechanism for key organisational actors? 
 
By addressing these questions, the thesis will contribute to the contemporary debates 
concerning unheard voices and to our knowledge of employee voice through an 
alternative mechanism. To evaluate the questions, the thesis uses the theoretical lens of 
the ‘frames of reference’ conceived by Fox (1966; 1974).  
 
1.5 Theoretical framework 
The theoretical framework of the thesis is the ‘frames of reference’ which were devised 
by the industrial sociologist Alan Fox. In a paper written for the Donovan Commission on 
trade unions and employers’ associations, Fox (1966) described the dominance of two 
perspectives in UK industrial relations; unitarist and pluralist. He later added a third 
frame, radical (Fox 1974). Fox (1966, 1974) argued that each frame provided a different 
interpretation of the employment relationship. Characteristic of unitarism is harmony in 
the employment relationship as employers and employees strive towards common goals. 
Pluralism interprets the relationship as both co-operative and conflictual based on the 
different interests and concerns of employees and employers. The radical frame regards 
the employment relationship as inherently flawed, skewed as it is towards the interests of 
employers.  
 
Since they were conceived, the frames have been used in different ways such as to 
understand how they underpin management styles and preferences (Legge 2005; see also 
Boxall and Purcell 2011; Johnstone and Wilkinson 2017). They have also been used to 
identify competing interpretations of the employment relationship (Bray et al 2015; 
Dundon et al 2017; Heery 2016; Kaufman 2015) and to evaluate employment relations in 
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practice (Heery et al 2008) such as through labour-management partnerships (Johnstone 
and Wilkinson 2017).  Importantly, a key feature of the frames is the premise that 
management styles, preferences or interpretations do not exist in isolation, rather, they are 
based on different philosophies which inform decisions, choices, actions, etc. As such, the 
frames provide a way of understanding and evaluating these different philosophies. As 
they relate to this thesis, the frames facilitate an understanding of the different 
philosophies which underpin management approaches to employee voice. 
 
By applying the frames of reference to the study of employee voice, its pluralist 
background is revealed through the mechanism of trade unions and its subsequent 
‘transformation’ (Dundon et al 2017) to the contemporary unitarist configuration through 
HRM. The frames also reveal some of the consequences of this unitarist configuration of 
employee voice which can manifest as low-level mechanisms meaning some voices go 
unheard. Budd and Bhave (2008) suggest we need to understand management philosophy 
as it is this which affects individuals’ own values and principles and therefore decisions 
about the design and implementation of voice mechanisms.  
 
In turn, management philosophy will affect how voice mechanisms are experienced by 
employees. The frames help us to understand these different philosophies and therefore 
help us to see how each individual frame will generate different forms and intensities of 
employee voice (Kaufman 2015) through the mechanism of employee-ownership. Whilst 
previous studies have considered employee voice as an aspect of studying employee-
ownership (e.g. Cathcart 2014; Salaman and Storey 2016), they did not use the frames of 
reference as the theoretical framework. In this study, the frames of reference will provide 
an intellectual lens through which to view employee voice in an employee-owned 
enterprise and help to explain and evaluate how it is different compared to a conventional 
business. 
 
1.6 Structure of the thesis 
Including this chapter, the thesis has eight chapters. Chapter two reviews the literature on 
employee voice. It begins by exploring the meaning of employee voice. This highlights 
interest from two principal academic disciplines; Employment Relations and HRM. 
Importantly, these two have quite different conceptualisations of employee voice which 
are explored further, firstly, by drawing on Employment Relations literature to review the 
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meaning of employee voice from this perspective and then drawing on HRM literature to 
review the meaning from this perspective. This reveals that much of our contemporary 
understanding of employee voice is from HRM scholars who draw empirical evidence 
from conventional businesses where ‘efficiency’ is a key objective of employee voice 
mechanisms. Having discussed various varieties of voice mechanisms, it then introduces 
a recent debate from Employment Relations scholars who argue that voice which does not 
correspond to efficiency can go ‘unheard’. This debate highlights a limited knowledge of 
alternative mechanisms through which voice may be heard. As an alternative, the chapter 
then discusses the literature on employee-ownership. This includes highlighting three 
differentiating factors of employee voice through employee-ownership compared to 
conventional businesses: the ‘right’ to a voice, the ‘embeddedness’ of voice and 
‘sophisticated’ governance processes suggesting it is part of an organisation’s fabric. 
However, factors are also discussed which could hamper it: ‘employee compliance’, 
‘organisational hierarchy’ and ‘management resistance’ suggesting it may be a 
fabrication. These factors are evaluated through the theoretical framework of the thesis. 
 
Chapter three discusses the theoretical framework that is used to evaluate whether 
employee voice is different through employee-ownership, the frames of reference. The 
frames help to reveal the philosophies of managers which underpin their choice of 
employee voice mechanisms and can shape how those mechanisms evolve in a company. 
The chapter begins by highlighting the main characteristics of the unitarist, pluralist and 
radical frames conceived by Fox (1966; 1974). It then discusses two developments to the 
frames. The first is a reconfiguration of the unitarist frame into hard unitarism and soft 
unitarism (Storey 1989). The reconfiguration helps to highlight that it is the hard and soft 
unitarism frames which underpin much of the contemporary HRM literature.  They are 
reflected in the choices of some managers for low-level voice mechanisms and in what 
they regard as the purpose of such mechanisms, which is to contribute to company 
‘efficiency’. The second is a recent development to the pluralist frame; collaborative 
pluralism (Bray et al 2015), which offers a different way to conceive employee voice 
through voice as a ‘right’ and ‘co-operative’. These three frames are used in this thesis to 
facilitate an understanding of the different philosophies which underpin management 
choices and approaches to employee voice in an employee-owned enterprise. 
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Chapter four outlines the rationale for, and approach to, the research methodology 
adopted for this study. It begins by considering the philosophical traditions which 
underpin different research approaches revealing how this affects research practice. To 
highlight these differences, it then discusses the approaches of HRM and Employment 
Relations scholars to the study of employee voice. It then states the approach here, which 
is a subjectivist ontology, interpretivist epistemology and a qualitative methodology via a 
single case study. This is followed by a discussion of the research design which follows 
the Context, Mechanism and Outcomes (CMO) configuration conceived by Pawson and 
Tilley (1997) which was used here to organise data collection and analysis. Next, it 
outlines the research process which includes selecting and accessing the case, methods of 
data collection and data analysis.  Finally, it discusses some of the limitations of the 
methodology. Given that this chapter highlights the importance of understanding the 
environment in which employee-ownership emerged, the next chapter discusses the social 
care sector as it is here that the studied case operates. 
 
Chapter five discusses the social care sector in which the studied case operates. The first 
section considers the context of social care and references a key policy turn, the 1990 
National Health Services and Community Care Act. The Act led to the marketization of 
social care and an increase in the prevalence of for-profit social care organisations. The 
chapter then considers the choices of employee voice mechanisms in social care 
organisations which are typically chosen by management and are low-level. It then 
examines the outcomes of employee voice in social care which reveals problems such as 
recruitment and retention of social care employees as they tend to leave an organisation 
rather than express their voice through low-level mechanisms. However, rather than leave 
the sector, some employees move to other social care organisations creating a paradox 
within the sector that is discussed in the final section. 
 
Chapter six presents the findings from the case study of Vivo-Co. The chapter begins 
with a company profile and then provides findings of aspects of the whole organisation 
such as how space is occupied and the company values. It then presents findings of the 
context in which Vivo-Co operates. This highlights a key objective in Vivo-Co of 
efficiency which was hampered by reduced local authority funding. This led to adopting a 
‘strategy of growth’ and addressing the ‘recruitment and retention problem’, the latter 
through employee-ownership. The chapter then discusses the mechanism of employee-
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ownership revealing that employee-ownership did present the potential of voice forming 
part of the fabric. There was a right to a voice which was embedded in the governing 
document and the potential was there of it being expressed through the sophisticated 
processes of an Annual General Meeting and a General Council. The final section 
discusses the outcomes of employee-ownership which reveal challenges to employee 
voice: ‘employee compliance’, ‘organisational hierarchy’ and ‘management resistance’. It 
is then argued that these challenges were a result of employee-ownership being regarded 
as a management tool that would achieve the objective of company efficiency. This leads 
to the key finding that, even when employee voice did reflect an efficiency objective, it 
often went unheard, suggesting it was a fabrication.  
 
Chapter seven, using the frames of reference, evaluates the findings from Vivo-Co as they 
relate to the employee voice literature. It evaluates the context of employee voice 
revealing that the assumption by senior executives that employee-ownership would 
incentivise employees was consistent with some of the literature. This literature is 
underpinned by a philosophy that regards employees as calculative and motivated by 
financial gain. It then evaluates how employee-ownership, as a voice mechanism, affects 
employee voice. The evidence here is consistent with the literature, employee-ownership 
can provide the means for voice to be heard through factors such as more sophisticated 
voice processes. It then evaluates the outcomes of employee voice through employee-
ownership. The literature suggests potential challenges, such as through management 
concerns of compliance, evidenced here through voice which was counteracted and 
weakened. The next section argues that these challenges meant that some voices went 
unheard. This leads to the final section which discusses whether employee voice in Vivo-
Co was part of the fabric or merely a fabrication. The chapter concludes that employee 
voice is a philosophy concerning the value placed on the right to be heard. This leads to 
the contribution of this thesis; the difference in employee voice is created not because of a 
mechanism, but because of the way in which it is valued. 
 
Chapter eight presents the conclusions of the study and offers some suggestions for future 
research. It begins by summarising the key points of the study drawn from the preceding 
chapters. It then considers the limitations in the extant literature which provided the 
motivation for this study and informed the research questions and then discusses how 
these limitations and questions were addressed by this study. This is followed by a 
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discussion of the main conclusions of this study based on the findings and analysis. 
Within the next section, relating to the fabric and fabrication of employee voice through 
employee-ownership, it then sets out the key finding of this study: even when employee 
voice does reflect an efficiency objective, it often went unheard. Its final conclusion is 
that the way voice is heard is not because of a mechanism, rather, employee voice is a 
philosophy concerning the value we place on the right to be heard. This leads to the 
contribution to knowledge of this study: the difference in employee voice is created 
because of the way in which it is valued. The contribution to knowledge of this thesis is 
the value of voice.  
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Chapter Two: Literature Review 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the literature on employee voice. Following chapter one, which 
outlined the aim of the thesis and set out the research questions, this chapter is organised 
around seven themes. The first explores the meaning of employee voice. This highlights 
the influence of two academic disciplines; Employment Relations and HRM which have 
quite different conceptualisations of employee voice. To investigate these differences, the 
second theme reviews the meaning of employee voice through the Employment Relations 
literature and the traditional mechanism of trade unions. The third draws on the HRM 
literature to review the meaning of employee voice from this perspective. This reveals 
that much of our contemporary understanding of employee voice is by HRM scholars 
who draw empirical evidence from conventional businesses where ‘efficiency’ is a key 
objective of employee voice mechanisms. This is reflected in ‘management choice’ which 
tends toward those considered to be at a ‘low-level’. To highlight this point, the fourth 
considers the varieties of contemporary employee voice mechanisms and the nature of 
voice that each yields. The fifth presents a recent debate in the Employment Relations 
literature which argues that voice which does not correspond to the efficiency objective 
can go ‘unheard’. This debate helps to highlight a limitation in the extant literature which 
is that much less is known about alternative voice mechanisms through which voice may 
be heard. To address this limitation, the remaining two themes review literature on 
employee-ownership.  The first of these reviews the development of employee-ownership 
in the UK whilst the second discusses factors which differentiate employee-owned 
businesses from conventional businesses in relation to employee voice. Differentiating 
factors are having the ‘right’ to a voice through its ‘embeddedness’ in the governance 
structure and expressed through ‘sophisticated’ processes which suggest it is part of the 
organisational fabric. However, a number of factors are revealed which can present 
challenges to employee voice: ‘employee compliance’, ‘organisational hierarchy’ and 
‘management resistance’ suggesting that it may be little more than a fabrication. All of 
these factors suggest employee-ownership will provide a particularly interesting site to 
explore whether, in such enterprises, employee voice is different compared to that of 
conventional businesses. 
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2.2 The meaning of employee voice 
Discussions about the meaning of ‘employee voice’ often draw on the work of the 
economist Alfred Hirschman (1970) as the starting point in the academic literature (Budd 
2014; Dundon et al 2004; Mowbray et al 2015). His seminal work on African railways 
was related to customer behaviour and sought to differentiate ways of explaining 
company decline. Hirschman (1970) considered customer behaviour in relation to an 
‘exit, voice and loyalty’ framework.  Exit relates to a customer choosing to leave an 
organisation due to a particular dissatisfaction. Alternatively, that customer may use 
channels available to them, i.e. voice, to express their concerns. Because the customer has 
been able to air their concerns then the likelihood is they will remain with the 
organisation: loyalty. However, whilst this conceptualisation may provide a useful 
starting point in understanding what is meant by employee voice, its transferability to the 
relationship between employees and employers are uncertain.  
 
The exit, voice and loyalty framework implies a linear progression between exit and 
loyalty with voice being the intervening factor: if voice mechanisms are put in place then 
the risk of someone leaving are reduced. Whilst this might apply to customer behaviour, it 
is argued here that the relationship between employees and employers is something quite 
different and more complex when compared to the relationship between a company and 
its customers. Indeed, when employee voice is conceived as a fundamental part of the 
relationship between employees and employers, which some Employment Relations 
scholars argue it is (e.g. Budd 2004; Dundon et al 2004), then its conceptual boundaries 
are broadened and go beyond that of the exit, voice and loyalty framework. Consideration 
of a broader conceptualisation of employee voice, highlights that it has an ‘historical 
pedigree’ which is often omitted in contemporary text on voice (Wilkinson et al 2014).  
 
2.2.1 Employee voice through different academic disciplines 
The necessity for employees to have a voice at work emerged during the industrial 
revolution because of the substantial numbers of those working in the newly created 
‘manufactories’ being subjected to harsh conditions and low wages (Cole 1913). Though 
the term ‘employee voice’ was never used at the time, much of the intellectual thinking 
on it was within this historical context and was influenced by a range of different 
academic disciplines. This includes the sociologist Emile Durkheim, the economist Adam 
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Smith (Kaufman 2014), the philosopher and economist Karl Marx (Wilkinson et al 2014), 
the psychologist Hugo Munsterberg (Wilkinson et al 2015) and the political economist 
Harry Braverman (Foley and Polanyi 2006). This interest from different academic 
disciplines is important as it has shaped what employee voice means which varies 
according to each (Dundon et al 2004; Dundon et al 2017; Wilkinson et al 2018).  
 
The importance of understanding the interest in employee voice from different academic 
disciplines is that this has led to two principal interpretations of its meaning. One 
interpretation relates to equity concerns and the second relates to efficiency concerns. For 
example, Braverman and Durkheim would regard having a voice at work as a way of 
enabling employees a moral right to humane and non-alienating work environments; an 
equity concern. Conversely, the primacy of the economy is apparent in the writing of 
Smith, Munsterberg and Hirschman; an efficiency concern. Against this academic 
backdrop, bodies of literature have developed around these two different meanings. A 
primary emphasis on equity has developed through the academic disciplines of sociology 
and political science and through the field of Employment Relations. In contrast, a 
primary emphasis on efficiency has developed through the disciplines of economics and 
psychology and the field of Human Resource Management. As such, Employment 
Relations and HRM scholars have quite different conceptualisations of employee voice, 
therefore an understanding of these differences is important to the discussion of employee 
voice. 
 
Within the body of Employment Relations literature, employee voice is conceived in a 
particular way such as the idea of ‘meaningful’ voice espoused by Budd (2004). This is 
achieved when employees have some input into decision-making, they are able to speak 
freely and they have the opportunity to challenge without any reprisal. Employee voice 
conceived in this way is therefore focused on the objective of ‘equity’ and its expression 
has traditionally been channelled through trade unions. By contrast, the prevailing 
contemporary use of the term has tended to be influenced by HRM scholars who have a 
different way of conceiving employee voice. The HRM literature tends to focus on 
efficiency objectives and voice reflects this objective and is channelled through an array 
of mechanisms. These differences between Employment Relations and HRM scholars and 
their conceptualisation of employee voice are important as they have shaped and 
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influenced academic understanding of it which also influences how it is conceived and 
manifests within companies. 
 
2.3 Employee voice and Employment Relations 
Employee voice has been a major topic of Employment Relations for many years (Barry 
and Wilkinson 2015). Much of the early thinking about employee voice is reflected in the 
classical work of Beatrice and Sydney Webb. Though never using the term ‘employee 
voice’, through their seminal work ‘Industrial Democracy’ (1897), the notion of 
employee voice manifests through links between industrial democracy and democratic 
theory, through trade union representation and notions of democratic processes (Dachler 
and Wilpert 1978). Focusing on the role of trade unions, this work concerned the 
mechanisms through which employees were able to ‘have a say’ at work (Marchington et 
al 1992), i.e. trade unions.  The meaning of employee voice in this context was equity. 
The work of the Webbs continued to influence much of the intellectual thinking on the 
meaning of employee voice during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This was 
channelled through trade unions and espoused academically through the field of 
Employment Relations. 
 
The Webbs are regarded as the founders of the Employment Relations tradition in the UK 
(Heery 2016; Mueller-Jentsch 2004). For Employment Relation scholars, employee voice 
has a focus on the various ways and means employees are able to ‘have a say’ at work 
(Marchington et al 1992). In other words, there is an emphasis on voice which reflects the 
concerns and interests of employees. This emphasis represents a fundamental premise on 
which Employment Relations is based: whilst there are areas of consensus in the 
relationship between employer and employee there are also differences, which at times 
may cause conflict. As such, the field of Employment Relations has a particular focus on 
the mechanisms through which employee voice is expressed – which historically, as 
noted above, was through trade unions. This Employment Relations lens was used in the 
pioneering work on American trade unions by Richard B. Freeman and James L. Medoff 
(Rees et al 2013).  
 
Acknowledging that it made ‘good sense’ to both employees and employers to have a 
voice mechanism (Dundon et al 2004), Freeman and Medoff (1979; 1984) identified two 
opposing views on the efficacy of trade unions. The first is the monopoly view whereby 
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trade unions are regarded as detrimental in capitalist societies doing little more than 
raising the wages of their members and in so doing, increasing the degree of economic 
inefficiency. In the second view, trade unions provide employees with a collective voice. 
Freeman and Medoff (1984) regarded collective voice as more favourable than individual 
voice as it helped to improve employment conditions as well as the conditions facilitating 
employee well-being, they argued: 
 
‘In a unionised setting, the union takes account of all workers and forms an 
average of preference that usually determines its position at the bargaining 
table…unionism provides an alternative mechanism for bringing about important 
and socially desirable changes’ (emphasis in original; p.7). 
 
One of their research findings was that the voice aspect of trade unions was key in 
reducing wage inequality and lowering profits. Based on this finding, Freeman and 
Medoff (ibid) suggest that for those who think economic equality is a plus, the role of 
trade unions was definitely good. Conversely, for those who think economic equality was 
bad then so too was the role of trade unions. They concluded from their research that 
trade unions raised social efficiency and reduced wage inequality. For them, trade unions 
were the best agents of voice as they are independent of employers, a factor which in turn 
aids the legitimacy of voice (Dundon et al 2004). Importantly, given the prominence of 
this work, the conceptual development of employee voice within the field of Employment 
Relations during much of the twentieth century became synonymous with trade unions 
(Ackers 2015; Bryson et al 2006; Budd 2014). 
 
Trade union membership was at a peak in the late 1970s in the UK. The typical member 
was a male, full-time manual worker in the production sector (Greene 2015). Trade 
unions provided a level of protection to employees by acting to correct or mediate the 
employment relationship when necessary (Benson and Brown 2010). Voice in this 
context is conceived as a form of ‘social insurance’ (Mares 2001) concerned as it is with 
equity. Trade unions enabled a collective voice that was independent of management and 
designed to act predominantly on behalf of employees in areas such as pay negotiations 
and terms and conditions of employment. In so doing, they provided a route for an 
equitable voice. Equity was the key concern that shaped an understanding of employee 
voice during this period (Budd 2004). However, a changed political landscape during the 
1980s led to employee voice becoming associated with, and limited to, grievance in the 
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workplace; trade unions became associated with a voice of ‘grievance’ (Dundon et al 
2004; Wilkinson et al 2018). The membership of trade unions began to decline at this 
time and has continuously declined since (Ackers 2015). This new political environment 
coupled with the new practice of HRM meant changes to the nature of employee voice.  
 
2.4 Employee voice and Human Resource Management 
Whilst trade unions were the main source of employee voice during the twentieth century, 
by the beginning of the twenty-first century, the main suppliers of voice in Britain were 
employers (Gomez et al 2009; see also Johnstone and Ackers 2015; Pohler and Luchak 
2014a). Notwithstanding international trends, two key events in the UK influenced this 
change: the 1979 election of a Conservative government and the new practice of HRM. 
When these two events combined, voice was re-oriented away from equity concerns 
towards efficiency concerns.  
 
A fundamental shift in the political environment during the latter part of the twentieth 
century had a substantial impact on employee voice. The industrial and economic turmoil 
of the 1970s led to strained relationships between trade unions and employers and trade 
unions and the state, a situation that led directly to the Thatcher era (Howell and Givan 
2011). The election of a Conservative government led by Margaret Thatcher in 1979 
heralded a sudden and rapid decline in the role of trade union voice (Johnstone and 
Ackers 2015). This new government was antagonistic towards trade unions. Trade union 
voice was regarded by some as the voice of grievance (Dundon et al 2004) the nature of 
which was ‘reactive’ (Kaufman 2007). Whereas the concern of trade unions was to 
provide a counter-balance between the needs of employees and those of employers, the 
new environment shifted attention to the needs of business. There was a ‘seismic shift’ 
during the 1980s in the relationship between employers and employees with power 
shifting in favour of management and shareholders (Mueller and Carter 2005) and away 
from the trade union side of the employment relationship (Procter and Rowlinson 2012) 
which resulted in, what Dundon et al (2017) refer to as, a transformation of employee 
voice.  
 
The Conservative government laid the foundations for an economic environment which 
was founded on free-market, neo-liberal policies. Once in office, they increasingly 
intervened to diminish the role of trade unions. This created a new landscape that marked 
18 
 
the beginning of large-scale de-collectivisation of employment relations institutions 
which has resulted in a continuing trajectory towards de-centralised, individualised, 
company-centred employment relations institutions offering much greater flexibility and 
autonomy in determining pay and conditions at the company level (Howell and Givan 
2011). The new environment enabled profit, productivity and performance to take 
precedence over any other concerns. Described as ‘casino capitalism’ (Hyman 2015), it 
has led to practices that have become familiar today such as asset-stripping, secondary 
markets and private equity. Terms such as shareholder value, commercial confidentiality 
and reputational damage have become common parlance both nationally and at the 
company level. 
 
The new environment was fertile ground for a different type of voice at work channelled 
through a vehicle that was relatively new to the UK: HRM. The term ‘HRM’ first 
appeared in the USA in the 1960s through ‘morphing’ some of the functions traditionally 
the domain of Employment Relations with those of personnel management (Godard 2014; 
Kaufman 2007). Though the roots of HRM as we would recognise it today appeared in 
the UK in the late nineteenth century, Kaufman (2007) states it was not until the 1980s 
that real interest began.  
 
The growth in interest in HRM was attributed to various factors, one of which was the 
demise of the trade unions - an historical irony given HRM developed, at least in part, 
from an industrial relations context. Other influencing factors included a growth in 
national interest in new management methods which would stimulate productivity and 
industrial performance, contribute to gaining a competitive advantage in the world 
economy as well as a perception that American management methods were ‘best practice’ 
and should be imported and emulated (ibid).  
 
The idea that HRM represented best practice developed because of the characteristics 
which tend to be associated with its practices. These include that HRM is regarded as 
proactive and integrative and forms part of an employee commitment and participation 
system (Beer and Spector 1984). Importantly, unlike its trade union predecessor as a 
channel for employee voice, this new HRM function was not focused on equity concerns 
of employees but rather on company performance (Wilkinson and Fay 2011). 
Furthermore, in practice this meant an emphasis on individual and direct voice and little, 
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if any, room for voice being collective or independent of management as it was with trade 
unions. Through an HRM function, it is typically managers who are the architects of 
contemporary employee voice (Wilkinson et al 2015).  
 
Where previously voice had been collective and indirect and channelled through trade 
unions it became individual and direct expressed through an array of mechanisms 
channelled through HRM departments. HRM was influenced by the management 
practices from overseas, such as Japan and the United States. As it developed in the 
contemporary UK workplace, it was managers who were the architects and implementers 
of employee voice (ibid). Terms like ‘involvement’ and ‘communication’ became 
fashionable and were associated with managerial initiatives designed to elicit employee 
commitment (Dobbins and Dundon 2011). Employee voice was regarded as the key 
ingredient for creating commitment (Wilkinson and Fay 2011). Further, HRM scholars 
argued that giving employees a voice made good business sense thus improving 
organisational performance (Timming and Johnstone 2015).  
 
Subsequently, much of the extant literature on employee voice has developed around 
attempts to prove links between specific HRM-initiated voice practices and outcomes on 
employee performance (e.g. Perotin 2012). However, some Employment Relations 
scholars contend the HRM literature arguing that the new voice practices yield limited 
opportunity for employees to express their voice on anything beyond efficiency concerns 
(e.g. Budd 2004). To explore this contention, the next section considers some of these 
contemporary employee voice practices and then explores the nature of employee voice 
yielded. 
 
2.5 The varieties of employee voice 
Mindful that approximately 40% of workplaces have no voice mechanisms at all (Van 
Wanrooy et al 2013) and that there is no legal obligation for companies to implement 
voice mechanisms, for those employees who do have access to voice mechanisms, there 
appears an abundance in the modern day workplace. Contemporary voice mechanisms are 
numerous and vary from formal to informal, direct to indirect, representative to non-
representative and collective to individual. To illustrate this variety, some of the types and 
forms are shown in table 2.1 below.  
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Voice Type Examples of Voice Forms 
Formal  Codified, pre-arranged, concrete structures (Marchington & Suter 2013); employee 
surveys, suggestions boxes, and financial participation and trade unions (Gomez et al 
2009). 
Informal  No explicit voice mechanisms (Mowbray et al 2015); electronic communications, 
employee feedback, conversations at social functions and informal meetings within 
the workplace (Gomez et al 2009). 
Direct  Individual, face-to-face (CIPD 2010; Marchington & Suter 2013), employee surveys 
(Gomez et al 2009). 
Indirect  Collective, representative, trade unions (Johnstone and Ackers 2015; Marchington & 
Suter 2013). 
Representative  Trade unions, workplace partnerships (Johnstone 2014; 2015); non-union employee 
representation (NER – i.e. one or two employees acting in a representative manner in 
dealing with management over workplace issues – (Butler 2005; Pohler and Luchak 
2014a); work councils (Marchington and Suter 2013); Joint Consultative Committees 
and Boards of Directors (Markey et al 2013). 
Non-
representative  
Consultative Committees (Barry and Wilkinson 2015) and team briefings 
(Marchington et al 1992). 
Collective  Trade unions, grievance procedures and collective bargaining (Wilkinson et al 2014); 
collective consultation, partnership agreements and employee forums (CIPD 2010; 
Johnstone 2014, 2015). 
Individualised  Social media, social gatherings, employee share ownership (Budd 2014). 
Table 2.1 Voice types and forms 
 
 
Though they have been separated for illustrative purposes, the types and forms shown in 
table 2.1 are not mutually exclusive. For example, direct voice can be expressed either 
formally, such as a face-to-face meeting between an employee and a manager, or 
informally, such as a conversation during a coffee break. Nor is it the case that only one 
mechanism is used, it might be that a number of different mechanisms are used by the 
same organisation at the same time. Nor are the mechanisms constant, they may change 
over time. What table 2.1 is helpful in doing is highlighting the array of mechanisms 
through which an employee is able to express their voice at work. What it does not do 
however, is tell us anything about the nature of voice that each type or form confers.  
 
Despite the quantity of voice types and forms, we know little about its nature. Indeed, as 
noted earlier, these types and forms tend to reflect managerial preferences. The choices of 
managers tend to privilege business concerns, such as a concern for the objective of 
efficiency, and are individual and direct in nature but what do they imply vis-à-vis 
employee voice? To explore this question, the work of Marchington et al (1992) is 
helpful. As part of their work on employee involvement in decision-making, they 
developed a typology of the degrees of control, organisational levels, range of subject 
matter and the form of involvement different mechanisms yielded (for an earlier example 
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of a similar typology see Bernstein 1976). As the typology applies here, ‘involvement’ is 
replaced with employee voice and the first part of the typology, the degree of control 
employees have in the organisation, is helpful in exploring employee voice through the 
different mechanisms.  
 
To illustrate the degree of control generated by different mechanisms, Marchington et al 
(1992) used an escalator metaphor containing five different levels, see figure 2.1 below. 
At the first, most basic, level of the escalator are various communication channels such as 
house journals and team briefings, the latter also appear at the second level. Also on this 
level are share ownership and profit sharing schemes. Employee voice at this level is 
considered ‘shallow’ by Wilkinson and Fay (2011) given employees are merely informed 
of decisions made by management but have no capacity to influence those decisions. The 
rationale of employers here is simply to provide information to employees or, in terms of 
share ownership and profit-sharing, for employees to share in the financial gains of the 
organisation though with limited, if any, scope to influence decisions. 
 
The second level includes team briefings, differentiated from team briefings at level one 
as at this level they provide the opportunity for a two-way dialogue between employees 
and managers or supervisors. Nevertheless, they are still relatively shallow as they carry 
little, if any, weight in terms of employees being able to influence decisions. A recent 
mechanism (therefore not included in this original illustration highlighted in figure 2.1 
though shown in table 2.1) used by increasing numbers of employers, an employee 
engagement survey, could also be included at this level. Dundon et al (2004) note that 
employee attitude surveys are widespread and were regarded by managers as an example 
of ‘good’ HRM, i.e. staff being asked for their views on a regular basis. However, Purcell 
and Hall (2012) question the efficacy of this mechanism arguing that it is often used in 
isolation rather than as a check on progress and a diagnostic tool and therefore cannot 
ever be an effective means for employees to express their views and be consulted.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
22 
 
 
    Control 
 
   Co-
determination 
 
 
 
Employee 
Owned 
Organisations 
e.g. JLP 
 
 
Worker  
Co-operatives 
e.g. SUMA 
  Consultation 
 
 
Works Councils 
 
Employee Share 
Ownership Plans 
 
Collective 
Bargaining 
 
Employee 
Directors 
 Communication 
 
 
Suggestion 
Schemes 
 
Quality 
Circles 
 
Joint 
Consultation 
Information 
 
 
 
 
Team Briefings 
House Journals 
Share 
Ownership 
Profit Sharing 
Team Briefings 
Figure 2.1 Employee involvement escalator 
 
 
The third step suggests slightly more opportunities for the expression of employee voice 
with, for example, employees invited to share their ideas via suggestion schemes and 
quality circles. Importantly, both mechanisms are intended to provide a vehicle for 
employees to make suggestions for improvements to the processes and procedures of their 
work. As such, they are considered at a lower level as the mechanisms do not provide a 
vehicle for employees to discuss matters of concern to them, for example, providing an 
avenue for employees to air grievances. It is the two remaining levels which begin to 
offer more opportunities to employees to express their voice. As such, they are considered 
to offer greater ‘depth’ (Wilkinson and Fay 2011) and ‘strength’ (Gollan et al 2015) and 
the potential for more extensive participation (Wilkinson and Dundon 2010), such as in 
terms of influencing decisions. Further, they are differentiated from the individual and 
direct forms of employee voice characteristic of mechanisms found at the lower end of 
the escalator erring as they do towards indirect, collective and representative mechanisms.  
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Through the fourth level, co-determination, employees are provided with more advanced 
opportunities to be involved at a higher organisational level such as through works 
councils, employee-share ownership plans, collective bargaining and as employee 
directors. Underpinning the works councils, for example, is a belief that whilst companies 
are economic institutions they are also social institutions and therefore accountable not 
only to shareholders but to other stakeholders, including employees (Gumbrell-
McCormick and Hyman 2010).  
 
The fifth level of the escalator, ‘control’, is regarded as the most advanced form of 
participation (Bernstein 1976). Not only is there control over decision-making at the fifth 
level, but also greater depth of influence (Wilkinson and Fay 2011). Such influence is 
yielded, in part, because of the degree of participation at this level. Marchington et al 
(1992) suggest the fifth level would satisfy the idealist notion of ‘full’ participation 
conceived by Pateman (1970). In other words, this level would facilitate greater 
participation of employees in decision-making, rather than being merely recipients of 
decisions-made such as at levels one, two and three. However, a further distinction is 
made at this level and relates to ownership.  
 
At level five there are various enterprise models that bestow some level of ownership to 
employees. The logic being that ownership offers the opportunity of greater control over 
decision-making. Notably at the fifth level are employee-owned organisations which are 
differentiated from employee-share ownership plans, which appear at level four, and 
employee share ownership/profit sharing, which appear at level one. These are important 
differences regarding the type of ownership as they imply differences to employee voice.  
 
Taking employee share ownership/profit sharing first, whilst conferring rights similar to 
those of external shareholders in a conventional business such as a financial stake in the 
company and possibly some access to financial information, rights are not conferred to 
employees in terms of company decision-making. An example is useful to highlight this 
point. The UK supermarket chain Sainsbury’s operates an employee share-ownership 
scheme [www.j-sainsbury.co.uk/responsibility/our-values/a-great-place-to-work/]. Here, 
employees have the opportunity to purchase shares giving them access to some financial 
information. They do not however, have access to other aspects of company decision-
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making and therefore are placed at the lowest end of the escalator. This is in contrast to 
employee-share ownership plans. 
 
In a company using an employee share-ownership plan, employees may have the 
opportunity to be involved in a company’s strategic decision-making in addition to a 
financial stake through their status as both employee and owner. Markey et al (2010) 
distinguished between participation as an employee and participation as an owner. 
Regarding the former, mechanisms appear at levels one to four. In contrast, participation 
as an owner appears at levels four and five. Participation as an owner is achieved through 
organisational models that, through their governance structure, ‘embed’ employee voice, 
it becomes part of the fabric through the ‘organisational infrastructure’ (Dundon et al 
2017). Importantly, the degree of employee voice in an employee share-ownership plan is 
dependent on how the organisation has been constituted. Thus, Marchington et al (1992) 
add the caveat that employee share-ownership plans are at this level ‘in theory at least’. 
Furthermore, employee share-ownership plans are typically indirect forms of employee-
ownership via governance processes such as employee representatives. An example is the 
UK retailer the John Lewis Partnership.  
 
Employee share-ownership plans have attracted a cautionary note from Bernstein (1976). 
He suggested that the strength of participation, employee voice in this case, can be 
weakened where management reserve commercial confidentiality rights and where they 
are reluctant to forego their prerogative, particularly where a scheme has been forced on 
them. A further issue is management’s greater expertise despite an increase in 
information provided to representatives given the division of labour and time. Given these 
challenges, employee share-ownership plans appear at level four not quite attaining the 
highest accolade of level five. There are, however, models of employee-ownership that 
confer direct ownership.  
 
The third type of ownership includes worker co-operatives, where, as the name implies, 
employees directly own and run the company and are involved at every level of 
operational and strategic decision-making. An example in the UK is Suma, a wholesaler 
and distributor of wholefoods. Given the greater level of ownership, such organisations 
appear at level five. However, so too does the John Lewis Partnership which is 
specifically referred to by Marchington et al (1992) as an example of employee-
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ownership at the highest level. There is no explanation given by the authors regarding 
why the John Lewis Partnership is placed at the highest level which highlights a grey area 
of this form of ownership. Furthermore, considering the escalator as a whole, there is an 
inference of a qualitative difference between the levels ranging from relatively low-level 
information-giving through to more sophisticated mechanisms of employees-as-owners.  
 
Though Marchington and Wilkinson (2005) suggest the escalator offers the opportunity to 
describe the type of schemes being used, Wilkinson et al (2010) suggest the escalator 
‘…implies a progression upwards rather than simply a move from zero participation to 
workers control’ (p.11). This idea of a progression from low mechanisms to higher 
impact mechanisms has been developed recently through the work of various 
Employment Relations scholars.  
 
A growing area of contemporary Employment Relations research is on what are referred 
to as non-union employee representation (NER) schemes (e.g. Dobbins and Dundon 
2014). These are defined as: ‘…employee-sponsored bodies of formally organised 
employee voice’ (Donaghey et al 2011b p.164). Through their work on NER schemes, 
Gollan et al (2015) developed the escalator metaphor (Marchington et al 1992) and 
conceived an ‘escalator of voice’. They use this to propose the idea of voice strength. 
They suggest that voice options vary in impact along a continuum from low to high; 
illustrated in the voice continuum in figure 2.2 below. 
 
 
No Voice                   High 
Voice 
     Influence/Power 
Figure 2.2 Employee voice continuum 
 
 
At the highest level, voice is collective, independent, formal and has influence and is 
therefore likened to the strong voice yielded through trade unions. In contrast, NER voice 
forms fall into the central domain of the two extremes as, though they are indirect and 
typically involve groups of workers organised to represent other workers, they do not 
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make it to the highest level, i.e. ranking lower than trade unions, as they are not 
independent of management and convey lower levels of power and influence, i.e. a 
weaker form of employee voice. Employee-ownership provides an example of employee 
voice through NER though also highlights an anomaly between the escalator and the 
continuum.  
 
As noted earlier, employee-ownership, was conceived by Marchington et al (1992) at the 
highest level of the escalator. However, such schemes are typically employer-initiated 
thus fitting the definition of an NER. Therefore, in contrast to the high positioning of 
employee-ownership on the escalator, they would fall within the middle domain of the 
continuum. In so doing, this raises an important point about the voice preferences of 
employers.  
 
Gollan and Xu (2015) suggest that whilst some forms of participation are purposely 
designed to provide employees with a voice they are designed in such a way as to only 
provide a very modest role in decision-making, i.e. weak voice mechanisms. Similarly, 
Gollan et al (2015) query whether such schemes represent a functioning reality or a 
‘rhetorical façade’ (p.2), the latter akin to Johnstone’s (2014) analysis of labour-
management partnerships as a ‘veneer of co-operation’ or Dobbins and Dundon’s (2017) 
analysis also of labour-management partnerships as a ‘chimera’. Furthermore, there is 
growing evidence that in the contemporary workplace, management preference is for 
mechanisms that are considered ‘low-level’ and which reflect their own agenda 
(Wilkinson and Fay 2011).  
 
Within the context of a management agenda, employee voice mechanisms are often 
limited to opening up lines of communication (Barry and Wilkinson 2015) and are 
considered as ‘weak voice systems’ (Dobbins and Dundon 2011 p.183; see also Johnstone 
and Ackers 2015). In other words, employee voice is constrained by weak mechanisms 
and confined to particular subjects. Additionally, mechanisms are introduced in an ad hoc 
manner (Dundon et al 2017; Wilkinson and Fay 2011), more as a ‘flavour of the month’ 
(Legge 2005) rather than as part of a coherent strategy. As such, employee voice can be 
fragile in its structure and its efficacy and is regarded by employees as having been bolted 
on, or lacking coherence or integration, to other policies and practices (Wilkinson and 
Fay 2011). With an emphasis on greater profit, productivity and performance, it is HRM 
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scholars who have influenced the contemporary conception of employee voice which is as 
something that reflects the efficiency concerns of employers (Budd 2004; Heery 2016). 
Employee voice is important inasmuch as it contributes to efficiency concerns and is 
evidenced through phrases such as employees ‘going the extra mile’ (Legge 2005; Piasna 
et al 2013). There are however several consequences for employee voice within this new 
landscape.  
 
One consequence is that without trade unions providing a social insurance, the onus has 
shifted to employees to navigate their way through the employment relations landscape of 
the modern day workplace. A second is a heightened focus on the relationships between 
employers and employees. Without the intermediary role of trade unions, managers 
became pivotal in the new employer-employee relationship (Gollan et al 2015). It is 
managers who set the terms and conditions of employee voice in the contemporary 
workplace. Importantly, the views of employees are rarely sought regarding their 
preferences for voice mechanisms (Marchington 2007). This is a concern to those 
academics who regard employee voice as the ability of an employee to express their voice 
regardless of the subject: 
 
‘…for voice to have legitimacy… it needs to be about more than the managerial 
concept of efficiency and adding value to business’ (Wilkinson and Fay 2011 
p.71).  
 
Employee voice that goes beyond the limits set by management is referred to by Budd 
(2004) as ‘meaningful voice’. By this he means having some input into decision-making, 
through being able to speak freely and by having the opportunity to challenge without any 
reprisal. In other words, employees are able to be involved in decisions that are made, 
they are able to express their views over whatever subjects they choose and they can do 
so without fear of recrimination. However, contemporary debates by Employment 
Relations scholars concerning employee voice suggest the idea of employees having a 
meaningful voice are not on the horizon. When efficiency is the overriding goal, there are 
consequences for employees; voice can be silenced (Donaghey et al 2011a) or ‘unheard’ 
(Gunawardana 2014).  
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2.6 Contemporary debates: silent and unheard voices 
Building on a substantive body of literature and evidence, there have been several 
contributions by Employment Relations scholars to contemporary debates regarding 
employee voice, notably with regards to employee silence and unheard voice. For 
example, some of the literature regarding employee silence has been developed by the 
discipline of Organisational Behaviour (e.g. Morrison and Milliken 2000).  
 
As it is understood by this discipline, employee silence is due to employee motivation; an 
employee consciously chooses to withhold information about possible problems or issues 
and therefore remains silent. However, this understanding has been challenged by 
Employment Relations scholars. For example, Donaghey et al (2011a) argue that silence 
is more likely to be the outcome of managerial, not employee, motivation. The motivation 
of managers is to silence employees which they do through practices such as agenda-
setting i.e. ensuring issues of concern to them are included on the agenda whilst omitting 
those of concern to employees. A further development of this theme relates to ‘unheard’ 
voices, an example of which is provided through the work of Gunawardana (2014).  
 
Through a case study of an apparel factory in an export processing zone in Sri Lanka, 
where voice mechanisms are notoriously absent, Gunawardana (ibid) found an array of 
voice mechanisms that were initiated by management. The purpose of the mechanisms 
was as a means of trade union avoidance and dissuading conflict. In so doing, according 
to management, lost productivity, absenteeism and turnover would be minimised. Despite 
the abundance of mechanisms, which included a workers’ council and management 
encouraging upward communication, the study concluded that employee voice often went 
unheard. Part of the reason for this is attributed to cultural norms requiring respect for 
elders and those in senior positions. However, a point noted by Gunawardana (ibid) 
though not followed through, relates to the format of workers’ council meetings.  
 
The workers’ council meetings were operated for management to communicate to 
workers whilst workers had the opportunity to raise concerns at the end of the meeting. In 
other words, workers were only able to speak when the meeting was coming to a close 
and those attending would more than likely have been wanting to leave to attend to other 
matters. This bears similarities to the notion of ‘designing out’ some voices through 
processes such as agenda-setting described by Donaghey et al (2011a).  
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Agenda-setting involves managers purposely including on the agenda items they wish to 
discuss whilst ensuring they exclude items which they know employees wish to discuss. 
In other words whether it is the agenda or the format, it is managers who are controlling 
the meeting. The concept of unheard voice has more recently been developed by 
Wilkinson et al (2018) who conceive five types of unheard voice: 
 
 
1. Organisations without any formal voice mechanisms because they are so small or 
the organisation is relying on precarious workers and therefore offer no 
mechanisms. 
 
2. Organisations where voice mechanisms exist but no-one is listening which could 
be because the active voice of employees takes place against a background of 
institutional noise making it likely that voice is not heard albeit not purposely. 
 
3. Organisations where there are mechanisms and employees use them and 
grievances are heard by management but are ignored. 
 
4. Organisations where voice structures are in place but a climate of perpetual 
silence has been created through ‘agenda-setting and institutional structures’ 
(Donaghey et al 2011a) and employees do not speak up as they know ‘the rules of 
the game’ (Kalfa et al 2017; cited in Wilkinson et al 2018). 
 
5. Organisations where employees may have differential access to voice and 
different propensities to use it based on factors such as gender or race (Syed 
2014). 
 
Though there are variations, the five types of voice reflect a commonality in the way they 
view voice; of having limited value. This manifests either by having no mechanism at all 
(1), or not listening to voice (2 and 3), or a more conspiratorial approach that ensures 
voice is closed down (4) or by not acknowledging that a diverse workforce may utilise 
voice in a different way than has been the norm (5). Regardless, it means employee voice 
is unheard which could have consequences for the organisation, such as missing 
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opportunities to tap into employees’ ideas and other important contributions they are able 
to make (Dundon et al 2017). More importantly, voice is not valued. It is not regarded as 
important in its own right (Budd and Zagelmayer 2010). In contrast, by following the 
logic of the escalator and the continuum, a stronger voice is yielded through employee-
ownership.  
 
The logic of the escalator and continuum imply the potential for employees to be heard 
through employee-ownership. However, this highlights an omission in the academic 
literature regarding different organisational forms through which to study employee 
voice. Much mainstream contemporary HRM literature is focused on employee voice in 
large-scale corporations to the exclusion of alternative voices (Delbridge and Keenoy 
2010; see also Atzeni 2012; Johnstone and Ackers 2015; Markey et al 2010; Strauss 
2006; Wilkinson et al 2010). A similar point was noted by Kaufman (2007), ‘A 
considerable portion of recent academic research on HRM has been focused on the top 
tier of companies in a small number of countries, leading to an unbalanced and overly 
ethnocentric and normative (prescriptive) account’ (p.42). This point is reflected in a 
report by The Ownership Commission (2012): 
 
‘The dominant corporate ownership type in the UK is the PLC…In policy terms 
the PLC has crowded out other forms of ownership... This is reflected in media 
commentary, public discourse and crucially through government policy. 
Discussions of corporate governance, company legislation and business regulation 
revolve around the behaviours of the largest listed companies… [And] reflects 
that other corporate forms are less well understood and in many cases disregarded’ 
(p.43) 
 
As such, much of the contemporary literature is limited in its conception of employee 
voice through an economic lens. Following Budd and Zagelmayer (2010) employee voice 
is not a private matter only for those employers who believe that it is in their interests to 
provide voice vehicles whilst other employers decide against it. Further, employee voice 
is too important to simply be seen as a vehicle to assist management on management 
terms (Barry and Wilkinson 2015). To address this limitation in the literature, it is then 
timely to explore employee voice in a different way, through employee-ownership. 
 
Importantly, opportunities for voice differ in employee-owned enterprise through voice 
being a ‘right’ which is embedded in the organisation’s fabric and through the 
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sophisticated governance processes when compared to voice in conventional businesses. 
As Budd (2014) suggests:  
 
‘…the voice literature would benefit from a deeper understanding of the 
relationships between corporate governance and ownership, corporate decision-
making, and employee voice structures’ (p.483). 
 
As such, employee-ownership offers fertile ground as an alternative way to study 
employee voice. To this end, the final section of this chapter considers the literature on 
employee- ownership in order to understand how and why employee voice might be 
different. 
  
2.7 Employee voice through employee-ownership 
The term employee-ownership covers a range of organisational forms including mutuals, 
worker co-operatives and employee share-ownership plans (ESOPs). As noted in the 
earlier discussion (The varieties of employee voice), each of these different types of 
enterprise yield different levels of employee voice. For example, ESOPs provide more 
opportunities for employee voice than simply financial participation but still less than 
worker co-operatives. During the course of this discussion, the term employee-ownership 
is used generically whilst the specific form, ESOPs, is also referred to as it is this form 
which was adopted by the studied case of this thesis. To begin the discussion, a summary 
of the development of employer-ownership in the UK is described below. 
 
2.7.1 Development of employee-ownership 
Historically, there are two prominent forms of employee-ownership in the UK. The first 
and most common of these were worker co-operatives (Pendleton and Robinson 2015). 
Emerging from early 19th century Christian Socialism, having links with the labour 
movement and espoused by social reformers such as Robert Owen, worker co-operatives 
(formerly producer co-operatives) were considered the antithesis of the competitive 
individualism of capitalism (Mellor et al 1988). In contrast to conventional businesses, a 
key characteristic of worker co-operatives is that they are established to serve members 
not shareholders (Co-operatives UK 2014). Further, and as with their counterparts in 
other sectors (e.g. consumer co-operatives), many worker co-operatives adhere to 
‘principles’ originally devised by the Rochdale Pioneers in the mid 19th century (Whyman 
2012).  
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Of these principles, the second enshrines member democratic control achieved through 
the process of decision-making endorsed by the one member one vote philosophy 
(Birchall 1997; Cornforth 1988; Mellor et al 1988; Ridley-Duff and Panton 2013). Profit 
distribution, ownership and decision-making mean worker co-operatives are regarded as 
advanced and distinctive forms of employee participation (Erdal 2011; Markey et al 
2010). They provide a platform for engagement through democratic structures (Wilson 
and Hoyt 2010) and see business growth through the transformative experience of 
workers having a voice (Cornwell 2012). As such, worker co-operatives are regarded by 
some as the purest form of employee-ownership (e.g. Brione and Nicholson 2012). 
However, a second form of employee-ownership was established in 1929, the John Lewis 
Partnership. 
 
The John Lewis Partnership bears some similarities to the worker co-operative model.  
Whereas the concern during this period for industrialists such as Cadbury was with the 
physical and social well-being of employees, John Spedan Lewis (1885-1963), the 
founder of John Lewis Partnership, wanted to share power and relinquish control enabling 
the potential for organisational democracy and mutual gain (Cathcart 2014). Underlying 
his philosophy, was the idea that ‘…a business should be a co-operative enterprise in 
which all workers share all the rewards as fairly as possible and have the satisfaction of 
being well-informed about the affairs of the organisation, and of being able to influence 
its conduct’ (Flanders et al 1968 p.31). His motivation was therefore a distaste for the 
extraction of profits by capitalists and a desire to re-distribute profits to all workers; thus 
bearing similarities to worker co-operatives. However, the form of ownership in the John 
Lewis Partnership is quite a different form of employee-ownership to that of a worker co-
operative.  
 
This difference lies in the form of ownership – whether it is direct or indirect (Pendleton 
and Robinson 2015). Ownership by employees in worker co-operatives is regarded as 
direct as it is more likely they will have invested financially into the business and have 
greater control of the decision-making processes of the company. By contrast, indirect 
ownership, which applies to employees (“partners”) in the John Lewis Partnership, means 
employees do not own the company. This in turn affects their influence of decision-
making processes. These differences help to explain why employee-ownership via worker 
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co-operatives is conceived at the higher end of the escalator (Marchington et al 1992) 
whilst ESOPs are conceived at the middle of the voice continuum (Gollan et al 2015). 
Nevertheless, though worker co-operatives remained a prevalent form of employee-
ownership during much of the 19th and 20th centuries, it is the ESOP form that captured 
interest from the latter part of the 20th century. 
 
2.7.2 Employee-ownership through employee-share-ownership plans 
Since the late 1980s, a plethora of new ownership forms and structures developed 
(Pendleton and Robinson 2015), including the contemporary ESOP. One explanation for 
the popularity of the new forms is the presence of a conducive political environment: one 
of the strongest influences on levels of employee-ownership activity (ibid). Another 
explanation is that they do not have the ‘ideological baggage’ associated with worker co-
operatives which are often seen as a ‘deviant’ form of ownership and organisation 
(Pendleton 2001) and as such are simply more palatable (Oakeshott 1990). Whilst John 
Lewis Partnership is regarded as a direct antecedent of such modern day ESOPs, a key 
influence on these new forms of ownership were the ideas of an American investment 
expert, Louis Kelso in the 1950s (Pendleton 2001).  
 
Kelso’s thinking was that wider ownership in an enterprise would provide a way of 
addressing the divisions of capitalism. If workers were given a greater share of profit they 
would be less likely to join a trade union or to seek wage increases, and as a result, 
capitalism would be strengthened. As such, the core mechanisms of ESOPs were 
developed and appealed to a number of Conservative politicians. Ronald Reagan 
commented:  
 
‘Could there be any better answer to the stupidity of Karl Marx than millions of 
workers sharing in the ownership of the means of production?’ (Pendleton 2001 
p.5).  
 
Using Kelso’s ESOP as the prototype, the ESOP form used in the UK was developed by a 
small group of professionals. Their interest in the US model stemmed partly from what 
they regarded as failures of worker co-operatives. This group was a key influence on 
growing interest in ESOPs during the 1980s; one of its aims was to influence the policy-
making process. The subsequent lobby group, that included representation from the John 
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Lewis Partnership, was able to make substantial progress in terms of legislative and 
policy changes. Two types of ESOP emerged.  
 
The first is a Case Law ESOP. It was so named because corporation tax relief on 
contributions from the company to an Employee Benefits Trust (EBT) was established via 
case law and general taxation principles rather than by statute. The EBT is the main 
component of this type of ESOP where shares from the trust to employees can be issued 
through a variety of routes. Furthermore, it uses its EBT to borrow funds to finance equity 
acquisition. The main duty of the EBT trustees is to act in the best interests of the owners, 
i.e. the employees. The second type is a Statutory ESOP.  
 
Statutory ESOPs were introduced in the 1989 budget under the Conservative government 
and aimed to reduce some of the complexity of the Case Law ESOP. The new legislation 
provided a legal status for ESOPs, a statutory set of principles for taxation and was 
stricter on the composition of trustees, e.g. a majority of trustees had to be selected by the 
majority of the workforce. Subsequently, the 1994 Finance Act removed the requirement 
that the majority of trustees had to be from, and elected by, employees. The first 
companies adopting the new ESOP structures arose through the buy-outs of bus 
companies during the 1980s.  
 
The context of these new ESOP companies was a political and public policy environment 
espousing share ownership and ‘popular capitalism’ which encouraged the growth of 
ESOPs. In other words, an emphasis on entrepreneurialism and ownership meant the 
environment for this particular form of employee-ownership was fertile. Reasons for 
companies adopting the schemes were to promote employee involvement, assist with the 
recruitment and retention of staff, increased remuneration, improving productivity and 
preventing take-overs. Pendleton (2001) states,  
 
‘The key point about employee involvement in this context is that it is not driven 
by the idealistic notion of self-expression and personal development often found 
in co-operatives. Instead, it is about encouraging employees to feel involved in a 
predetermined corporate entity’ (p.33).  
 
As such, he argues, they were a form of remuneration rather than a mechanism for 
bestowing control rights, the latter being either weak or non-existent.  
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2.7.3 Contemporary employee-ownership 
Today, employee-ownership is a form of business ownership in the UK attracting interest 
from academics, politicians, policy-makers and practitioners as well as from the business 
community (Brown et al 2019; Pendleton and Robinson 2015). Current figures of firms 
with significant employee-ownership (those where 25% or more of the ownership of the 
company is broadly held by all or most of the employees, or on their behalf by a trust) in 
the UK is 250-300 (ibid). This interest in employee-ownership, and specifically ESOPs, is 
attributed to a number of factors, including the challenging economic environment 
brought about by the 2008 global financial crisis (Findlay et al 2017; Heery 2016; see 
also Boxall and Purcell 2011). The rationale being that employee-ownership provides an 
alternative way of organising a business compared to that of conventional businesses. 
This last point is raised by Brown et al (2019) in their study of employee-ownership as a 
potentially more resilient business model when facing events such as the global financial 
crisis and cite various studies that argue employee-ownership can withstand such forces, 
especially regarding factors such as employee participation. 
  
Similarly, it is argued employee-ownership can reduce inequality by passing greater 
control to employees (Wilkinson and Pickett 2010); can lead to better health and well-
being (McQuaid et al 2012); can help to create employment, contribute to the security of 
employment, contribute to a more participative and dignified working life, improve 
employee compensation, develop leaders and teach skills of participation and self-
governance (Logue and Yates 2006); and, can improve company performance and 
productivity, reduce absenteeism, foster greater innovation and provide a longer-term 
view of business decision-making (Brione and Nicholson 2012). With specific reference 
to the John Lewis Partnership, it has been argued, employee-ownership provides a model 
for reconstructing employment relations (Findlay et al 2017; Heery 2016; see also Boxall 
and Purcell 2011). By contrast, within the context of events such as the global financial 
crisis, Brown et al (2019) argue factors such as employee voice may be side-lined. 
 
In so doing, they argue, opportunities for what Dobbins and Dundon (2017) refer to as 
‘collaborative mutuality’, will be countered. More simplistically, Oakeshott (1990) 
suggested that for some, employee-ownership using the ESOP form were more palatable. 
One reason he gives for such palatability is that ESOPs enable employee-ownership to be 
36 
 
combined with conventional forms of company management (ibid; Pendleton and 
Robinson 2015). In other words the hierarchical management structure typical in 
conventional business could be melded with the new arrangement. It is through the 
characteristics of the new arrangement, specifically the governance structure of 
employee-ownership, that employee voice would be enabled.   
 
2.8 Characteristics of employee-ownership 
Three characteristics of the governance structure of employee-owned enterprises vis-à-vis 
employee voice are notable: the right to a voice, the embeddedness of voice and 
sophisticated voice processes. Combined, these factors suggest employee-ownership will 
provide the mechanism for all voices to be heard; voice becomes part of the 
organisational fabric yielded through the mechanism of employee-ownership thus 
differentiating it from conventional businesses. In order to explore this idea, the following 
section discusses these characteristics. 
 
2.8.1 The right to a voice 
It is through the right to a voice that employee voice is first realised through employee-
ownership. This is referred to by Pendleton (2001) as the ‘constitutional establishment of 
rights’ (p.110); voice in an employee-owned enterprise is institutionalised (Kandathil and 
Varman 2007). In other words, rights are established that are enshrined in the 
organisation’s governing document and are enacted through various processes. As a 
result, employees are able to use their right to a voice to influence decisions. Pendleton 
(2001) suggests that whilst employee-based participation is relatively common, in 
contrast, employee-ownership-based participation in governance decisions is novel given 
it is based on rights that are typically attached to capital. In this context, employee-
ownership is the antithesis of shareholder-value. 
 
It is through ownership rights bestowed to employees that a form of employee voice 
which is fundamentally different to that in conventional businesses is provided. Typically, 
in the latter, voice is given or taken away at the behest of managers. In contrast, through 
employee-ownership, employees are at one and the same time owners and employees of 
an organisation (Gospel and Pendleton 2010; Markey et al 2010). As employee-owner, 
they have the right to participate in the management of the company (Kaarsemaker et al 
2010). This means greater potential for employees to have control and influence over 
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organisational decision-making (Marchington et al 1992) which provides the potential of 
greater ‘depth’ of voice vis-à-vis influencing decisions (Wilkinson and Fay 2011). This 
reflects a recent debate regarding the complementarity of different employment practices. 
For example, Blasi et al (2016) support the argument that group incentive practices, such 
as employee-ownership, work well with the complementary practice of involving 
employees in decision-making. Further, such complementarity of practices, Pohler and 
Luchak (2014a) argue, can have a positive impact on employee voice. 
 
2.8.2 Embedding employee voice 
The right to a voice facilitates the second characteristic of employee-ownership, the 
embeddedness of the governance processes. This is typically through the organisation’s 
governing document, referred to as the Articles of Association, a legal document which 
sets out the main parameters of the form of employee-ownership and the responsibilities 
of its key personnel. This document provides some sense of permanence brought about by 
the model and it is considered more robust compared to conventional voice mechanisms 
which are more easily discarded depending on a manager’s preferences and priorities. In 
other words, employee-ownership potentially has more permanence compared to the 
mechanisms often implemented by management in conventional businesses (Wilkinson 
and Fay 2011).  
 
Employee voice in this context is regarded as part of what Dundon et al (2017) refer to as 
the ‘organisational infrastructure’. Again, this strengthens the potential for employees to 
influence decision-making (Marchington et al 1992; Wilkinson and Fay 2011) and means 
it has the potential of providing a fundamentally different form of employee voice 
compared to conventional business.  
 
2.8.3 Sophisticated employee voice processes 
The right to a voice and the embeddedness of voice through those rights within the 
governance structure of employee-ownership lead to the third feature of the model: the 
governance processes. The key employee-ownership governance processes as they relate 
to employee voice are, firstly, employees being able to attend and express their voice at 
Annual General Meetings and secondly, employee representatives on boards of 
management. An eloquent description of the highly intricate processes that give access to 
voice within the John Lewis Partnership is conveyed by Flanders et al (1968).  
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Given that the concern of the founder, John Spedan Lewis, was to ensure a counter-
balance to the privileges of management, the John Lewis Partnership had, and continues 
to have, an array of governance processes that encourage all forms of voice at all 
organisational levels (Salaman and Storey 2016). This includes those noted above, 
Annual General Meetings and employee representatives, as well as additional processes. 
These processes enable structural relationships within the organisation. In other words, 
conversations throughout the whole organisation rather than segmented organisationally, 
departmentally or hierarchically. As part of his review of Varano’s ethnography of the 
Weirton steel mill, which also had an employee share-ownership plan, Ackers (2001) was 
similarly impressed by the sophistication of the processes.  
 
In this instance, the processes included majority employee-ownership, worker directors 
and a trade union. Additionally, there was an ‘employee participation group’ and a posit-
employee share-ownership plan communication system. All of which support the 
discussion above regarding the complementarity of practices (i.e. Blasi et al 2016; Pohler 
and Luchak 2014a). Further, in a study of ten employee-owned enterprises, Brown et al 
(2019) highlighted the use of processes such as ‘open forums’ through which employee-
owners were able to explore operational issues as well as enabling them to share 
innovations leading to changes within the organisations. The authors argue these factors 
contributed to employee voice being heard and assisted with factors such as employee 
retention. However, this study also highlighted a particular difference between 
management and employees.  
 
Financial participation was viewed by managers as the key motivational driver and the 
basis of a strong perceived work ethos within employees. However, ‘For employees, on 
the other hand, financial incentives were less immediately important, whereas feelings of 
responsibility and commitment to the organisation increased in importance’ (ibid p. 80). 
This suggests a more complex picture regarding motivation within an employee-owned 
enterprise. There are also other challenges of employee-ownership raised by the literature 
which are explored in more detail below relating to employee compliance, organisational 
hierarchy and management resistance. 
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2.8.4 Employee compliance 
The first issue highlighted by the literature on employee-ownership points to a worrying 
observation. This observation suggests that employee-ownership can be used as a means 
of compliance by encouraging employees to ‘go the extra mile’ (Cathcart 2009; 2014). 
For example, Le Grand (2003) has argued that employee-ownership in the form of 
mutuals can act as an incentive for employees and Kurtulus and Kruse (2017; cited in 
Brown et al 2019) claim that employee-ownership can stimulate employees to work 
harder and more effectively thus creating a more harmonious workplaces through 
aligning incentives. In contrast, in her study of the John Lewis Partnership, Cathcart 
(2009; 2014) notes how partners, i.e. employee-owners, were implored by management to 
put the business first, set aside their personal preferences and ‘give that little bit extra’ in 
recognition of their status as owners. In so doing, the line between employee-as-employee 
and employee-as-owner becomes blurred. This dual role of employees in an ESOP; as 
owner and an employee is something investigated by others.  
 
A more complex picture is presented by Pendleton (2001). He suggests this new role as 
owner can bring about a precariousness through employees acquiring new interests and a 
new set of relationships with the firm and with management which derives from their 
ownership of all or part of the firm. However, in turn, these interests may differ from 
those they have as employees. Further, he suggests that the various forms of voice, i.e. as 
owner or as employee, may have different dynamics and express different sorts of 
objectives for each of the groups of actors in the firm and as such, it may be possible to 
identify conflicts in these various voice forms.  
 
2.8.5 Organisational hierarchy 
A second issue relates to organisational hierarchy. As noted above, Oakeshott (1990) 
regarded the ability to incorporate a conventional hierarchical management structure as a 
positive aspect of an employee share-ownership plan. Hierarchical structures are the 
traditional way of organising work in the UK and considered by some to be the most 
efficient. For example, Flanders et al (1968) argued:  
 
‘A business on any scale requires a hierarchical structure of power and authority 
with superiors and subordinates, in which some give orders and others have to 
carry them out. Moreover it cannot function without some kind of law in the form 
of rules or regulations to govern the behaviour of its members’ (p.27).  
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They go on to suggest that every business embodies a system of controlling and influence 
vis-à-vis employees and that with increasing scale, so a more elaborate management 
system develops. Similarly, Williamson (1975; cited in Pendleton 2001) suggested a 
managerial hierarchy was necessary in an enterprise where there are complex production 
processes and in order to co-ordinate and control the various labour inputs and the large 
volume of information to be processed. However, this way of organising work has been 
challenged. 
  
Organising work hierarchically, Atzeni (2012) argues, is so deeply embedded in the UK 
that alternatives are not considered. He notes that the nature of work within a capitalist 
system is regarded by many social scientists as something workers need to be encouraged 
to do, ‘work is generally seen as a negative, alienating and unchangeable condition of 
life’ (p.4). As an example he refers to labour economics that has described work over the 
last thirty years as something that ‘has to be done’. Monetary rewards are emphasised as a 
way of encouraging workers to work; employees need to be incentivised. Similarly he 
suggests, workers needing motivation to work is something that underpins the HRM 
narrative. A different view suggests a rigidity of hierarchical systems which can stifle and 
suppress individual needs for self-esteem, self-confidence and growth (Pateman 1970).  
 
An argument for flatter, non-hierarchical organisations is put forward by Rothschild 
(2000). She argued that they have the potential for balancing market concerns with issues 
of ownership and control. Such a scenario bridges the gap between those who manage 
and those who are managed:  
 
‘In the fully collectivist organisation, relations between members are valued in 
and of themselves, and all are on an equal footing’ (p.196).  
 
In other words, they are not only founded and valued on an economic level, but also on a 
social level. She goes on to argue:  
 
‘Most basically, democratized organisations reject justifications for top-down 
control: when authority is delegated, it is delegated for a specific term and it is 
subject to recall by the collectivity’ (p.200).  
 
41 
 
A further argument is put forward by Pencavel (2001) who questioned the claim that 
hierarchically managed firms outperform other types of enterprise. In so doing, he 
suggests, outputs and consumption are privileged over employee voice.  
 
2.8.6 Management resistance 
The third issue relates to the role of managers in relation to employee-ownership and their 
resistance to the notion of employees as owners. Suggestive of, though not framed as, 
‘resistance’, Brown et al (2019) noted in their study of employee-ownership the continued 
role of managers as the final decision-makers. Again this reflects a form of employee-
ownership at the middle range of the voice continuum (Gollan et al 2015) as it portrays a 
more consultative process than one that requires all employee-owners to be fully 
involved. This resistance to employee-owners participating fully in decision-making 
processes seems, at least in part, to be attributable to the relationship between capital and 
labour and the role of managers within that relationship.  
 
In a conventional enterprise, the role of managers is to act as agents of (external) 
shareholders (Paranaque and Willmott 2014). By contrast, the relationship in an 
employee-owned enterprise is more complex given labour and capital are neither 
exclusively separate nor joined. Pencavel (2001) states that in some ESOPs only a small 
proportion of assets are owned by employee-owners and therefore it is not surprising that 
they have little influence in determining policy by a board of directors. A second factor is 
that employee-owners will typically not have invested their own capital into the 
enterprise, i.e. the indirect form of ownership discussed earlier in this section. Combined, 
these two factors complicate the labour-capital relationship. However, management 
resistance can also be attributed to other factors. 
 
Management resistance to employee-ownership can stem from an unwillingness to 
empower employees and stem from a belief that it can over-complicate decision-making 
processes (McCarthy and Palcic 2012). This resistance could be an inherent problem with 
ESOPs. Pendleton (2001) observed from his research that whereas employees are 
accountable to managers in the employment relationship, by contrast, managers are 
accountable to employees-as-owners in the employee-ownership relationship. His case 
studies of ESOPs revealed the overriding goal of management was to retain 
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‘conventional’ structures of management and, avoid what they saw as the ‘threats’ to 
efficiency alongside a belief that employees could not act as ‘responsible’ entrepreneurs.  
 
‘The danger of employee-ownership, as expressed by managers in interviews, was 
that employees would exploit their ownership rights to claim a much greater say 
and involvement in routine management activity, especially on issues that directly 
affect them such as staff and labour deployment’ (Pendleton 2001 p.144).  
 
Despite the concerns of managers, what happened was the opposite. Managerial concerns 
influenced the role and function of employee directors in these cases and thus emphasised 
their role as communicators and supporters of board decisions to the rest of the 
workforce. Pendleton (ibid) comments, ‘to all intents and purposes, most [employee 
share-ownership plans] are ‘conventionally’ organised and managed firms’ (p.183).  
 
Combined, these three issues - compliance, hierarchy and resistance - present potential 
challenges to employee voice in an employee-owned enterprise and will have a bearing 
on how voice is conceived, enabled, implemented and experienced. Indeed, whilst the 
positive characteristics of employee-ownership suggest the potential of employee voice 
being heard given it is part of the fabric of employee-ownership, the three challenges 
discussed above have the potential to weaken employee voice, suggesting it could be no 
more than a fabrication. Combining all of the factors suggests that employee-ownership 
via an ESOP provides a fruitful site for further study of employee voice. 
 
2.9 Summary 
This chapter has reviewed the literature on employee voice and was organised around six 
themes. The first explored the meaning of employee voice. This revealed interest from 
two primary bodies of literature; Employment Relations and HRM both of which have 
quite different conceptualisations of employee voice. To investigate these differences, the 
second theme investigated employee voice through the Employment Relations literature 
and the traditional mechanism of trade unions whilst the third investigated the HRM 
literature to review employee voice from this perspective. This revealed that much of our 
contemporary understanding of employee voice is by HRM scholars. HRM scholars tend 
to draw empirical evidence from conventional businesses where ‘efficiency’ is a key 
objective of employee voice mechanisms. This was reflected in ‘management choice’ 
which, despite an array of mechanisms, tended toward those considered to be at a ‘low-
level’. To highlight this point, the fourth theme discussed some of the varieties of 
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employee voice mechanisms and the nature of voice each yields. Against this backdrop, 
the fifth theme presented a recent debate in the Employment Relations literature which 
argued that voice which does not correspond to the efficiency objective can go ‘unheard’. 
This debate helped to highlight a limitation in the extant literature, much less is known 
about alternative voice mechanisms through which voice may be heard.  
 
To address this limitation, the remaining two themes reviewed the literature on employee-
ownership.  The first of these reviewed the development of employee-ownership in the 
UK whilst the second discussed factors which differentiate employee-owned businesses 
from conventional businesses in relation to employee voice. Differentiating factors were 
the ‘right’ to a voice through its ‘embeddedness’ in the governance structure and 
expressed through ‘sophisticated’ processes which suggested it was part of the 
organisational fabric. However, a number of factors were revealed which could present a 
challenge to employee voice: ‘employee compliance’, ‘organisational hierarchy’ and 
‘management resistance’ which suggested that it may be little more than a fabrication. 
These factors suggest employee-ownership will provide a particularly interesting site to 
explore whether, in such enterprises, employee voice is different compared to that of 
conventional businesses. In order to explore these factors in greater depth, the thesis uses 
the theoretical lens of the ‘frames of reference’ (Fox 1966; 1974) which is discussed in 
the next chapter. 
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Chapter Three: Theoretical Framework 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the theoretical framework. Following chapter two, which 
highlighted various factors which can differentiate and can also challenge employee voice 
in an employee-owned enterprise, the theoretical framework will help to evaluate these 
factors and thus, help to evaluate whether employee voice in an employee-owned 
enterprise is different to conventional businesses. The theoretical framework is the frames 
of reference. The chapter is organised around two themes.  
 
The first theme discusses the main characteristics of the frames of reference in their 
original form as developed by Fox (1966; 1974). These were pluralist, unitarist and 
radical and were developed to provide an understanding of different management 
approaches to the relationship between employees and employers. It also draws on the 
Employment Relations and HRM literature to highlight differences between the frames. 
The second theme discusses two developments to the frames; firstly a reconfiguration of 
the unitarist frame (Storey 1989); hard and soft unitarism. This highlights similarities 
between the two frames, e.g. the purpose of employee voice being to contribute to the 
efficiency of the company, and some differences, e.g. how employees are motivated. It 
also highlights that these frames have a bearing on whose voices are heard. The second 
development to the frames is collaborative pluralism (Bray et al 2015; Budd and Bhave 
2017). This builds on some of the characteristics of early pluralism, e.g. a focus on equity 
concerns, whilst offering a different way to conceive employee voice based on voice as a 
right and as co-operative. The reason for discussing the development to the unitarist 
frame is because it underpins much of the contemporary HRM literature on employee 
voice. The reason for discussing the development to the pluralist frame is that it offers a 
different way of evaluating employee voice. These three frames provide the theoretical 
framework to evaluate whether employee voice through employee-ownership differs to 
that of a conventional business and help to facilitate an understanding of the different 
philosophies which underpin management choices and approaches to employee voice in 
such enterprises. From the discussion in chapter two, we know that in such enterprises 
voice has the potential of being part of a company’s fabric. However, in an environment 
where unitarism prevails, whether hard or soft, might suggest that employee voice will be 
no more than a fabrication. The three frames will help to evaluate these issues. 
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3.2 The frames of reference and employee voice 
The frames of reference were devised by Fox (1966; 1974). He initially conceived 
unitarist and pluralist frames (1966) and later added a third, the radical frame (1974). The 
purpose of the frames was to provide a theoretical lens through which to view the 
relationship between employees and employers (Johnstone 2007). Importantly, each 
frame conveys a different view of the employment relationship because of the different 
beliefs and values of that relationship held within each. Furthermore, though rarely made 
explicit, the beliefs and values which are bound up in each frame are certainly implicit in 
different academic disciplines and in the work of policy makers and practitioners (Budd 
and Bhave 2008). Moreover, an important feature of the frames is the premise that 
management styles, preferences or interpretations do not exist in isolation, rather, they are 
based on different philosophies which inform decisions, choices, actions, etc.  
 
As such, the frames provide a way of understanding and evaluating these different 
philosophies. As they relate to this thesis, the frames facilitate an understanding of the 
different philosophies which underpin management approaches to employee voice. An 
understanding of each frame, and as such the differences between frames, is therefore 
important.  
 
3.2.1 Unitarism  
The main goal in the unitarist frame is efficiency (Budd 2004). The way to achieve this is 
through the alignment of interests between employers and employees (Heery 2015) 
towards a common goal of business success. This results in the characteristically unitarist 
view of employment relationships as harmonious. The unitarist frame tends to be 
associated with the relatively recent academic field of HRM and the use of commitment 
practices to establish harmony between managers and employees (Beer and Spector 1984; 
Kaufman 2015).  
 
Through an HRM function, managers invest in employee training, above market wages 
and benefits and job security and other practices in order to gain higher productivity from 
highly motivated, skilled and engaged workers. The aim is to make the firm more 
efficient so the surplus can be shared as higher profit for shareholders and wages and job 
security for labour: a win/win situation. The idea of employee voice in this context is to 
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contribute to company efficiency through harmonious relationships between employees 
and managers with trade unions regarded as unnecessary.   
 
3.2.2 Pluralism  
One of the main goals in the pluralist frame is to achieve equity in the relationship 
between employees and employers (Budd 2004). The need for equity is based on a belief, 
inherent in this frame, which is that there is an imbalance in the relationship between 
employers and employees. This imbalance tends to favour employers meaning their 
interests are prioritised at the expense of employees. Further, this imbalance means that 
the relationship is one of both conflict and co-operation. However, though conflict is 
unavoidable, it is not chronic and can be resolved through compromise to the benefit of 
all (Heery 2015).  
 
Finding such compromise has traditionally been the role of trade unions whose role is to 
provide an independent voice for employees and articulate their interests. The pluralist 
frame tends to be associated with the (comparatively) long-standing academic tradition of 
Employment Relations (Heery 2016; Kaufman 2015). As noted in chapter two, the Webbs 
are regarded as the founders of this tradition in the UK through their work on trade unions 
(Heery 2016; Mueller-Jentsch 2004). This work was continued through a focus on 
collective bargaining by scholars such as Allan Flanders and Hugh Clegg and Fox 
himself, thus, the idea of employee voice through pluralism became associated with 
representative participation via trade unions (Barry and Wilkinson 2015; Heery 2015; 
Johnstone and Ackers 2015).  
 
3.2.3 Radical  
The radical frame regards the employment relationship as entirely illegitimate existing 
solely to satisfy the interests of the dominant party, i.e. employers. Characteristic of this 
frame is an inevitability of workplace conflict arising from socio-economic, political and 
legal inequalities (Johnstone 2014). However, unlike the pluralist frame where conflict is 
unavoidable though resolvable, the radical frame, which tends to be associated with a 
Marxist view of the employment relationship (Kaufman 2015), would see conflict as a 
more fundamental problem given capitalist organisations are predicated on exploitation.  
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Whilst there is sympathy for participation and voice within this frame, the way of 
achieving it is quite different. Though regarding trade unions as efficient in the short-
term, in the long-term, given capitalist businesses are predominantly run for shareholders 
this affects the genuineness of voice, genuine voice can only be achieved when workers 
own and control the business (Atzeni 2012). As such, capitalism would be replaced by 
some form of collective ownership and workers’ control of industry.  
 
3.3 Developments to the frames 
Since they were first conceived, there have been several developments to the frames. 
Table 3.1 (p.49) provides a summary of the key developments. For example, Storey 
(1989) separated unitarism into two categories: hard and soft whilst Godard (2000) 
separated the frames into five categories: neo-classical, managerialist, orthodox pluralist, 
liberal reformist and radical. More recently, Cullinane and Dundon (2014) combined 
Fox’s (1966) conceptualisation of the unitarist frame with literature concerning 
management styles. In so doing, three variations of unitarism are identified: 
 
1. Traditional – this variation is characterised by Purcell and Sisson (1983; cited in 
Cullinane and Dundon 2014) as autocratic in relation to employer authority. 
Employees are regarded as being financially motivated and any opposition from 
them is regarded as illegitimate as it counters the employment contract. This 
contract also serves to legitimise the employer directing and controlling an 
employees’ activities, particularly in relation to time, place, content and method of 
work and, in so doing, legitimises sanctions if an employee is disobedient. Trade 
unions are regarded with disdain in this variation. 
2. Paternalistic – this variation retains the autocratic form of employer authority 
though this is mixed with benevolent inclinations such as ensuring care and 
responsibility for employee welfare. Employee opposition is regarded as being 
due to their misunderstandings and there is a hostility towards trade unions which 
are regarded as unnecessary.  
3. Human Relations – this variation is characterised by a co-operative employment 
relations climate and sophisticated labour management practices which are used to 
legitimise employer authority. Purcell and Sisson (1983; cited Cullinane and 
Dundon 2014) suggest such authority is akin to ‘sophisticated manipulation’. 
Conflict, and the need for trade unions, is regarded as unnecessary and exceptional 
in this variation assuming the ‘right’ Human Resource policies are in place. 
 
These variations reflect some of the key characteristics of the hard and soft versions of 
unitarism discussed by Storey (1989). For example, that employees are thought to be 
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motivated by financial gain in the Traditional variation is synonymous with hard 
unitarism whilst the assumption that with the ‘right’ policies conflict can be averted in the 
Human Relations variation is synonymous with soft unitarism. As such, the variations 
will be considered further in the sections below. There have also recently been 
developments within the pluralist frame, particularly regarding the way employee voice is 
studied.  
 
By building on earlier forms of pluralism, Employment Relations scholars have begun to 
consider different ways of studying employee voice. This is reflected in the discussion in 
chapter two of the contemporary Employment Relations literature regarding non-union 
employee representation schemes (e.g. Dobbins and Dundon 2014; Donaghey et al 2011b; 
Gollan et al 2015). Heery (2015) suggests a new form of pluralism is emerging that 
accepts there are a ‘plurality of institutions’ through which employee voice can manifest. 
Examples of schemes which he suggests are being treated sympathetically by 
Employment Relations scholars include statutory works councils, joint-consultation, 
employee involvement (i.e. unitarist) and financial participation. However, whilst much 
of the Employment Relations literature on employee voice has focused on participative 
democracy, less attention has been paid to other forms of participation. Regarding this as 
an omission, both Budd (2004) and Ackers (2002) argue in favour of broadening the 
scope of the debate on employee voice and a re-definition that takes it away from its 
traditional focus on trade unions.  
 
Both scholars suggest that Employment Relations literature has become too focused on 
the ‘labour problem’ and conflict. Ackers (2011) notes: ‘Over the twentieth century, 
Anglo-American industrial relations writers constructed a powerful realist, pluralist 
conventional wisdom that participation should centre exclusively on collective bargaining 
with unions…’ (p.53). Similarly, Budd (2004) argues that trade unions became the 
dominant way of understanding employee voice but argues such a conceptualisation 
needs to be broadened. To progress the discussion, the scholars lay substantial emphasis 
on bringing moral and ethical concerns back into discussions of the employment 
relationship, and as such, employee voice.   
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Originator Year Frame Organisational vision  Behaviour 
principle 
Characteristics  Voice form 
Fox  1966 Unitarism  Harmonious  Co-operation Commonality of interests; 
harmony in the workplace; anti-
union. 
Bilateral 
communications, 
employee involvement 
Pluralism Legitimacy of 
conflictual and co-
operative relationships 
Negotiation and 
compromise 
Emphasis on mixed interests. Collective 
representation; 
distributive bargaining 
1974 Radical* 
 
Capitalist monopoly Conflict and 
struggle 
Employment relations are 
‘exploitative, coercive and de-
humanising’ (Heery 2015 p. 
23). 
Workers’ control 
Storey  1989 Soft 
unitarism 
Harmonious Competition and 
co-operation 
Voice is conceived as 
harmonious and achieved 
through constructive and 
integrative behaviour 
Bilateral 
communications, 
employee involvement 
Hard 
unitarism 
Free market Competition  
 
Resource-focused; gaining 
competitive advantage; 
competitive market model of 
neo-classical labour economics: 
individualist view of humans 
motivated by rational self-
interest and maximising gain’.  
Open door/exit 
Budd & 
Bhave 
2008 Egoist** Free market 
Bray et al 2015 Collaborative 
pluralism 
Legitimacy of co-
operative relationships 
Co-operation Emphasis on common interests. Co-determination; 
integrative bargaining 
Table 3.1 Summary of developments of the frames of reference 
* Re-named critical (Budd & Bhave 2008) **Re-named individualist (Gollan et al 2015)
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Following Adams (1991), Budd suggests employee voice in the workplace is a moral 
imperative. Influenced by the idea of creating a balance between the interests of efficiency, 
equity and voice (Budd 2004), Pohler and Luchak (2014b) have argued that: 
 
‘There is a necessity to make a commitment to the fundamental democratic principle 
that employees should have some say in the decisions that affect their working lives, 
recognising that voice is not only a means to achieve a balance between efficiency and 
equity in the employment relationship, but also that voice is an end in itself’ (p.201). 
 
Indeed, inherent in the traditional pluralist form, was the belief that the employment 
relationship embraces the equally legitimate sets of interests of employers and employees 
(Blyton et al 2008). It is this idea of legitimacy and conflict in relation to employee voice that 
is developed by Budd. Through what Heery (2016) considers to be a contemporary re-
statement of the pluralist perspective, the work of Budd (2004) makes two important points; 
the first is conceiving employee voice as a right and the second is conceiving the potential of 
employee voice as co-operative rather than conflictual. Both of which are reflected in his 
recent work with colleagues (Bray et al 2015) on collaborative pluralism, discussed below. 
 
The developments to the frames of reference have meant that they are considered to be one of 
the most enduring approaches to capturing the changing dynamics of management choice 
(Dundon et al 2017). Cullinane and Dundon (2014) argue that Fox (1966) regarded unitarism 
as an ideology which provided an ‘instrument of legitimisation’ for employers through which 
to evoke loyalty and commitment from employees. As such, Budd and Bhave (2008, 2017) 
suggest we need to understand such management philosophy as it is this which affects 
individuals’ own values and principles and therefore decisions about the design and 
implementation of voice mechanisms. In turn this will affect how those mechanisms are 
experienced by employees. The frames help us to understand these different philosophies and 
therefore help us to see how each individual frame can generate different forms and intensities 
of employee voice (Kaufman 2015).  
 
Given their relevance to the empirical findings of this study, the following sections consider 
the main characteristics of the hard and soft unitarist frames conceived by Storey (1989) and 
then considers the recent development of collaborative pluralism conceived by Bray et al 
(2015). These three frames, hard unitarism, soft unitarism and collaborative pluralism in turn 
provide the framework through which employee voice in an employee-owned enterprise is 
evaluated. 
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3.3.1 Hard unitarism, HRM and employee voice 
Hard unitarism is typically grounded in the academic discipline of economics and has a focus 
on outcomes (Heery 2015). The rationale of hard unitarism is based on a business case which 
is predicated solely on economic efficiency (Wilkinson and Dundon 2010). Efficiency in this 
frame is regarded as an end in itself and is prioritised over anything else (Dachler and Wilpert 
1978). Such efficiency is achieved, according to this frame, through alignment with the 
resource-based approach of some HRM practitioners.  
 
The resource-based approach proposes that investment in certain HRM practices is likely to 
result in superior performance and competitive advantage (Guest 2011; for an example see 
Gielen et al 2010). More specifically, the way to maximise efficiency and productivity is 
through regarding employees as ‘resources’. Viewed from the perspective of the hard unitarist 
frame, employees have to be managed in a way that is both rational and also coalesces with 
the strategic objectives of the company (Storey 1989) and the way to do this is through 
viewing employees as a resource. This view of employees reflects an earlier assessment by 
Polanyi (1944) who argued employees are regarded as a commodity akin to any other 
productive resource. Similarly, Legge (2005) argued: 
 
‘The ‘hard’ model implies that employees are a resource to be used like any other, at 
management’s discretion, in whatever way best achieves strategic objectives’ (p.279). 
 
The resource-based view is in evidence in a contemporary qualitative study of management 
approaches by Jenkins and Delbridge (2013). They found that one organisation they studied 
had adopted a hard approach and had an explicit objective of gaining competitive advantage 
with employees regarded as a ‘resource’ to achieve this. Furthermore, a practice used within 
this frame to garner commitment from the resources, the employees, is incentivisation.  
 
Incentives are used as way of aligning employer and employee interests and extracting 
employee performance based on a belief that employees are both rational and calculating, 
they seek to maximise utility and are motivated by gain (Legge 2005). This reflects the term 
‘calculative relationship’ which has been used to describe the ‘normal’ employment 
relationship – i.e. members of the organisation are committed to it to the extent that they are 
prepared to do a fair day’s work for a fair day’s pay (Flanders et al 1968).  A component of 
incentivisation are financial participation schemes that are used in this frame to secure higher 
performance. The main prescription within this frame has tended to be for systems of 
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incentivisation through financial participation such as profit-sharing, share-ownership, worker 
co-operatives and partnerships to provide long-term financial incentives for co-operation 
(Heery 2015). This has manifested recently with interest in the UK retailer the John Lewis 
Partnership by politicians and policy-makers (Findlay et al 2017; Heery 2016). Further, the 
previous UK Coalition government accepted the recommendations of the Nuttall Review of 
employee-ownership (Department for Business, Innovation and Skills 2012) resulting in 
measures to encourage growth in this area. Similarly, public sector workers were enabled to 
exchange their employment rights for ownership of shares through spin-offs of public sector 
mutuals (Le Grand and the Mutuals Taskforce 2012).  
 
Some of these schemes were discussed in chapter two through the lens of Employment 
Relations scholars, i.e. Gollan et al (2015) and Marchington et al (1992) suggesting that 
employee voice would have greater strength in companies such as the John Lewis Partnership. 
However, importantly, through the lens of hard unitarism, the rationale underpinning such 
schemes is not fairness and equity. Rather, it is an assumption that employees are motivated 
solely by financial gain and employment practises are organised accordingly. 
  
The way of organising employment practices, according to this frame, is through the 
traditional, hierarchically ordered organisation.  Bernstein (1976) observed strict managerial 
styles prevalent in many workplaces that were reliant on hierarchical and authoritarian 
relationships to direct and co-ordinate a smooth flow of production. Based on Max Weber’s 
(1864-1920) conceptualisation of the rationalised company, the most efficient performance of 
employees was achieved through increasing an organisation’s degree of standardisation, 
impersonality, specialisation, routine, formal regulation and promotion through hierarchy. 
Beneath this administrative apparatus were the ‘principles of scientific management’ (Taylor 
1911). 
 
The key aspects of the principles of scientific management were the fragmentation, repetition 
and specialisation of work tasks the main goal of which was efficiency. Work tasks were not 
designed by employees but rather by industrial engineers, hence a separation of ‘brain-work’ 
and physical labour. An example is Ritzer’s (1983) conceptualisation of ‘McDonaldisation’, 
i.e. the rationalised company that is characterised by efficiency, predictability, calculability, 
control and technology. The separation of brain work and physical labour led to stressing the 
need for a division of labour and repetitive and specialised work tasks. Direction and control 
was provided through a unified chain of command, close supervision and a reward structure 
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based on extrinsic factors. Given such stifling working practises, it is no surprise that 
employee voice is considered important in this frame only in terms of addressing the ‘labour 
problem’. 
 
The labour problem relates to absenteeism, high staff turnover and employee unrest. The main 
proponents of this theory tend to be management theorists, consultants and business leaders 
and therefore participation is limited to work tasks and is firmly under the control of 
management. As such, there are no challenges to the power prerogatives of employers 
(Dachler and Wilpert 1978). This bears similarities to the egoist frame proposed by Budd and 
Bhave (2008).  
 
They argued that management discourse is grounded in the egoist model which emphasises 
the primacy of market ideals. Here, the dominance of a free market is primary and institutions 
such as trade unions and the state are regarded as unnecessary. This point is referenced in the 
research findings of Cullinane nad Dundon (2014) who found an overwhelming ideological 
commitment and persistent attachment to the Traditional variation of unitarism from 
respondents. They highlight that an ‘economistic interpretation between buyers and sellers of 
labour abounded’ whereby employees are cast as motivated solely by financial gain and 
which produced an ‘unproblematic authority structure’ (p.2584). Similarly, Bray et al (2015) 
suggest the employment relationship in this frame is predicated on ‘enforced compliance’ 
(p.11) which bears similarities to Cathcart’s (2014) finding of ‘employee compliance’ in the 
John Lewis Partnership. Following this rationale, voice is essential though only in relation to 
the sole quest for increased performance and competitive advantage achieved through 
employees regarded as resources and their compliance regarded as essential.  
 
3.3.2 Soft unitarism, HRM and employee voice  
Much of the contemporary field of HRM is underpinned by soft unitarism (Budd and Bhave 
2008). HRM emerged in the UK during the 1980s and represented a ‘sea-change’ in the way 
the employment relationship, and therefore employee voice, was conceived (Heery 2016 
p.13). Whereas the hard unitarist frame regards employees as a resource whose compliance is 
essential, soft unitarism regards employees as ‘assets’ (Storey 1989). Influenced by the 
academic discipline of psychology, particularly industrial and organisational psychology 
(Barry and Wilkinson 2015), the rationale of soft unitarism is based on, and justified by, there 
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being a unity of interests between the employer and employee striving to maintain the 
‘natural’ order of harmony1 in the workplace.  
 
Soft unitarism has been influenced by the hierarchy of needs thesis (Maslow 1943) which 
grew from what was regarded as the negative effects of hierarchical organisations which 
hamper satisfaction of the higher order needs, i.e. esteem and self-actualisation. More recent 
influences on this frame are by Seligman (2002) who, by drawing on Maslow’s work, 
developed a thesis of ‘positive psychology’ evidenced in his idea of ‘the good life’. Further 
influences are from scholars such as Van Dyne and LePine (1998) whose more specific  focus 
on employee voice is conceived as discretionary, pro-social and largely informal and 
individual behaviour (e.g. Morrison et al 2011). Employee voice through this frame and 
channelled through HRM tends to be predicated on the notion that ‘what is good for the firm 
must be good for the worker’ (Barry and Wilkinson 2015 p.263; see also Dobbins and 
Dundon 2011). As such, a preoccupation is identifying the conditions under which employer 
and employee interests are most closely aligned as it is in such circumstances that 
performance is maximised (Heery 2016). An array of practices, tools and techniques are 
therefore vital in creating the right conditions. 
 
Soft unitarism is process-focused (Budd and Bhave 2008; Heery 2015) based on an 
assumption that with the right HRM policies and practices in place, the interests of employees 
and employers will be aligned because ‘labour and management have a unity of interests’ 
(Budd and Bhave 2008 p.103). By following this logic, employee voice is effective as it 
provides employees with the opportunity to contribute to business decision-making by 
drawing on their knowledge of work processes (Heery 2015). Practices include sharing 
information, direct consultation and task-based forms of participation, profit-sharing and more 
recently, employee engagement (Heery 2015; Johnstone and Ackers 2015). The aim is to 
make the company more efficient in order that the increased surplus can be shared as higher 
profit for shareholders whilst providing higher wages and job security for employees: 
‘win/win’; simultaneously benefiting employers through profit maximisation and employees 
through fulfilment (Budd and Bhave 2008). This corresponds with the study by Jenkins and 
                                                          
1 An early reference to the concept of a ‘harmony of interests’ was by Leffingwell (1917; cited in Saval 2014) in 
relation to a growing middle class of clerks in 19th century America who, unlike their contemporaries working in 
factories, saw commonalities between themselves and their bosses rather than disparities. This, combined with 
the influence of European socialists such as Charles Fourier, Robert Owen and Karl Marx regarding the 
irreconcilable differences between capital and labour, prompted a change in discourse to harmony rather than 
discord. 
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Delbridge (2013) where an organisation adopting a soft management approach included using 
practices such as promoting ‘positive’ workplace conditions. Importantly, in this frame, 
conflict is regarded as being due to poor policies, practices and management. 
 
Conflict in the soft unitarist frame is viewed as ‘essentially pathological’; the result of 
management failure or challenging external influences, such as trade unions (Heery 2015 
p.21). If companies are following HRM practice, then employees will be fulfilled and there 
would be no need for mechanisms to resolve conflict. Indeed, contemporary HR professionals 
often regard a need for a union as an HRM failure (Kochan 2004). Employees are able to 
express their (presumably positive) voice through a range of sophisticated policies, processes 
and practices. As with hard unitarism, the driving motivator for employee voice in this 
context, its purpose, is not for reasons of social justice but rather to enhance employee, and in 
turn organisational, performance.  
 
Employee voice in this frame makes good business sense vis-à-vis improving organisational 
performance (Timming and Johnstone 2015). It therefore regarded as the key ingredient for 
creating organisational commitment framed in terms of its contribution to profit and 
shareholder value (Wilkinson and Fay 2011). This is achieved through the pursuit of shared 
aims and values and by investment in training, above-market wages and benefits and job 
security in order to gain higher productivity from highly motivated, skilled and engaged 
workers (Arrowsmith and Parker 2013; Johnstone 2014; Kaufman 2015). However, a 
preoccupation for harmonious employment relationships and an aversion to conflict within 
this frame could conceal a more malignant reality.  
 
Johnstone and Ackers (2015) argue that it is important to note that initiatives such as those 
described above are driven by management and build a measure of employee participation 
around a conventional capitalist business organisation run to increase shareholder value. This 
means that the primacy of shareholder value is retained whilst simultaneously involving 
employees, though not because of social justice factors, rather, because it may impact 
positively on shareholder value. As an example, Johnstone (2014) relates the soft unitarist 
frame to his work on partnership (noted in chapter two). He suggests that attempts at 
partnership could mask and reinforce inequalities behind a ‘veneer of co-operation’ (p.318).  
 
Similar observations are made by other Employment Relations scholars. Gollan et al (2015) 
use the term ‘rhetorical façade’ (p.2), and Dobbins and Dundon (2015) make reference to the 
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‘chimera’ of labour-management partnerships which were considered ‘superficial’ by Danford 
et al (2005). Far from an apparently benign outward impression, a particularly malignant 
element of this frame is its focus on performance and ‘delivering ‘bottom line’ results’, 
which, in a competitive world, worryingly, demand that the employee ‘goes the extra mile’ 
(Legge 2005 p.340). Legge (ibid) states: 
 
‘The ‘soft’ normative model of HRM is depicted as individualistic, with committed 
employees working flexibly and ‘beyond contract’ in pursuit of competitive 
advantage’ (p.279).  
 
As with the hard unitarist frame, the emphasis here on performance and ‘going the extra mile’ 
is similar to the finding noted by Cathcart (2014) in the John Lewis Partnership whereby 
partners were implored to go the extra mile for the sake of the business. A further similarity is 
found in the Human Relations variation of unitarism highlighted earlier by Cullinane and 
Dundon (2014) whereby labour management practices were regarded as ‘sophisticated 
manipulation’ (Purcell and Sisson 1983; cited in Cullinane and Dundon 2014). Such 
emphases however are based on a number of assumptions. For example, the idea of 
employees ‘going the extra mile’ presumes they are not already doing so. Further, employee 
voice in the context of going the extra mile reflects the compliancy espoused by the hard 
unitarist frame albeit framed in a softer, more positive guise, though no less manipulative. 
Voice viewed from this perspective reflects a management agenda that does not involve 
sharing of power or authority (Wilkinson and Fay 2011) and therefore is conceived as ‘voice 
without muscle’ (Kaufman and Taras 2010). A further issue is that HRM is associated with a 
positivist approach involving research practices that try to establish links between HRM and 
performance (Harley and Hardy 2004; Legge 2005).  
 
An overwhelming concern with conceptualising, measuring and identifying the antecedents 
and consequences of positive psychological states amongst workers has been observed within 
the unitarist tradition and given fresh emphasis in the last two decades by the ‘positive 
psychology movement’ associated with soft unitarism as well as the recent wave of research 
on employee engagement (Heery 2016). Such ‘psychologisation’ of the employment 
relationship manifests in a focus on studying voice through surveys in the hope of finding 
links between specific HRM practices and performance (Godard 2014). Heery (2016) 
suggests that within this frame there has been a pronounced imbalance in research that has 
meant a greater focus on identifying whether employers are realising their interests rather than 
whether employees are achieving theirs: 
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The overwhelming mass of unitary research on employment relations has been on the 
degree, manner and conditions under which management strategies, techniques and 
practices elicit improved performance from workers’ (p.16). 
 
Though limited to certain disciplines, this unitarist emphasis remains the dominant paradigm 
within the contemporary employment relationship (e.g. Delbridge and Keenoy 2010; Hannon 
2010; Heery 2016; Janssens and Steyaert 2009). As such, the contemporary employee voice 
landscape is underpinned by a unitarist philosophy which is based on an assumption that all 
members of an organisation have mutual interests (Delbridge and Keenoy 2010).  
 
Importantly, this landscape manifests in a re-orientation of employee voice away from equity 
concerns towards efficiency concerns (Budd 2004). Within this landscape, HRM is under 
increasing pressure to ‘align’ itself with (financial) business objectives (Cushen and Harney 
2015; see also Johnstone and Wilkinson 2013; Thompson 2011). The effect on employee 
voice is that it is characterised by low involvement and low representation mechanisms and 
predicated on low-trust relationships. Providing employees with workplace equity and voice 
has an ‘instrumental value in increasing efficiency and competitiveness’ (Budd 2004 p.70). 
Critical of mainstream economics that subordinates voice to efficiency, Budd (2004) argues:  
 
‘Work is not simply an economic transaction; respect for the importance of human life 
and dignity requires that the fair treatment of workers also be a fundamental standard 
of the employment relationship – as do the democratic ideals of freedom and equality’ 
(p.1).  
 
As such, economic performance, the ‘rhetorical power of efficiency’ (ibid p.5) should not be 
the sole standard by which employee voice is assessed. He goes on to argue for an alignment, 
a balance, between the business case and the social case, the latter based on values such as 
human dignity, mutual respect, loyalty and trust, and a richer set of objectives beyond that of 
efficiency. Similarly, Ackers (2002) argues: ‘…the employment relationship should be 
conceptualised as a social and ethical relationship, as well as an economic transaction’ 
(emphasis in original; p.12). 
 
3.3.3 Collaborative pluralism 
The frames of reference are used by Bray et al (2015) as the starting point to develop the idea 
of ‘collaborative pluralism’. There are two important characteristics of collaborative pluralism 
which differentiate it from the more traditional forms of pluralism. Firstly, it recognises and 
accepts that managers, employees and employee representatives are legitimate parties to co-
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operative relationships with sometimes separate and sometimes shared goals. It is through this 
legitimacy that employee voice is expressed. Secondly, collaborative pluralism is focused on 
the co-operative aspects of the employment relationship rather than conflict. 
 
a. The legitimacy of employee voice 
The legitimacy of employee voice within the frame of collaborative pluralism draws on the 
earlier work of Budd (2004) which was concerned with how the employment relationship is 
viewed. If it is viewed through the lens of a hard unitarist for example, then the relationship is 
regarded purely as a transaction: employees regard work as a burden carried out only to earn 
an income therefore companies must devise mechanisms that incentivise and control to 
counter such things as shirking. However, an alternative view he argues is that the 
relationship is more than an economic one. Grounded in Kantian moral philosophy (Adams 
2005), it is this latter approach which Budd takes by conceiving voice as a right, a moral 
imperative; voice is an end in itself. 
 
Kantian philosophy is predicated on the belief that the basis of human dignity is autonomy 
and self-governance as well as on assumptions that humans are wise, intelligent, informed, 
responsible, interested in civic affairs, rational and co-operative. Against this philosophical 
backdrop, Budd (2004) argues that work is a fully human activity and employees are entitled 
to fair treatment (equity) as well as opportunities to have an input into decisions that affect 
their lives (voice). Denying people a voice at work violates the Kantian principle of having a 
duty to respect human life in and of itself, i.e. voice is a moral imperative. The notion of voice 
as a moral imperative and its legitimacy corresponds to his idea of the workplace as a place of 
democracy.   
 
A broader definition of democracy is offered by Dachler and Wilpert (1978). They state that 
democracy has functioned as a social value in itself, and as such, ‘serves as a…moral standard 
against which social decision-making schemes can be evaluated’ (p.4). Democracy in this 
sense has a much broader remit than its narrowly defined counterpart in the traditional 
pluralist frame relating only to trade unions (e.g. Ackers 2002; Budd 2014). A key proponent 
of democratic theory is Pateman (1970) whose view of participatory democracy was all 
embracing, incorporating not only the political sphere but all aspects of social life, e.g. 
education, employment, family life.  
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For Pateman (ibid), there was a significance of employees being involved in decision-making 
rather than simply being recipients of decisions-made. This links to how Budd (2004) 
understands employee voice; it concerns employee participation in decision-making. 
Importantly, this way of thinking represents an alternative view of employee voice to the 
traditional adversarial and combative pluralist voice and, moreover, to the contemporary 
HRM/unitarist view of voice. What it does is put employee voice back where it originated, i.e. 
the traditional pluralist concern for employees, but takes it further by arguing that employees 
have a legitimacy to express their voice, they have the right. This is a view that is also 
reflected in the work of other Employment Relations scholars. For example, Donaghey et al 
(2011a) argue: 
 
‘Genuine pluralism rests upon social values which recognise the right of employees to 
an effective voice in their own destiny, regardless of the consequences for 
management’ (p. 55).  
 
Similarly, Wilkinson et al (2014) regard employee voice as something which is fundamental 
and should form part of a human dignity philosophy. Within the Employment Relations 
discipline, there has been an increasing emphasis on the importance of industrial citizenship 
and social democracy; thus employee voice is viewed as a right in modern democratic 
societies (Timming and Johnstone 2015). Following a social justice logic, employee voice is 
regarded as a fundamental right in order that employees are able to extend a degree of control 
over managerial decision-making encompassing notions of free speech and human dignity 
(Wilkinson and Dundon 2010). Gollan (2013) argues:  
 
‘Voice, the right to be heard and have influence over workplace issues, and at times an 
acknowledgement of differing interests, may be essential conditions for more effective 
decision-making processes and greater social well-being and inclusiveness’ (p.501).  
 
Whilst efficiency has become the standard by which employment relationships are assessed, 
Budd (2004) argues for employment that has a ‘human face’. He suggests voice should be a 
standard within the employment relationship akin to economic (efficiency) and equity 
(fairness) standards. Furthermore, he argues, employee voice should be ‘meaningful’. By this 
he means employees having some input into decisions that affect them in the workplace 
achieved through free speech and the opportunity to challenge without any reprisal. This leads 
to the second aspect of collaborative pluralism which conceives employee voice as co-
operative rather than conflictual. 
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b. A co-operative voice 
The second aspect of collaborative pluralism is concerned with emphasising co-operation in 
the employment relationship. The classic pluralist frame characterised employment 
relationships as both conflictual and co-operative. Within this state of conflict-co-operation, 
notions of fairness and justice act as a mediator (Ackers 2002). However, Ackers (ibid) and 
Budd (2004) argue that increasingly the pluralist frame became synonymous with the 
conflictual side of the relationship to the detriment of co-operation. Therefore, what 
differentiates collaborative pluralism from classic pluralism is the greater emphasis on co-
operation. The argument is that by acknowledging that employees are legitimate parties to the 
employment relationship, the possibility exists for a greater emphasis on co-operative 
relationships, the type of relationship that employees want with their employers (Freeman and 
Rogers 2006).  
 
Several studies report that the type of voice employees would like is one of co-operation with 
some influence at both strategic and operational levels (Bryson and Freeman 2007; Cathcart 
2014; Flanders et al 1968; Freeman et al 2007; Ramsay 1977; Rathkey 1983; The Smith 
Institute 2016). Further, Freeman et al (2007) argue that, given workers are the main 
consumers of employee voice, attention should be paid to the type of voice employees want 
when it comes to constructing or reforming voice institutions. Yet, despite the evidence 
suggesting employees want a more co-operative relationship with their employers, there are 
some who question whether such a situation can be achieved in capitalist organisations. 
 
Within capitalist organisations, the key architects of employee voice mechanisms tends to be 
managers, as discussed in chapter two. Management-led employee voice places emphasis on 
what is referred to as a ‘business-case’. (Cathcart 2009; Johnstone and Wilkinson 2015). The 
purpose of employee voice within this context is to contribute to business goals and is 
achieved through a range of HRM innovations such as open door policies and suggestion 
schemes, at the lower end of the escalator in figure 2.1 (chapter two). These HRM innovations 
are influenced by a unitarist frame, and as such, the workplace environment is characterised 
as individualistic, harmonious and unified. As argued by Legge (2005):  
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‘The individualistic values (and anti-union bias) that pervade the rhetoric of the 
enterprise culture are consistent with the individualistic and unitarist values of 
stereotypical normative HRM models. Its emphasis on the primacy of the market and 
the need to create enterprising individuals and firms to compete successfully in the 
marketplace find echoes in the ‘hard’ model’s emphasis on external integration – of 
the match between strategy and environment, and of HRM policy, procedures and 
practices with business strategy’ (p.122). 
 
 
It is within this unitarist environment that the philosophies of the most prominent 
organisational actors, managers, are shaped by the different academic conceptualisations of 
employee voice.   
 
Following Budd (2004), Kochan et al (1984) and Kochan et al (1986), managers are the 
primary movers of organisational change and their strategic choices are underpinned by their 
own philosophies. This combination of the external environment and management 
philosophies creates a particular conceptualisation of employee voice as something which 
exists to contribute to the efficiency of the business. Simultaneously, other interpretations of 
employee voice which do not correspond to this conceptualisation are closed down or 
obscured. In so doing, some voices and subjects are heard and regarded as valuable whilst 
other voices and subjects are not. The key argument here is that employee voice in its current 
form is predicated on academic and managerial conceptualisations which influence what is of 
value and what is not, therefore constraining and coercing voice to correspond to this 
conceptualisation. In contrast, collaborative pluralism provides an alternative to the unitarist 
frame of reference to evaluate employee voice.  
 
Collaborative pluralism represents an important intellectual shift away from employee voice 
focused on conflict (classic pluralism) or efficiency (hard and soft unitarism) by focusing on 
employee voice that is co-operative and yielded because of its legitimacy. This frame 
provides a useful addition to this thesis for the purpose of comparing and contrasting 
employee voice against the other two frames, hard and soft unitarism. As such, these three 
frames will be used in this thesis to provide a lens through which to examine employee voice 
through employee-ownership. Will employee voice be any different in an employee-owned 
enterprise given it is part of the fabric, or, against the backdrop of a pervasive unitarist 
environment, will it merely be a fabrication? 
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3.4 Summary 
This chapter has discussed the theoretical framework that will be used to evaluate the 
difference in employee voice in an employee-owned enterprise; the frames of reference. The 
frames were originally conceived by Fox (1966; 1974) and subsequently developed by Storey 
(1989) and by Bray et al (2015). To explain the relevance of the frames in relation to 
employee voice, the chapter was separated into two themes. The first discussed the main 
characteristics of each frame as conceived by Fox (1966; 1974). It also drew on the 
Employment Relations and HRM literature to highlight differences between the frames. The 
second theme focused on developments to the unitarist frame and the pluralist frame and 
explained the relevance of each in terms of enabling an analysis of employee voice. 
 
It was argued that it is hard and soft unitarism, as conceived by Storey (1989), which underpin 
much of the contemporary HRM literature on employee voice and, as such, influence it at 
company level. Influenced by a unitarist environment, employee voice at company level 
reflects the choices made by managers. These choices are for low-level mechanisms alongside 
prescriptions about what voice ought to do; which is to contribute to the efficiency of the 
company. It was argued that this environment has a bearing on whose voices are heard. An 
alternative frame was then discussed, collaborative pluralism (Bray et al 2015), which 
proposed employee voice as a right and as co-operative. Collaborative pluralism, it was 
argued, offers a different way of conceptualising voice and enables comparisons to be made 
with the dominant unitarist frames.  
 
These three frames, hard and soft unitarism and collaborative pluralism, provide the 
theoretical framework to evaluate whether employee voice in an employee-owned enterprise 
is different compared to that of conventional businesses. They will help to facilitate an 
understanding of the different philosophies which underpin management choices and 
approaches to employee voice in an employee-owned enterprise. As discussed in chapter two, 
we know that in such enterprises voice is a right, it is embedded and it is expressed through a 
range of sophisticated processes and as such, there is a potential of it being part of a 
company’s fabric. However, against the backdrop of a unitarist philosophy, will it be no more 
than a fabrication?  The frames will help to evaluate these issues using empirical evidence 
drawn from this study. This evidence will come from the methodological approach which is 
considered in the next chapter. 
 
  
63 
 
 
Chapter Four: Research Methodology 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the research methodology. The methodology is designed to address the 
research questions presented in chapter one and the limitation in the employee voice literature 
highlighted in chapter two and reflects the theoretical framework discussed in the previous 
chapter. Chapter three highlighted how contemporary employee voice is underpinned by the 
unitarist philosophy of managers in conventional businesses which orients voice towards 
company efficiency and is reflected in the choice of low-level voice mechanisms. Having 
introduced an alternative philosophy, collaborative pluralism, it was then argued that the 
frames of reference will help to facilitate an understanding of the philosophy which underpin 
management choices and approaches to employee voice in an employee-owned enterprise. As 
discussed in chapter two, we know that in such enterprises voice is a right, it is embedded and 
it is expressed through a range of sophisticated processes and as such, there is a potential of it 
being part of a company’s fabric. However, when the prevailing philosophy is unitarism, the 
question of whether voice would be no more than a fabrication was posed. The frames will 
help to evaluate these issues using empirical evidence drawn from this study which will come 
from the methodological approach discussed in this chapter. The chapter has six sections.  
 
Section one considers the philosophical traditions which underpin different research 
approaches. To highlight how these differences affect research practice, section two discusses 
the approaches used by HRM and Employment Relations scholars to study employee voice. It 
then states the approach of this study which is a subjectivist ontology, interpretivist 
epistemology and qualitative methodology. Section four details the research design, which is 
a qualitative single case study that is exploratory and explanatory, and includes the Context, 
Mechanism and Outcomes (CMO) configuration conceived by Pawson and Tilley (1997) that 
is used to organise data collection and analysis. Section five outlines the research process 
which includes selecting and accessing the case, methods of data collection, data analysis and 
reflexivity in the research process.  Finally, some of the limitations of the methodology are 
discussed. 
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4.2 Research ontology, epistemology and methodology 
Social science research is founded upon, and influenced by, various philosophical positions 
which are concerned with the nature of existence, ontology, and the nature of knowledge - 
epistemology. These philosophical positions are important as they underpin the values and 
beliefs of researchers (Saunders et al 2012). In turn they influence every aspect of the research 
process, the methodological approach, beginning with whatever it is that forms the focus of 
the research right through to the analysis of data, the conclusions that are drawn and the 
knowledge that is thus created. Importantly, these positions are based on different ontologies 
regarding the nature of existence and different epistemologies regarding the nature of 
knowledge that shape the beliefs of the researcher. In other words, they are important because 
they provide a base from which the foundations of a research project are built.  
 
The following section discusses what is meant by, and the differences between, ontological 
and epistemological orientations followed by a discussion of how each influences the research 
methodology, whether quantitative or qualitative. It then states the position taken here which 
is a subjectivist ontology, interpretivist epistemology and qualitative methodology to carry out 
the research on employee voice. 
 
4.2.1 Ontology and the nature of reality 
Ontology is the philosophical study of the nature of existence, of being or of reality. It is 
concerned with questions about whether the social world is regarded as something which is 
external to social actors or, conversely, whether it is regarded as something that humans are 
involved in influencing (Bryman 2012). As it relates to employee voice, it refers to the 
ontological assumptions made by different researchers regarding the term. For example, it 
might involve such questions as, what is the nature of employee voice? In other words, it 
relates to how an entity, employee voice in this instance, is understood and the assumptions 
which are made about the nature of that entity (Johnstone 2007; Kempster and Parry 2011). It 
is about a researcher’s understanding of what some ‘thing’ is; their understanding of a thing is 
ontological. Indeed ontology underpins why, as a researcher, a specific subject has been 
chosen and what the perceived relevance of that thing is. Furthermore, it questions the 
assumptions of the researcher in relation to how they see the external world operating. 
Ontology is how the researcher makes sense of what they are studying. It can be understood 
as a continuum ranging from objectivism at one extreme and subjectivism at the other with 
various other approaches falling between these extremes.  
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The objectivist researcher believes there is one single objective reality that can be studied. 
Further, the phenomenon which is studied is regarded as separate from themselves as 
researchers. That is, social entities can and should be considered as objective and having a 
reality that is external to humans (Bryman 2012). Based on this ontological assumption of 
objectivity, it is an approach which is likened to the way phenomena are studied by the natural 
sciences. Given that it tries to replicate the procedures of the natural sciences, objectivism 
strives to ensure researcher bias is minimised and is regarded by those researchers who adhere 
to the approach as being reliable and valid. This is in contrast to studying a phenomenon 
through the lens of ontological subjectivism. 
 
Subjectivism emphasises that there is not one but many realities. Within these multiple 
realities, social ‘entities’ (i.e. rather than ‘phenomena’) are regarded as being made up of the 
perceptions and actions of humans (ibid). An understanding of an entity from a subjective 
approach comes through discovery and from the meanings people attach to it. To apply the 
lens of subjectivism to employee voice requires the researcher to be empathetic to multiple 
interpretations and perspectives. Employee voice, its meaning and purpose, will be interpreted 
differently from one person to another. An important difference between subjectivism in 
contrast to objectivism is that the former realises that an understanding of an entity also comes 
from within the context in which that particular entity occurs as opposed to the latter which 
studies a phenomenon in isolation of its context. This is an important difference and will be 
discussed in greater detail below (Context, Mechanism and Outcomes). A further difference 
between the two approaches concerns researcher bias.  
 
Whereas an objectivist researcher would argue that bias must be minimised during the 
research process, from a subjectivist ontology there is no such thing as value-free research. 
Rather, the emphasis is on getting as close as possible to the entity which is being studied. 
Similarly, differences are noted in the terms ‘reliability’ and ‘validity’. Whilst an objectivist 
would argue they are fundamental to research, they are meaningless terms to the subjectivist. 
However, this by no means reduces the quality of the research process, rather different 
mechanisms are put in place. The mechanisms which are used in this research to ensure 
certain standards are met are discussed in a section below (Principles, Ethics and Reflexivity). 
 
4.2.2 Epistemology and the nature of knowledge 
Epistemology relates to the theory of knowledge. It asks questions such as what do we know 
and how do we know what we know? As it relates to employee voice, it refers to the 
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epistemological assumptions made by different researchers: what do we know about 
employee voice and how do we know what we know? In social science research there are 
various philosophical positions regarding knowledge that in turn influence the research 
process. There are particular sets of beliefs, concepts and practices which underpin and guide 
the process. Again, the idea of a continuum is useful to highlight the extremes of positions. 
There is at one end positivism and at the other interpretivism with various other approaches 
falling between these extremes. 
 
Positivism has a distinctive epistemology concerning the nature, form, acquisition and 
communication of knowledge about a particular social phenomenon which is being 
investigated (Johnstone 2007). Integral to it, is a mirroring of natural scientific approaches 
regarding the acquisition of knowledge about the social world and to the interpretation and 
understanding of social phenomena. In its most basic form, positivism searches for 
replicability, reliability and validity believing as it does that society must be studied in the 
same methodical way as, and in accordance with, scientific methods (Mearns 2011). 
Positivism’s epistemology identifies scientific knowledge as having ‘covering laws’ and 
regards itself as independent of the reality it is describing (Riley 2007). As such, knowledge is 
derived, or rather deduced, in a search for general laws and objective social facts akin to 
‘truths’ in the natural sciences. By adopting a positivist epistemology to study employee 
voice, a ‘nomothetic’ methodological approach would be used. This approach is discussed in 
more detail in the section below (Methodological approaches: quantitative and qualitative). 
 
By contrast, integral to interpretivism is a belief that there are many realities, thus rejecting 
the objectivist view that meaning resides in the world independent of human consciousness. It 
does not search for one ‘truth’ but rather acknowledges that there are many. Thus, the goal is 
to find a socially agreed understanding in order to make sense of a given entity. The way to 
access those realities and meanings comes through social constructions such as language, 
consciousness, shared meanings and instruments. It embraces a number of different 
approaches that include social constructionism, phenomenology, post-modernism and 
hermeneutics. Characteristic of this position is the need to look at the social world from the 
inside and adopt a subject-subject relation to the field of study (Myers 2013): both researcher 
and researched are integral parts of the research process. Indeed, the context in which the data 
is situated is paramount. The logic here is that without an understanding of the broader 
context it is impossible to understand the correct meaning of a single piece of data (ibid). This 
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epistemology which underpins interpretivism in turn informs the way employee voice is 
studied in this thesis, through an ‘ideographic’ methodological approach. 
 
4.2.3 Methodology: quantitative and qualitative 
Grounded in a distinctive ontology and epistemology, positivism has a methodological 
approach that is ‘nomothetic’, the word originating from the Greek word ‘nomos’ meaning 
law. This conveys an approach that is objective and systematic which seeks to provide general 
law-like statements (Johnstone 2007). This is regarded as the defining feature of positivism 
which implies that there exists in the social world regularities or law-like generalisations in 
material or social settings which provide a basis for explanation and prediction (Easton 2010). 
With a preference for quantitative research methods, a positivist approach is often taken to 
mean deductive, theory-testing, objective and positivist processes (Lee 1999). Kempster and 
Parry (2011) suggest there are a number of principles common to positivism which are 
followed by some researchers in order to demonstrate law-like regularities to explain reality. 
These principles include: 
 
a. The researcher being independent and value-free. 
 
b. Establishing causation through a process of identifying a hypothesis that is tested and 
either proved or disproved through statistical measurement. 
 
c. That such measurement is to be drawn from samples of sufficient size that inferences 
can be drawn. 
 
Following these principles, positivist researchers will tend to preference research methods 
such as surveys and questionnaires. The principles have been applied in social sciences 
research influenced by an epistemology that considers it possible to make predictions about 
social phenomena in the same way as it is to make predictions about phenomena in the natural 
world. However, those rejecting a positivist philosophy argue the same principles of natural 
sciences cannot be applied to social sciences.  For example, Mearns (2011) notes, ‘…the 
employment relationship does not operate in a vacuum, nor does it operate in a sterilised 
laboratory’ (p. 366; see also Butler 2015). An alternative philosophy is interpretivism, which 
seeks a more subjective approach to the entity being investigated.  
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In contrast to positivism, the approach of the interpretivist researcher is ideographic. This 
approach highlights the unique elements of an entity and focuses on subjective accounts 
(Johnstone 2007). It considers the social world as not static but in a constant state of change 
and as humans we are constantly acting to change or modify it through our interactions with 
others; a ‘negotiated order’ (Strauss et al 1963). As such, the research process preferences a 
qualitative approach that is inductive, theory-generating, subjective and non-positivist (Lee 
1999). Further, its research is typically inductive compared to the deductive nature of 
quantitative research and is non-linear (Myers 2013). Research methods typically used are 
case studies, observations and interviews. And, in contrast to the emphasis in positivism on 
reliability and validity, it uses a variety of ways to ensure the research process is robust and 
meets a high standard, discussed in more detail below (Principles, Ethics and Reflexivity).  
 
What is clear from this discussion, is that the social sciences are founded on different 
philosophical positions which influence methodological approaches to what is researched and 
how that research is undertaken. Some of the key differences between epistemologies, 
ontologies and methodological approaches are highlighted in table 4.1 below.  
 
 
Positivism Interpretivism 
Objective  Subjective  
Quantitative  Qualitative  
Fact gathering Meanings are constructed 
Nomothetic: search for general laws Ideographic: study an individual or 
unique person/event/thing and 
interpretation of results/findings 
Deductive  Inductive  
Test/verify hypotheses  Multiple realities 
Numerical based Text based 
Table 4.1 Differences between positivism and interpretivism 
 
 
Such differences include an emphasis on objectivity and the search for ‘facts’ as integral to 
the positivist research process. By contrast, qualitative research tends towards a subjective 
approach whereby meanings are constructed. For the former, the research process is linear 
(Braun and Clark 2006; Myers 2013) for the latter, it is iterative and evolving. Some caution 
has been expressed that the lines between the extreme ontological positions are blurring (e.g. 
Harley and Hardy 2004). This is exemplified in attempts to challenge the polarity of social 
science research such as the recent development of critical realism which tries to find a 
common ground between the two extremes (Edwards et al 2014). Nevertheless, what is 
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important to highlight is that these different ontological and epistemological approaches 
influence research methodology.  
 
As these differences relate to employee voice, they have a bearing on the way it is studied. As 
noted in chapter two, and though not explicitly referred to as such, the study of employee 
voice has a long history within the discipline of Employment Relations. By contrast the 
relatively new field of HRM has tended to dominate the contemporary literature. The 
important point in a research context is that each of them have quite different approaches to 
the way they research employee voice. These differences are important as they affect how 
employee voice is studied and therefore how it is understood. 
  
4.3 Research methodology and employee voice 
Given its emphasis on trying to establish links between workplace practices and employee and 
organisational performance as noted in chapter two, the HRM literature has been influenced 
by positivism (Cushen and Harney 2015; Francis 2003; Guest 2011; Johnstone 2007; 
Marchington and Kynighou 2012). Positivism is the dominant form of research in most 
business and management disciplines (Myers 2013) and is driven by empirical 
generalisability and strives to be independent and value-free (Kempster and Parry 2011). The 
adoption of natural scientific approaches to acquire knowledge about the social world is 
fundamental to this approach. However, the influence of positivism has created a crisis within 
the research community in terms of the forms of knowledge which are generated (Savage 
2013). An academic discourse of HRM has been constructed which has brought into being an 
understanding and a set of practices that have created a ‘truth’ (Harley and Hardy 2004). This 
‘truth’ manifests in an emphasis on efficiency as the only objective of a business which is 
influenced by hard and soft unitarist theories underpinning the HRM:  
 
‘The theories do not merely create a picture of reality, but also help to create that 
reality’ (Edwards 2017 p.4). 
 
Through the philosophical approach of positivism, HRM has sought to isolate those practices 
thought to improve profit, productivity and performance and therefore has created as reality 
the efficacy of some practices over and above others. Those studying employee voice from 
the soft unitarist frame, which influences much of HRM, have a tendency to try to replicate 
natural sciences both in terms of methodology but also in terms of ontology (Godard 2014; 
Heery 2016). Underpinned by this frame, HRM tends to focus on the outcomes of a particular 
mechanism rather than on either the mechanisms and/or the context in which particular 
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mechanisms were implemented. As well as this resulting in ‘intellectual poverty’, a further 
concern is a view of ‘human resources’ which adopts a hyper-positivist and instrumentalist 
perspective: 
 
‘The risk is that human beings come to be viewed as objects to be manipulated, and 
especially in the case of industrial psychology, disciplined and controlled’ (Godard 
2014 p.11). 
 
This view reflects some of the literature on HRM and soft unitarism discussed in chapter three 
that was exemplified through such notions as ‘going the extra mile’ (Legge 2005; Piasna et al 
2013). The malignant nature of such notions is not to be under-estimated; they call for 
employees to go beyond their contractual agreements and are based on assumptions that 
employees are not already fully committed to their work. Research of this nature that focuses 
exclusively on whether outcomes are efficient or whether practices and institutions improve 
productivity, ‘embodies a normative judgement that efficiency concerns are paramount’ 
(Budd 2004 p.186).  This is true of soft and also hard unitarism: 
 
‘The overwhelming mass of unitary research on employment relations has been on the 
degree, manner and conditions under which management strategies, techniques and 
practices elicit improved performance from workers’ (Heery 2016 p.16). 
 
Whilst such approaches provide useful insights, it is argued here that they provide only a 
partial contribution to understanding employee voice. Quantitative approaches offer little 
about the context in which employee voice evolves, how processes and mechanisms operate, 
how and why employee voice occurs and offer limited explanation of linkages between voice 
practices. As such, there is a tendency to ‘lack sensitivity to the complexities of voice’ 
(Marchington 2007 p.239). An example which reflects this point was discussed in chapter two 
regarding the recent development of employee engagement surveys. 
 
Quantitative approaches such as employee engagement, or satisfaction, surveys have become 
the key mechanism within organisations through which employees are able to express their 
voice. However, such surveys are regarded by some as ineffective as a means of employees 
expressing voice (Purcell and Hall 2012).  For example, they rarely seek views from 
employees outside of the topics that are prescribed by management, provide little in the way 
of contextual influences and data is limited to giving percentages but not answers to why or 
how questions.   
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In short, the limitations of even the most sophisticated quantitative studies in developing our 
understanding of the importance of contextual factors and social processes, and how these can 
affect HR outcomes, are now increasingly recognised with some arguing that the workplace is 
an ‘open system’ too complex to be fully understood by ‘scientistic meta-theory’ (Fleetwood 
and Hesketh 2010). As such, and as noted earlier, these approaches may provide only a partial 
contribution to understanding employee voice. A different perspective on these issues, such as 
the importance of context, is evident in the Employment Relations literature. 
 
Employment Relations scholars are mindful of the role of the context in which a phenomenon 
evolves and develops. This is in contrast to HRM. Whereas HRM researchers rarely, if at all, 
give consideration to the context in which a social phenomenon occurs (Heery 2016), 
Employment Relations researchers do place emphasis on it (e.g. Johnstone 2014; 2015). 
Context as it relates to an organisation includes external factors in which an organisation 
operates (McBride and Stirling 2002). This can include the historical, social, economic and 
political environment. It also includes internal factors, for example, an organisation’s policies 
and procedures. Scholars in this tradition are attentive to the role played particularly by the 
external environment in shaping and constraining employee voice (Heery 2016). Academics 
working within an Employment Relations tradition are likely to be interested in the context in 
which employee voice has developed in order to understand how and why it is configured as 
it is. A further difference vis-à-vis employee voice between HRM and Employment Relations 
relates to research concerns about efficiency or equity. 
 
Whereas HRM research tends to focus on employee voice in relation to its contribution to an 
organisational efficiency objective, research undertaken by Employment Relations researchers 
tends to reflect the pluralist objective of equity. Researchers in the pluralist Employment 
Relations tradition focus on particular mechanisms, the way those mechanisms operate in 
practice, the way they are used by an organisation and whether voice that is yielded as a result 
errs towards concerns of equity. This is evidenced in the association between an Employment 
Relations approach with trade unions described in chapter two. Indeed, given that the origins 
of employee voice evolved with trade unions, it is no surprise that this was where 
Employment Relations researchers traditionally focused their energy. However, with the 
demise of trade unions some Employment Relations researchers have turned to other 
institutions and other mechanisms to study employee voice. Heery (2016) suggests there are 
three ways pluralist Employment Relations scholars study employee voice: 
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a. Scholars who are mounting a defence of trade unions, e.g. Bryson and Forth (2011). 
 
b. Scholars who focus on trade union revitalisation via, for example, partnership 
agreements, labour-management partnerships, e.g. Johnstone (2014; 2015). 
 
c. Scholars who focus on voice beyond trade unions to examine other representative 
institutions, such as employer-sponsored collective voice, worker directors, co-
operatives, works councils, financial participation, etc. e.g. Bryson and Freeman 
(2007); Johnstone et al (2010) and Kaufman and Taras (2010). 
 
It is with the third strand of Employment Relations research that this thesis is most closely 
aligned. Non-union forms of representative employee voice were discussed in chapter two 
with employee-ownership part of the cadre. As such, this research follows the contemporary 
path of Employment Relations academics through the study of employee-ownership. It uses a 
philosophical approach which has a subjective ontology and interpretivist epistemology. This 
is based on a belief that as researchers we are guided by our own ideas about the nature of 
existence and about what constitutes knowledge.  
 
The ontological position of this study is that as researchers we do not operate in isolation of 
the myriad values and belief systems that surround us in wider society. Rather, we are 
influenced by those values and beliefs and, it is argued here, are an influence on them. Whilst 
objectivism is regarded as an appropriate and relevant ontological position from which to 
study phenomena in the natural world, it is argued that the same position is not appropriate to 
the study of the social world. In the natural world there are phenomena that can be objectively 
observed in the search for understanding and establishing knowledge, tidal changes providing 
one example. The same approach is not appropriate to the social world.  
 
The argument here is that the social world is made up of many, sometimes competing, 
realities and interpretations. The role of the researcher is to untangle these realities and 
interpretations, try to make sense of what is happening and provide an explanation and 
analysis for what, in their view, is occurring. Given this ontology, it follows that the 
epistemological position is interpretivist prioritising an understanding of the social world 
through examining the interpretation of that world by its actors (Bryman 2012).  
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By adopting this approach, some of the key ontological and epistemological characteristics of 
research underpinned by positivism are anathema. This researcher assumes knowledge of 
reality is gained through social constructions, such as language, shared meanings, documents 
and other artefacts. Therefore, the research had no pre-defined variables; there were no formal 
propositions and no hypotheses to be tested or inferences to be drawn. This research is 
focused on the complexity of the environment in which decisions were taken about voice 
mechanisms, how employees make sense of the mechanism, employee-ownership, and how it 
is used by them to express their voice.  
 
A rich and in-depth qualitative study therefore lends itself more favourably to the study of 
employee voice. Importantly, the research approach emphasises the context when trying to 
understand the nature of employee voice. Therefore, the configuration conceived by Pawson 
and Tilley (1997) which recommends studying context alongside mechanisms and outcomes, 
provides a way of organising the research approach.  
 
4.4 The research approach 
The research approach of this study was a single qualitative case study. Underpinned by a 
subjective interpretivist philosophy, the key purpose of the research approach was to ensure a 
richness and depth and was exploratory and explanatory (Saunders et al 2012) vis-à-vis 
employee voice. To do so, evidence was drawn from a single qualitative ‘case’ of an 
organisation which aimed to capture the voice of employees as it emerged in its real-life 
setting.  
 
4.4.1 A single case or multiple cases? 
This study uses a single rather than multiple cases. Using a single case is potentially 
contentious and therefore requires justification (Saunders et al 2012). There are several 
reasons for choosing a single case. The first is the fundamental nature of this research and its 
complexity requiring examination of multiple units of analysis at different levels within the 
organisation which in turn would allow analysis and exploration of relationships between 
those units (Yin 2009).  For example, the manifestation of employee voice will be considered 
at various organisational levels enabling the researcher to ‘close-in’ and respondents to ‘talk 
back’ (Flyvberg 2006 p.235; p. 236). This will ensure that a ‘thick description’ (Geertz 1973) 
of the case is achieved. The second reason is the case itself.  
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A single case study is used when it is considered ‘unique’ (Saunders et al 2012), ‘extreme or 
deviant’ (Flyvberg 2006) or ‘rare’ (Yin 2009). An employee-owned enterprise is an atypical 
business model and therefore understudied (Strauss 2006). The third is the time and resources 
needed for a study of this depth that could not be achieved if studying multiple cases. The 
fourth is the emphasis on qualitative rather than quantitative research; the idea being that it is 
depth not breadth that is important: ‘Using three or four cases is no better than using one case 
when it comes to increasing confidence in your findings’ (Myers 2013 p. 84). Indeed, though 
a case study can be used as part of a research strategy in either quantitative or qualitative 
research, the decision to adopt one or the other approach is not taken in isolation but rather, as 
noted earlier, is influenced by the researcher’s own assumptions and beliefs about reality and 
knowledge. 
 
In a substantive critique of the case study approach, Robinson (2002) highlights how Stake 
(2005) and Yin (1993) use very different epistemologies in their approaches to using case 
studies. Given the philosophical orientation of this research, it is the approach used by Stake 
(2005) that has influenced the selection of the type of case study which is used here. That 
said, the contribution to the subject by Yin (1993) is clearly substantive and so at times and 
where relevant, his work will be drawn on. As a self-confessed constructivist, Stake (2005) 
argues knowledge is constructed by people. In this view, the plausibility of the case is 
paramount and is increased through the use of multiple sources of evidence coupled with a 
clear description of what has been done and how it has been done (Myers 2013). In contrast, 
Yin’s (1993) epistemology is grounded in the scientific, positivist method. Here, concerns are 
with the research questions or propositions and the logic of aligning data to those questions 
and propositions (Myers 2013). As noted in the discussion of epistemology, these differences 
affect the design, selection, execution and analysis of the research.  
 
As one would expect, Stake’s (2005) ontological approach to research design, selection, 
execution and analysis is subjective. Rather than having a linear path, it is a process which 
evolves as the researcher progresses through the research. In contrast, Yin’s (1993) 
ontological approach is more objective and as such is organised, logical and methodical. Stake 
(2005) states:  
 
‘The name “case study” is emphasised by some of us because it draws attention to the 
question of what specifically can be learned about the single case’ (p.443).  
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Applying the same epistemological question to this research, it becomes: what can we 
specifically learn about employee voice in an employee-owned enterprise? Further, the focus 
of this research is very much on developing an understanding of employee voice within this 
case rather than trying to generalise beyond it. Specifically, the qualitative case study strategy 
enables a focus, not only on the case itself but also on the context in which it operates which 
influences decisions about mechanisms which in turn affect the outcomes of voice as it 
unfolds in this particular case. Hartley (1994; cited in Kandathil and Varman 2007) suggest a 
case study provides a fuller contextual sense of the studied phenomena and is best suited for 
studying ‘social processes as they unfold in organisations’ (p.143). Stake (2005) identified 
three types of case study which are outlined in the table 4.2 below. 
 
 
Type Description 
Intrinsic  The primary concern is for a better understanding of the particular 
case; it is not undertaken because it is representative nor because it 
illustrates a trait or problem, but because, despite its ordinariness, this 
case is itself of interest. The purpose is not to understand some 
abstract notion, nor is it theory-building, the study is undertaken 
because of an intrinsic interest. 
Instrumental  The primary concern is to provide insight into an issue or to re-draw a 
generalisation, as such, the case itself is of secondary interest, it 
facilitates our understanding of something else. The case may or may 
not be typical of other cases, the choice of the case is made to advance 
understanding of that other interest. 
Multiple  When there is even less interest in a particular case, a number of cases 
may be studied jointly in order to investigate a phenomenon, 
population or general condition, it is an instrumental study extended to 
several cases. 
Table 4.2 Types of case study 
 
 
Though Stake (ibid) posits either an intrinsic or instrumental case study, the approach here 
will be both as it seeks a better understanding of the case itself, an employee-owned 
enterprise, whilst also seeking to advance understanding of employee voice within the case. 
The third type of case study, multiple, and a rationale for not using it, has been discussed 
above (A single or multiple cases). Additionally, to ensure richness and depth, this study will 
use a single ‘embedded’ (Saunders et al 2012) and ‘extended’ (Burawoy 1998) case study 
design.  
 
Embeddedness will come from studying a unit of analysis within the context of the case and 
related sub-units enabling how and why questions to be asked (Yin 2009). The units will be 
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identified by drawing on examples from the existing literature as well as through the research 
process itself. Extendedness will come from situating the phenomenon in its wider context 
and its localised environment and studying people not in terms of what they ‘ought to do’ but 
rather on what they ‘actually’ do (Burawoy 1998 p.5). Consideration of the wider 
environment is something which has been noted by several qualitative researchers as 
important (e.g. Myers 2013) as has placing oneself in the position of those who are being 
studied. 
 
Flyvberg (2006) argues ‘…the most advanced form of understanding is achieved when 
researchers place themselves within the context being studied’ enabling a ‘proximity to 
reality’ (p.237). Gillham (2000) argues any definition of a case study should include: ‘a unit 
of human activity embedded in the real world; which can only be studied or understood in 
context; which exists in the here and now; that merges in with its context so that precise 
boundaries are difficult to draw’ (p.1). An embedded and extended case study is appropriate 
to enable proximity to the reality described by Flyvberg (2006) and as the boundaries of the 
phenomenon and the context in which it operates are not clearly separated (Yin 2009). For 
Burawoy (1998) such a reflexive model of science embraces not detachment, as with the 
positivist researcher, but rather engagement as the road to knowledge. A key aspect then of 
the qualitative case study is understanding what is going on in a particular case through 
observation and through being reflective (Stake 2005). The approach that has been used for 
this study has ensured sensitivity to the context of the organisation (Bryman and Bell 2011; 
Maitlis 2005), has focused on complex social processes (McBride 2005), created depth and 
detail (O’Mahoney and Vincent 2014), allowed how and why questions to be asked (Harrison 
and Easton 2004; Yin 2009) and facilitated theoretical generalisation (Tsang 2014). 
 
4.5 The research design: Context, mechanism and outcomes 
As noted several times during this chapter, context is regarded as fundamental to 
understanding the nature of employee voice within the case study. Reflecting the logic that 
without an understanding of the broader context it is impossible to understand the correct 
meaning of data (Myers 2013), it is anticipated a more holistic, in-depth, accurate and fair 
picture of the studied organisation will be achieved. Further, the context in which the studied 
organisation operates will have a bearing on the voice mechanism that is chosen and affect the 
subsequent outcomes for key organisational actors. The design of this research has followed 
the ‘Context, Mechanisms and Outcomes’ configuration conceived by Pawson and Tilley 
(1997). 
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‘Context’ refers to the conditions in which a mechanism is introduced which are relevant to 
the operation of the mechanism. As it is used for research purposes, it refers to the external 
environment (e.g. economic and political) and internal environment (e.g. policies and 
statutory obligations) in which the studied organisation operates. External context as it 
concerns the studied case for this research is the social care sector. ‘Mechanism’ refers to the 
processes through which voice manifests. An important consideration regarding a particular 
mechanism relates to the intention of that mechanism (Kessler 2010), i.e. what is hoped to be 
achieved by its architects? For this study, the mechanism is employee-ownership and an 
important question is how is voice is exercised through it? It has been suggested that the 
interaction of context, company characteristics and actors’ objectives can have a powerful 
effect on the level and type of employee-ownership (Pendleton 2001). As such, as noted by 
Wilkinson et al (2014):  
 
‘In a world in which voice mechanisms go beyond the traditional union mechanism, 
there is a need for more fine-grained and at times more qualitative analysis of how the 
different mechanisms actually function’ (p.6).  
 
Regarding the outcomes of a mechanism, these can relate to quantifiable features such as 
absenteeism and staff retention. As it is used here, outcomes refer to the way in which the 
mechanism was experienced by organisational actors. Figure 4.1 below summarises the CMO 
configuration that will provide a way of organising the investigation of employee voice in this 
study.  
 
 
Figure 4.1 Context-Mechanism-Outcomes configuration 
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As the configuration relates to context, the research will draw on the social care literature 
(chapter five) to explore challenges in the external environment in which the studied case 
operates. These external challenges influenced the decision to adopt employee-ownership as 
the mechanism as well as influencing how it evolved in the studied case. By outcomes, the 
research will focus on the consequences for employee voice in the studied case through 
consideration of its effect on key organisational actors.  
 
4.6 Research process 
Grounded by a subjective interpretive philosophy and using a single qualitative case study 
with the CMO providing a way of organising the data collection and its analysis, this section 
outlines the research process. The section is separated into sub-sections that cover: selecting 
the case, accessing the case, selecting respondents, methods of data collection, withdrawing 
from the research, data analysis and the principles, ethics and reflexivity of the research. 
 
4.6.1 Selecting the case  
The studied case has been given the pseudonym ‘Vivo-Co’ in order to protect its identity. The 
relevance of the case which forms the focus of any research project is paramount. Cases have 
to be selected because ‘…they exhibit or are likely to exhibit variation in the mechanism 
under scrutiny or its context’ (Ackroyd and Karlsson 2014 p.31). As discussed above, Vivo-
Co was chosen for its ‘suitability’ in relation to employee voice. In so doing, it is the unit of 
investigation that counts rather than the way the case was identified (Diefenbach 2009). 
Similarly, purposive sampling is recommended by Stake (2005) regarding the choice of the 
case and ensuring one is chosen from which the most can be learnt.  
 
Purposive sampling can include using existing personal and corporate relationships (Myers 
2013). Such an approach, Saunders et al (2012) suggest, means ‘professional colleagues’ can 
trust the stated intentions and assurances given about the use of data and involves a researcher 
‘trading on your existing credibility’ (p.222). Vivo-Co was accessed through established 
networks of professional contacts. The process began through a meeting with an existing 
professional contact known to the researcher for approximately twenty years. However, this 
did not mean access was either straightforward nor a one-off negotiation. The complexity of 
the access process to Vivo-Co is discussed below. 
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4.6.2 Accessing the case 
There are myriad access issues that can affect the research process (Whittle et al 2014). 
Indeed, the organisation being approached may not see an advantage in taking part in the 
research at all (Myers 2013). On the contrary, they may anticipate burdens such as the 
researcher taking up staff time or key actors not seeing any value to themselves in terms of the 
research results. Once access is granted, this should not be regarded as a one-off activity but 
rather something that needs constant re-negotiation (Delamont 2002). This was true of 
accessing Vivo-Co, which was a continuous process rather than something that occurred once 
at the beginning of the study.  
 
Gaining access to Vivo-Co was protracted (eight months) consisting of five meetings with the 
Chief Executive Officer and sometimes other members of the senior executive team. Given 
the length of the access process, more details are provided in appendix one. It was a process 
that was intensive and time-consuming and incurred a number of challenges. The challenges 
included a period of time where the researcher was unsure whether access would be granted at 
all.  Once access had been granted there was nevertheless a constant uncertainty during the 
course of the research that it would be revoked. This point is made by Delamont (2002) who 
acknowledges the vulnerability of the researcher in terms of knowing that the gatekeeper can 
at any time choose to withdraw access. In such circumstances, and indeed as it was here, 
constant communication between the researcher and the primary gatekeeper, the Chief 
Executive Officer of Vivo-Co, were necessary to alleviate her uncertainty whilst providing 
reassurance to him. 
 
Despite the challenges of accessing Vivo-Co, the Chief Executive Officer was helpful and 
generous in giving further time. Alongside access meetings, a further six meetings as well as 
several electronic communications were held with him. Mainly, this was to keep him up-to-
date with the research, discuss any particular areas of concern and to discuss specific technical 
issues regarding either social care or employee-ownership as it related to Vivo-Co. What the 
process did highlight was the degree of flexibility needed by the researcher in terms of both 
accessing an organisation as well as seeing the research as a non-linear process and made up 
of a number of constituent parts involving various organisational actors. Gaining access to an 
organisation was not a one-off event nor a linear process. Rather, access proved to be an 
integral part of the research process requiring constant renegotiation which involved several 
organisational actors.  
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4.6.3 Selecting respondents 
Depending on the research methods being used within the bounds of the case study, there are 
several ways in which the researcher can select respondents within the case. As with case 
selection, ‘purposive sampling’ can be used to select respondents who are most likely to be 
able to answer the research questions (Corley and Gioia 2004). This is also known as 
‘theoretical’ or ‘judgemental’ sampling the purpose of which is to illustrate the phenomenon 
rather than achieve representativeness. Other examples are snowballing, whereby each 
respondent helps the researcher to find another respondent and opportunity sampling, 
whereby the researcher seizes opportunities when they arise (Delamont 2002).  
 
For this research, the strategy of selecting respondents was two-fold. Firstly, purposive 
sampling was used to ensure access to respondents who were directly involved with 
employee-ownership and therefore likely to be able to answer the research questions. This 
included those actors who were a member of the employee-ownership governing body, the 
‘General Council’ as it was called in Vivo-Co. The General Council was a specific process 
yielded through employee-ownership which enabled employee voice. Furthermore, given the 
General Council was a relatively small group, it was feasible to consider approaching each of 
them to ask that they take part in an interview. Secondly, opportunity sampling occurred 
where the researcher was invited to attend particular events and took the opportunity to 
observe and ask questions of those attending these events. 
 
4.6.4 Familiarising with the case 
A degree of familiarisation with Vivo-Co was carried out before the primary and secondary 
research began. The purpose of this was to explore where employee voice might manifest. As 
there was no tool available that would allow the researcher to structure this process of 
familiarisation, one was developed. A ‘6-S’ configuration (see appendix two) was developed 
to aid understanding of how, where and with what effect employee voice was channelled into, 
within and outwith different parts of Vivo-Co. This was achieved by separating the 
organisation as follows:  
 
1. Sovereignty – governance mechanism 
 
2. Structure – organisational and governance configuration 
 
3. Strategy – business planning, etc. 
 
4. Systems – processes of employee-ownership 
 
5. Shape – size of the organisation and the physical space it occupies 
 
6. Spirit – how open and welcoming the organisation was 
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As an example of how the configuration aided familiarisation, the first component, 
sovereignty, related to how employee voice could manifest at the level of governance through 
being enshrined in Vivo-Co’s governing document. This governing document provided the 
framework for employee-ownership: firstly, in terms of the technicalities and regulations of 
Vivo-Co as an employee-owned organisation; secondly in terms of its aspirations and its 
purpose; and thirdly in terms of setting the parameters of what the organisation and its various 
bodies could and could not do; its organisational powers. The 6-S configuration aided 
familiarisation of particular parts of the organisation and helped to provide a boundary for 
data collection and, importantly, helped the researcher to understand how one part related to 
other parts of the configuration when it came to analysing the data and understanding the 
nature of employee voice in Vivo-Co. 
 
4.6.5 Methods of data collection 
Within the research process, a combination of research methods were used, thus ‘deploying 
multiple dialogues to reach explanations of empirical phenomena’ (Burawoy 1998 p.5) 
through ‘converging several lines of enquiry’ (Yin 2009 p.115). Three research methods were 
used to undertake the research: observations, semi-structured interviews and documentary 
evidence.  
 
a. Observations 
Regarded as the ‘central plank of qualitative research’ (Delamont 2002) and mindful of the 
advice from Hazen (1993), to ‘hear’ as well as ‘see’ an organisation, observations formed a 
major part of the research process. For this element, observations of Vivo-Co all took place in 
formal settings – a place of work and permission to observe was always granted by the most 
senior person in the organisation, the Chief Executive Officer. The activity of each 
observation is defined here as either ‘formal and organised’ (e.g. General Council meetings, 
team meeting and managers meeting) or ‘formal and disorganised’ (employees coming into 
and out of an office reception).  
 
The formal and organised observations were of people within groups (Saunders et al 2012). 
Predominantly, this involved observation of the General Council meetings though it also 
included observing a team meeting of social care employees and a manager’s meeting. Whilst 
it had been intended to carry out non-participant observation, defined as: ‘A situation in which 
the observer observes but does not participate in what is going on in the social setting’ 
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(Bryman 2012 p.273), on a number of occasions the researcher was invited into the space of 
the meeting, such as being included in introductions at the beginning of meetings and being 
asked for thoughts during General Council meetings about specific topics. Additionally, 
several electronic conversations were held with the researcher and the chair of the General 
Council between meetings where the researcher was asked to reflect on the General Council. 
As such, observations erred more towards participant than non-participant observation.  
 
The formal and disorganised observations were of social care employees coming into and out 
of their office-base at one of the branches of Vivo-Co. Vivo-Co has six branches though the 
researcher had a more frequent presence at one of them to carry out observations of social 
care employees. The reason for focusing on one was that the six branches are scattered 
geographically across the UK meaning observations in all of them would have been time-
consuming and costly; it was deemed that more substantive observations could be undertaken 
by focusing on one branch. As with the formal and organised observations, permission was 
sought from the Chief Executive Officer and the relevant branch manager to observe the 
social care employees. The Chief Executive Officer and the relevant branch manager were 
also asked by the researcher to seek permission from the social care employees to be 
observed. Permission was subsequently granted by the Chief Executive Officer and branch 
manager to access this particular branch. The Chief Executive Officer also suggested it would 
be courteous to inform the branch manager when observations were going to take place. The 
researcher’s role in observing social care employees was more peripheral than was the case 
with the formal organised meetings.  
 
A schedule including prescribed themes was used to record interaction during both organised 
and disorganised observations and in so doing, provided some structure to the observations 
and consistency of observations across different groups. The schedule for observations can be 
found in appendix three and included: who decides what is on the agenda, where meetings 
were held, what the attendance was, who talked and who did not, the format of the meetings, 
who decided the format of meetings, who actioned points afterwards and what was the nature 
of discussions: friendly, formal, inclusive. In other words, the schedule enabled the researcher 
to capture data relating to the formal aspects as well as informal aspects of each meeting.  
 
Particular attention was paid to informal behaviour as well as the formal aspects of 
organisational life (Delamont 2002). For example, observing interactions before and after 
General Council meetings was as important as observing the actual meeting. Observing the 
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practices of business etiquette being invoked before, during and after meetings was also of 
interest. Furthermore, observations of the physical aspects of the organisation were noted 
including notices, to assess how welcoming the offices were. 
 
During the research period, five General Council meetings were observed between June 2015 
and June 2016. The researcher was invited to each of the General Council meetings by the 
Chief Executive Officer. Each meeting was rotated between the organisation’s six branches 
and lasted a full day. There was one full-day observation of a managers meeting, six half-day 
observations of social care employees and one half-day observation of a team meeting of 
social care employees.  
 
The observations of social care employees took place on a Monday morning, a particularly 
busy period as this was the time they came into the branch office to drop off their time-sheets 
for the hours they had worked during the previous week.  The researcher sat in the reception 
area and observed social care employees during each three hour observation period. This also 
provided the opportunity for conversation with the branch receptionist. Agendas of all of the 
meetings, minutes of each meeting and other documentary evidence also formed part of the 
analysis and are discussed below (Documentary Evidence). A key concern when observing 
was how voice was enabled or prevented through the mechanism of employee-ownership. 
 
b. Semi-structured interviews 
The second research method was semi-structured interviews. In contrast to other types of 
interview, such as structured or unstructured, semi-structured interviews involve some pre-
formatted questions though there is not necessarily a strict adherence to them (Myers 2013). It 
is for this reason, i.e. the flexibility of the method to both the respondent and the researcher 
that it was selected. Semi-structured interviews enabled the researcher to focus each of the 
respondents on specific issues whilst at the same time enabling them some flexibility in terms 
of how they responded to questions. Such flexibility however, means that semi-structured 
interviews can be time-consuming raising a further issue of how many to carry out. 
 
Regarding how many people to interview, Diefenbach (2009) suggests the numbers of 
interviewees is shrouded in quantitative representativeness aiming at statistical validity and 
though data from one interview is unlikely to tell the whole story, interviews with a number 
of people referring to the same issues will give a broader picture of that which is being 
studied. That said, he suggests there is no way of determining a sufficient number. As it was, 
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interviewing a number of organisational actors from Vivo-Co enabled cross-checking and 
comparisons which in turn led to emerging patterns and deeper insights during the analysis 
phase. Similarly, Myers (2013) suggests it is not so much an issue of numbers as it is making 
sure the people interviewed represent a variety of voices. As such, interviews were with those 
people representing as many parts of Vivo-Co, such as the branch receptionist, though having 
a specific focus on those directly involved with the employee-ownership mechanism.  
 
Detailed explanations of each of the organisational actors, such as ‘founder members’, will be 
provided in the next chapter when discussing the organisational configuration of Vivo-Co and 
chapter six when discussing the findings of the research. Suffice at this point, a summary of 
semi-structured interviews that were undertaken were with the following organisational 
actors: 
 
 Two with the Chief Executive Officer  
 
 Eight with five employee representatives 
 
 Three with founder members 
 
 Two with the Chair of the governing body, the General Council  
 
 Four with representatives of the senior executive team. 
 
The interview schedule used for each individual or group can be found in appendix four. The 
schedule was adapted depending on who was being interviewed. The interviews with the 
Chief Executive Officer, founder members, chair of the General Council and representatives 
of the senior executive team were arranged during the course of the research. Of the employee 
representatives, all five were asked at a General Council meeting to take part in an interview 
and all agreed. All were given a copy of a consent form which they all signed (appendix five).  
 
Subsequently one of the representatives did not respond to email requests to arrange an 
interview date. All interviews were undertaken between the fourth and fifth meetings of the 
General Council. Waiting for some time before interviewing representatives meant they had 
time to familiarise themselves with the role. Two of the interviews were by telephone and two 
were face-to-face. All representatives were assured of confidentiality. Of the two face-to-face 
interviews, both representatives stated their preference was that the interview was not 
recorded. Each interview lasted between 30-40 minutes. The researcher took handwritten 
notes during the interview and made additional notes following each interview. 
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c. Documentary evidence  
The third data collection method was documentary data. This has been treated here as data in 
its own right (Buchanan and Dawson 2007) as well as how it corresponds, complements or 
challenges data from other sources. Following Delamont (2002), all documentary data is 
socially produced and has a particular audience in mind requiring therefore that such evidence 
is read sceptically and examined within its social context. Regarding the efficacy of particular 
forms of documentary evidence, Scott (1990) suggests four criteria are used, illustrated in the 
table below. 
 
 
Criteria Considerations 
Authenticity  Is the evidence genuine and of unquestionable origin? 
Credibility  Is the evidence free from distortion and error? 
Representative  Is the evidence typical of its kind? 
If it is not typical, is the extent of its untypicality known? 
Meaning  Is the evidence clear and comprehensible?  
Table 4.3 Criteria for assessing the quality of documentary evidence 
 
Following these criteria, the documentary evidence forming this research was:  
 
 Company website 
 Six agendas of meetings of the governing body 
 Six sets of minutes of meetings of the governing body 
 One copy of the Employee Owners’ Manual 
 Findings of one internal employee satisfaction survey 
 Minutes of one Employee Engagement Forum 
 The company’s Articles of Association 
 The company’s Trust Deed 
 The company’s organisational structure 
 Notes of one meeting between an employee representative and a branch manager  
 Newsletters 
 Social care employees’ team meeting agenda 
 Company’s core values statement 
 Duties and responsibilities of employee owners 
 Process of the employee suggestion scheme 
 Two reports of Vivo-Co by the Care Quality Commission 
 Company demographics 
 One operating board meeting agenda 
 Staff turnover rates  
 Marketing materials (on-line and hard copy). 
 
Mindful that this documentary data is shrouded in a particular organisational and professional 
language, the researcher was guided by the questions: how is this written, by whom, for 
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whom and what is missing? A further point to note is that substantial research was carried out 
in order to understand the context of the social care sector in which Vivo-Co operates which 
is discussed in chapter five. This included researching organisations involved with the care 
sector such as the Care Quality Commission and Skills for Care.  
 
4.6.6 Withdrawing from the research  
Knowing when and how to leave the research site is an important decision. Having an ‘exit 
strategy’ built into the research design may help. The fieldwork for this research was guided 
principally by the notion of ‘theoretical saturation’; in other words the point at which few new 
observations or themes are observed in the data (Mason 2002), as well as being influenced by 
more practical issues of access and resources (Saunders et al 2012; Yin 2009). The term 
‘diminishing analytical return’ is used by Fine (1983; cited in Delamont 2002); in other 
words, the time to leave is when there is nothing new to be learned. However, there were two 
inter-related reasons why reaching such a point was not so straightforward.  
 
Firstly, following the philosophical orientation of this thesis, there is always something new 
to be learnt. The ‘reality’ of employee-ownership in Vivo-Co was constantly changing and re-
writing itself and therefore would continue once the researcher had left the site. Secondly, 
given that employee-ownership was something new to Vivo-Co, the story was still unfolding 
more so than in other, more established employee-owned organisations. As it was, the 
researcher decided on a point to withdraw from the research and provided notice of this 
decision to key participants. Additionally, a letter was sent to the Chair of the General Council 
asking him to thank all of those who took part in the research and offering to present some of 
the key findings at a later date convenient to the organisation. To date, a reply to this offer has 
not been received. 
 
4.6.7 Data analysis 
There are few formulae to analyse qualitative data; much is dependent on empirical thinking, 
presentation of evidence, consideration of alternative interpretations and reflection and critical 
evaluation of methodology and analysis (Silverman 2010, 2011; Yin 2009). The researcher is 
involved in a continuous process of moving back and forth between the data and theory 
(Ackroyd and Karlsson 2014; Harrison and Easton 2004) searching for themes and patterns; 
similarities and differences. It is a process that is intense and can seem disordered and messy 
when compared to the more organised and systematic process of analysing quantitative data. 
The analysis of qualitative data has no clear start or end point.  
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The analysis process is one that is iterative with an emphasis on the depth of analysis rather 
than the number of data sources. Analysis approaches can be either top-down through 
drawing concepts from the extant literature or bottom-up where concepts emerge from the 
data (Myers 2013). This research used both approaches: 
 
a. A top-down approach involves drawing concepts from the extant literature. The 
frames of reference (Bray et al 2015; Fox 1966, 1974; Storey 1989) discussed in 
chapter three provided a theoretical framework with a priori themes that guided the 
analysis process. The key frames vis-à-vis this research were hard and soft unitarism 
and the contemporary frame of collaborative pluralism (Bray et al 2015). The 
framework was used as a lens to seek characteristics akin to each frame as voice was 
expressed by different organisational actors. For example, a key phrase synonymous 
with the soft unitarist frame is ‘going the extra mile’. This was a phrase invoked 
several times during interviews which called on social care employees to go beyond 
their day-to-day duties and give more to the organisation.  
 
b. A bottom-up approach is through in-vivo themes, i.e. themes that emerge from the 
data. There were a number of themes that emerged from the data and included words 
and phrases used by the organisational actors to express their voice regarding a 
particular matter. An example of this was an analogy that was used by an employee 
representative who described himself and the other employee representatives as ‘little 
fish’ which was in contrast to the big fish such as the Chief Executive Officer. 
 
To provide some structure to the analysis process, the researcher drew on thematic analysis. 
This is ‘a method for systematically identifying, organising and offering insight into patterns 
of meanings (themes) across a data set’ (Braun and Clark 2012 p.57). It is regarded as one of 
the most commonly used forms of qualitative data analysis (Ripley 2011). Data analysis 
‘phases’ devised by Braun and Clark (2006), highlighted in the table below, were used to 
guide the analysis process, though the authors caution that qualitative data analysis is not a 
linear but rather a recursive process. 
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Phase one Data familiarisation 
Phase two Generate initial codes 
Phase three Search for themes 
Phase four Review themes 
Phase five Define and name themes 
Phase six Report writing 
Table 4.4 Data analysis phases 
 
 
 
a. Data familiarisation 
The first phase of the data analysis process highlighted in table 4.4 relates to familiarisation 
with the data. This is achieved by reading and re-reading the data, making notes during this 
process and highlighting specific parts of potential interest. To do this, fieldwork notes were 
handwritten immediately after either observations or interview.  
 
All notes and scripts were typed manually into a Personal Computer by the researcher 
according to the originating source, and where relevant, each interview participant. Where 
more than one interview was undertaken with a participant, the file name was given a 
corresponding number according to the number of the interview, one, two, and so on. Data 
was initially organised according to the particular research method used: observational data 
was collated and analysed discreetly as was interview data and documentary evidence. Once 
several transcripts had been generated, the process of reading the data began.  Braun and 
Clarke (2012) advise reading the data actively, analytically and critically and thinking about 
what it means. This process revealed recurring themes between transcripts which led to the 
second stage of the process. 
 
b. Initial coding.  
Some of the initial codes which were generated reflected the respondents own language, for 
example ‘little fishes like us’ whilst others involved some interpretation by the researcher, 
such as a sign hung on a door which read, ‘No [social care employees] beyond this point’. The 
process also included generating codes relating to the participant’s words as being, for 
example, confident, servile, conflictual or compromising. In other words, the codes related to 
the way in which employee voice was being expressed which would then be compared to the 
key words and terms used in each of the frames of reference. Once all of the data had been 
analysed and codes identified the next stage was to develop themes from the codes. 
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c. Searching for themes 
This third stage of the analysis process involved the refinement of the codes, developing 
themes from the codes and looking for relationships between themes. The basic process 
involves either collapsing or clustering codes that share some ‘unifying feature’ (Braun and 
Clark 2012 p.63). Here, the frames of reference (Bray et al 2015; Fox 1966, 1974; Storey 
1989) provided the framework to allocate the developing themes. Combined scripts and texts 
of each research method were read and re-read in relation to this framework.  
 
d. Review themes 
The fourth stage involved reviewing potential themes in relation to the coded data and also the 
full data set. This process is one that is recursive involving the researcher going back and 
forth between codes and themes.  
 
e. Defining and naming themes 
The fifth stage involves defining and naming the themes and selecting extracts to be 
presented. Braun and Clark (2012) advise the themes should be both descriptive and 
interpretive. This process generated a number of themes, for example, governance, ownership, 
hierarchy, etc. Once this process had been undertaken within each research method, themes 
were then compared between the research methods to see if there were any similarities or 
differences, for example between interview data and observational data. By following this 
process, several themes were generated and through a process of re-analysis became sub-
themes of the overall analytical themes of the frames of reference.  For example, hierarchy 
became a sub-theme of the hard unitarist frame. An example of part of the data analysis 
process is provided in appendix six. 
 
f. Writing a report 
The resulting analysis from each of the three research methods, both individually and 
combined, has brought a level of triangulation to the process and forms chapter six, the 
findings of the research. This detailed analysis process, Stake (2005) argues, helps to identify 
different realities and reduce misinterpretation. 
 
4.6.8 Principles, ethics and reflexivity 
The principles on which qualitative research is carried out differs from that of quantitative 
research. Principles which are concerned with ‘validity’ and ‘reliability’ in the research 
process are not typically associated with qualitative research given the implication in both of 
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an objective and independent reality (Myers 2013). They are terms more typically associated 
with quantitative research and lay weight to the argument that such research is more robust. 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that the principle of robust research cannot equally, albeit 
differently, be applied to qualitative research.  
 
Following a call for greater researcher accountability (Gatrell 2009) and an acknowledgement 
that: ‘Qualitative researchers are guests in the private spaces of the world’ (Stake 2005 p.459), 
being guided by a set of research principles and ethics are considered to be an integral part of 
the qualitative research process. As such they should guide the way in which the researcher 
designs, executes, analyses and reports on the research. Though not being prescriptive, 
Saunders et al (2012) suggest researchers adhere to ethical principles including:  
 
 Integrity and objectivity of the researcher 
 
 Respect for others 
 
 Privacy of those taking part 
 
 Voluntary nature of participation 
 
 Informed consent of participants 
 
 Ensuring confidentiality of data and anonymity 
 
 
Through adhering to these principles, as well as the ethical policy of the researcher’s own 
institution, the research process will be strengthened whilst at the same time ensuring those 
who take part in the research are treated with the dignity and respect they deserve. These 
principles have therefore been incorporated into the whole research process, from its design, 
through to its implementation and finally in its analysis and reporting. The principles also 
underpinned the ethical approach of this research. 
 
The ethical approach of this research was guided and informed by the researcher’s academic 
institution but also by her own belief that research ethics should constitute an integral part of 
the research process. As such, they should be, and in this case are, designed into the study 
from the outset and inform every step of the process including the literature that has been 
reviewed, the philosophical and theoretical perspective taken as well as being integral to the 
methodological and analytical approach used. They included aspects such as integrity, 
sensitivity, confidentiality, anonymity, accountability and transparency and formed an integral 
and continuous part of the research process. Given that access was initiated to Vivo-Co via a 
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professional contact, the researcher was mindful of knowing some respondents and therefore 
of possible impacts and conflicts of interest. A further concern is the sensitive nature of the 
research, i.e. individuals’ work experiences and commercial issues.  
 
To address the sensitive nature of the research, respondents were assured their identity would 
be protected and their responses would be treated confidentially. Commercial confidentiality 
was a particular issue affecting access to Vivo-Co. As such, a thorough system of ethical 
approval was undertaken as well as consideration of the relevant literature (e.g. Diefenbach 
2009; Gatrell 2009). Furthermore, a non-disclosure agreement was signed by the researcher 
by way of assurance to the Chief Executive Officer. Nevertheless, despite such a thorough 
ethical approach, being reflexive during the process was also essential. 
 
Reflexivity in the research process is increasingly regarded as an essential component of that 
process (Cruz and Monteiro 2017). It requires the researcher to be clear about their role within 
the research process. Whether a researcher regards themselves as part of the process is rooted 
in their ontological and epistemological orientation as noted in the discussion above. For 
example, a researcher adopting a positivist position would not necessarily see such reflexivity 
as important given their stance is one of objectivity and therefore distancing themselves from 
the phenomenon of study. In contrast, those researchers following a subjective interpretive 
ontology regard themselves as very much a part of, and having an effect on, the research.  
 
As noted by Delamont (2002) ‘There is no location where the researcher can base herself to 
do research which is outside or beyond the social world’ (p.8). As such, researchers of the 
latter orientation, including this researcher, are increasingly subscribing to a process of 
reflexivity whereby they consider their role in the research and reflect on how that has 
affected the process and outcomes of the research as well as transparency in terms of those 
processes and conclusions drawn.  
 
4.7 Limitations of the research methodology 
Despite the merits of the research methodology, inevitably there are limitations. The first 
relates to the philosophical approach. Adopting a subjective interpretivist approach means that 
what is included in the research process, including its findings, are decided by the researcher 
and undoubtedly shrouded in their own assumptions and beliefs. Nevertheless, drawing on 
this particular philosophy has, it is hoped, produced a richer and more in-depth understanding 
of employee voice than could have been achieved through other approaches.  
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A second limitation relates to the strategy of using one case study which, as noted above, is 
contentious and carries a high risk. For example, the participating organisation could have 
withdrawn access. Certainly, the protracted process of accessing the case caused a continuous 
worry. This was addressed by frequent communication with the key organisational actors, 
such as through progress reports, to provide reassurance about the research process.  
 
The third relates to observation as a research method. For Silverman (2010) the challenge of 
such a method is its subjectivity in terms of perceived relevance of data. In other words, what 
is included as part of an observation is subjectively chosen by the researcher. Also, Bryman 
(2012) has suggested the method is intense and, whilst the researcher will be able to observe 
behaviour, the opportunity is not there to know the intentions or meaning of that behaviour. It 
was anticipated that by using multiple-methods some of these limitations would be alleviated.  
 
The fourth relates to semi-structured interviews. As with observations, interviews are 
subjective relying on the nature of, and reflection on, individuals’ experiences. Undoubtedly 
this was affected by memory, privileging the present over the backstory (Friedman 2014) and 
potentially influenced the reliability of the data (Hamel et al 1993; Hammersley 2007; 
Saunders et al 2012). The authenticity of interview data has been questioned by Watson 
(2011) whilst Gatrell (2009) has pointed to the potentially exploitative nature of the interview. 
Despite these challenges, given that the focus of the research was employee voice, it seemed 
counterintuitive not to provide as many opportunities as possible for employees to have a 
voice in the research process: interviews offering one such opportunity.  
 
Additionally, the researcher was sensitive to, and took account of, the conflicting needs of 
interviewee vis-à-vis the interviewer. Practical issues were addressed such as giving advance 
warning of the interview format, interviewing respondents in their space and time, providing 
assurances about confidentiality and anonymity, giving an opt in/out option, informing that 
the interview could be stopped or questions skipped, and giving an idea of what would be 
covered.  
 
4.8 Summary  
This chapter has discussed the research methodology. The chapter was separated into six 
sections. Section one considered the philosophical traditions which underpin different 
research approaches. To highlight how these differences affect research practice, the second 
section discussed the research approaches used by HRM and Employment Relations scholars 
93 
 
to study employee voice. The third section stated the approach of this study: a subjectivist 
ontology, interpretivist epistemology and qualitative methodology. Section four discussed the 
research design. This is a qualitative single case study that is exploratory and explanatory, and 
includes the Context, Mechanism and Outcomes (CMO) configuration conceived by Pawson 
and Tilley (1997) that is used to organise data collection and analysis. Section five discussed 
the research process which included selecting and accessing the case, data analysis and 
principles, ethics and reflexivity. Finally, some of the limitations of the methodology were 
discussed such as using a single case. Following on from this discussion of the 
methodological approach, and having specifically highlighted the importance of 
understanding the context in which an organisation operates, the next chapter will discuss the 
context of the social care sector as it is in this sector that the studied case operates.  
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Chapter Five: The Social Care Sector 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the social care sector. Following on from the discussion in the previous 
chapter, which emphasised the importance of having an understanding of the context in which 
a case is situated, this chapter will consider various aspects of social care as it was this sector 
in which the studied case operates. In so doing, a richer and more in-depth evaluation of the 
case will be achieved. It will also help to evaluate the factors that influenced decisions within 
the case regarding the choice of employee voice mechanism. To organise the process of 
understanding the environment, the CMO configuration (Pawson and Tilley 1997), also 
discussed in the previous chapter, is followed. The chapter has four sections.  
 
Section one considers the context of social care and references a key policy turn, the 1990 
National Health Services and Community Care Act. The Act led to the marketization of social 
care and an increase in the number of for-profit social care organisations. Section two 
considers the choices of employee voice mechanisms in social care organisations which are 
typically chosen by management and are low-level. Section three explores the outcomes of 
employee voice in social care. This reveals such problems as staff retention as social care 
employees tend to leave their employing organisation rather than express their voice through 
low-level mechanisms. This leads to the final section which discusses a paradox: rather than 
leave the sector, many social care employees move onto another social care organisation. This 
raises questions regarding the way in which employee voice in social care is valued. 
 
5.2 The context of social care 
An awareness of the context in which an organisation operates is important, particularly in 
relation to the structural constraints that the environment imposes on organisations (Findlay et 
al 2017). Indeed, without an understanding of the broader context, it is impossible to 
understand the correct meaning of data that is collected (Myers 2013). With these points in 
mind, the contemporary UK social care sector is a culmination of numerous legislative and 
policy interventions made by successive governments. Those interventions have shaped how 
social care is delivered and, importantly, by whom and affects the nature of care work for 
those who are delivering services (Murphy and Turner 2014). To fully understand the current 
social care environment, an awareness of its history is essential.  
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5.2.1 The history of social care and its marketization 
A substantive paper documenting the historical development of social care provision in the 
UK is provided by Thane (2009). That paper is drawn on here to highlight some key points as 
they relate to this thesis. The paper states that the only publicly funded social care for older 
and disabled people in the nineteenth century was through the Poor Law. This required every 
parish to levy rates to care for destitute people who did not have any support from their 
family. Poor Law ‘relief’ was however both limited in its scope and stigmatising to those who 
had to use it. It was during this period that the principle of charging for social services 
administered by local authorities was established.  
 
Then, as now, local authorities had responsibility for providing social care services, for which 
they were able to make charges. During this period independent organisations, mainly from 
the voluntary (not-for-profit) sector, played a significant role in the provision of health and 
social care of older and disabled people. Indeed before the Second World War, the voluntary 
sector, often in collaboration with local authorities, was well established as a provider of 
social care services. This provided the framework for social care provision that carried on into 
the post-war Welfare State.  
 
From the 1950s however, concern was expressed about the high and rising cost of social care 
coupled with concerns about rising life expectancy – concerns that continue to be expressed 
today. Reflecting this concern, the emphasis changed from providing mainly institutional-
based care towards a preference for community-based care because of improvements in 
medical knowledge and treatment and arguments such as it better reflected the preferences of 
service users; it improved the quality of life for those receiving services; and, that community 
care was cheaper at a time when demand and costs of services were increasing.  
 
This began a trajectory away from residential care toward community-based care. Further 
changes followed such as the 1968 Health Services and Public Health Act (implemented in 
1971) which increased the powers of local authorities to provide care services. A particularly 
notable change was the 1970 Local Authority and Social Services Act which established a 
single social services department (SSD) in each local authority. The creation of SSDs 
followed the recommendations of a report by Seebohm (1968) which suggested that social 
care services had become fragmented (Carey 2015). Each SSD became responsible for 
providing domestic help, meals, residential accommodation and recreation, all of which could 
be charged for. Importantly, though SSDs were able to charge for services, providing social 
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care during this whole period was conceived as a service. This conceptualisation of care as a 
service was to change fundamentally during the 1980s and 1990s. 
 
The political changes at the end of the 1970s and throughout the 1980s, which were discussed 
in chapter two, provided the backdrop for a key turning point affecting the social care sector. 
Compared to previous years, the most rapid change to social care was witnessed during this 
period due to a political commitment to cut public expenditure and an ideological preference 
for private rather than public social care provision. Fundamental to this change was the 
influence of a ‘neo-liberal’ political and economic environment (Hall and Soskice 2001). This 
environment was characterised by rigid hierarchies in which authority is embedded (Allen and 
Tuselman 2009) and through which relationships between employers and employees are 
typically low-trust and calculative (Frege and Godard 2014). It was against this backdrop that 
market principles were introduced to social care culminating in the 1990 National Health 
Services and Community Care Act (implemented in 1993).  
 
It would be impossible to over-emphasise the way in which the Act changed the nature of the 
social care sector in the UK through its marketization and the application of business 
principles. The underlying philosophy of the Act re-framed the way social care was 
conceptualised. The language of charges became that of profit and what had been a social care 
service became a social care market.  
 
The influence of the New Right which dominated the Thatcher period during the 1980s was 
the main impetus behind various policies that affected community care (Walker 1993). The 
main purpose of social care policy during this period was unreservedly to restrict or minimise 
the role of statutory providers whilst at the same time fragmenting social care services – the 
opposite of the intentions of the report by Seebohm (1968). Part of the rationale for the 
changes was an ever-increasing older population which, it was argued, threatened to place 
unlimited financial burdens on the state. Other factors included perceived inefficiencies of 
social care services delivered by local authorities; service provision was led by ‘producers’ 
(i.e. local authorities) rather than ‘consumers’ (i.e. service users); and the market provided an 
efficient mechanism to reduce cost and improve efficiency and quality (Twelvetrees 1998). 
The clear aim of the policy was to establish a mixed economy of social care provision that 
was driven by market principles (Balloch et al 2000) and bears similarities to key aspects of 
the hard unitarist frame discussed in chapter three.  
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The central prescription within the hard unitarist frame is the marketization of public services 
and the empowerment of consumers (Heery 2016). A market environment as it relates to 
social care means consumers have a choice between providers. This choice is regarded as 
necessary given it is the interests of consumers that are legitimate and take priority over those 
of employers and employees. Key then to this frame is aligning employee and employer 
interests with those of the consumer: 
 
‘It is by capturing, not denying, the instrumental, fundamentally economic, rationality 
of workers and their employers that hard unitarists believe a more productive, 
mutually beneficial trilateral relationship can be forged’ (ibid p.142). 
 
Following this logic, the idea is that markets are created through ‘deregulation’ and 
‘incentivisation’ (e.g. Le Grand 2003; Le Grand and the Mutuals Taskforce 2012). 
Regulation, such as employment rules, can hamper the creation of markets. By contrast, 
incentivisation can enhance market creation. Incentivisation is a fundamental characteristic of 
hard unitarism. 
 
The hard unitarist frame, as noted in chapter three, views employees as resources (Paauwe 
and Boselie 2003). Incentivisation practices espoused by this frame include Individual 
Performance Related Pay and profit-sharing schemes which are used increasingly in the 
marketization of public services (Heery 2016). Economists such as Gielen et al (2010) reflect 
this unitarist emphasis through their work that seeks to identify a link between labour (i.e. 
employees), productivity and Performance Related Pay. There are however implications of 
such practices. Whilst unitarists, whether hard or soft, would see the market mechanism as the 
most efficient and effective way of delivering public services, the 2008 global financial crisis 
highlighted that markets can fail, as noted in chapter two. A unitarist response to the financial 
crisis is reflected in the language used by Nijssen and Paauwe (2012). They call for greater 
company ‘agility’ which can be achieved by the ‘scaling of its workforce’; it is assumed such 
scaling of the workforce translates as making employees redundant. Such language is also 
evident when referring specifically to the practice of delivering social care.  
 
A report by the United Kingdom Homecare Association (UKHCA; 2016) uses language such 
as: domiciliary care market, market capacity, market stability and instability and providers 
who trade with local authorities. In the same vein, the National Audit Office (NAO; 2014) 
reported that the 2012 Care Act: ‘…is expected to require authorities to promote and shape an 
efficient and effective care market’ (p.38). The same report states that different social care 
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organisations use different business models and therefore have different levels of financial 
risk. For example, to mitigate this risk in the residential care home sector there are practices 
known as ‘bulk purchase discounts’. This means purchasing a higher quantity of units for a 
lower unit cost, the unit in this instance being service user beds. The report also notes that: 
‘There is strong local competition on price in most areas’ (p.38). Furthermore, prices that a 
local authority pay for care services have not kept up with inflation. As such, some 
organisations have withdrawn from contracts as they have become unprofitable. These 
examples help to highlight the way social care is referred to in much the same way as any 
other sector in the economy. It is possible that a soft unitarist frame offers a different 
perspective on social care delivery given its different view of employees. 
 
Though the soft unitarist frame regards employees as important ‘assets’ to achieve business 
success, the values underpinning the frame are somewhat questionable. The values can be 
seen in the new service management with its roots in psychology and marked by ‘positivity’ 
discussed in chapter three (Seligman 2002). The focus here is on how services are 
experienced and therefore stresses the need for effective processes that ensure responsiveness 
and courtesy.  
 
According to this frame, employees gain benefit through satisfying customers: ‘…the act of 
service is itself pleasurable’ (Heery 2016 p. 144). Indeed, a notable argument in this frame is 
that HRM provides a route to high performance, effectiveness and productivity. Importantly, 
the notion of employees ‘going the extra mile’ is considered in this frame as an expression of 
an employee’s commitment to the organisation (Piasna et al 2013). However, the social care 
sector stands out from other types of service providers. In contrast to some other services – 
such as selling a McDonalds burger, social care involves an actual relationship between those 
providing and those receiving a care service. It is however possible that the fragility of this 
relationship is used by social care organisations to lever more commitment, thus requiring 
social care employees to ‘go the extra mile’.  
 
The key point of discussing social care in relation to these two frames is to highlight the 
fundamental change from a public service to a private market. Within both frames, creating a 
social care market is no different from creating a market in any other service sector. Such 
markets are created through competition. Competition in the social care market follows the 
same principles as conventional businesses: ‘markets find their own competitive equilibrium 
between price and quality’ (Care Quality Commission 2014 p.3). The changed language of 
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social care helps to highlight this point which is in contrast to the language used by Thane 
(2009) that refers to charges rather than profit. Similarly, a report by Unison (2016) refers to a 
homecare ‘system’ rather than a market. The concept of marketizing social care was, and 
continues to be, a contentious issue.  
 
Some argue that profiteering from an individual’s social care needs is anathema. Moreover, 
there is a fundamental difference in providing social care as a public service compared to 
providing it as a profit-making enterprise. Though forming part of the service sector, social 
care is quite different from say, providing a service in a branch of McDonalds. Marketization 
of social care has also changed the nature of the work. Originally, activities were quite 
literally domestic tasks such as shopping and housework whereas the work of a social care 
employee today is likely to embrace a host of activities:  
 
‘Counterintuitively to the popular belief that care work is unskilled work…the 
introduction of more demanding tasks and clients with higher needs demonstrates that 
domiciliary carers require increasing levels of skill, although this is not recognised or 
rewarded’ (Bolton and Wibberley 2014 p.694).  
 
In other words, the boundaries of a social care employee’s role have been extended as social 
care organisations focus on seeking greater efficiencies within a social care market. The 
important point as it relates to employee voice, is that the way social care is conceived 
nationally, i.e. as a public or a private service, has an effect at company and employee level. 
The next section will consider the contemporary social care context and the organisations who 
provide social care services. 
 
5.2.2 Contemporary social care and social care organisations 
The contemporary UK social care sector faces myriad challenges, not least because social 
care needs continue to rise whilst, simultaneously, social care budgets are reducing (UKHCA 
2016). National government is responsible for social care budgets and setting the amount of 
funding awarded to local authorities as well as devising social care policy and determining the 
statutory duty of local authorities. They then devolve funding to individual local authorities 
who in turn commission individual social care organisations to deliver services. The majority 
of formal social care in the UK which is commissioned by local authorities is, importantly, 
delivered by independent social care organisations. Local authorities are responsible for 
setting their own policies and priorities, deciding how to commission services and how 
funding is spent across services. Budgets have however been cut.  
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In England, local authorities have had to make savings of £1.1 billion in their social care 
budgets in 2015-2016 which take cuts since 2011 to £4.6 billion (Unison 2016). Over the last 
five years, 81% of local authorities in England reported having had to reduce their real-term 
spending on social care for older people given an 11% cut in real terms to social care budgets 
(Humphries et al 2016). In order to fund the short-fall, 93% of local authorities in England 
had used the full council tax precept2. Drawing data from the Low Pay Commission (2016), 
table 5.1 below highlights payments for social care between the UK regions and nations. 
 
Region Price (per hour) 
South west £16.86 
South east £16.68 
Eastern £15.15 
Wales  £14.99 
East midlands £14.78 
Scotland  £14.74 
West midlands £14.30 
Greater London £14.21 
Yorkshire and Humber £14.11 
North west £12.95 
North east £12.60 
Northern Ireland £12.35 
Table 5.1 Average price paid for social care by UK region/nation 
 
There is some variation in payments, but table 5.1 reveals these are minimal which suggests 
some parity amongst local authorities in the challenges they face regarding the cost of social 
care. However, what this serves to highlight is two anomalies regarding the rationale of 
marketizing social care.  
 
Firstly, that the purpose of marketization is to create markets. However, how can markets be 
created when the starting point for those purchasing care is the same i.e. a finite resource from 
central government. Second, and related, whilst budgets continuously decrease there has been 
a parallel increase in the demand for services. This creates a particular issue in social care 
when compared to other service sectors: an increase in demand for social care does not equate 
to an increase in income (Legge 2005). That is, whilst an increase in demand for products or 
services in traditional service markets translates into greater income, the same is not true with 
                                                          
2 For the last two years local authorities have been allowed (by central government) to raise an extra 2% from 
their population to fund social care and this has been used to off-set the cost of the National Living Wage (Low 
Pay Commission 2016)  
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regard to public services where traditionally increased demand means increased costs with no 
relational increase in income. Combined, these two anomalies present challenges to social 
care organisations which in turn impact on social care employees.  
 
There are an estimated 1.55 million people employed to provide social care services, a total 
which includes different types of social care such as domiciliary care (also known as 
homecare), residential care, day care and community care (NMDS-SC 2017). There are       
10, 176 organisations providing domiciliary social care in the UK (UKHCA 2016). This type 
of social care is provided within a service user’s own home and includes personal care such as 
assistance with bathing as well as other tasks such as cleaning or cooking. The majority of the 
organisations providing social care, of whatever type, make up what is referred to as the 
‘independent sector’. Though various definitions exist, this thesis defines the independent 
sector as commercial and not-for-profit organisations (Skills for Care 2016), in other words 
all social care organisations with the exception of the statutory sector. The important point 
here being that ownership matters (Grimshaw et al 2015) as it is increasingly independent 
sector organisations who provide social care and this can have an effect on employee voice. 
 
Reflecting national government policy, there has been a consistent increase in social care 
provided by independent sector organisations. Moreover, there has been a consistent increase 
in the amount of social care provided specifically by the private for-profit sector compared to 
either statutory or not-for-profit organisations, the latter including charitable and voluntary 
organisations:  
 
‘The withdrawal of local authorities and the NHS from the direct provision of long-
term care has been a major strategic shift in adult social care policy over the last 30 
years (Humphries et al 2016 p. 6). 
 
To highlight the dominance of private for-profit social care organisations, figures for 1992 
show only 2% of social care being provided by the private sector (Carey 2015). This is not 
surprising as it was before the 1990 National Health Services and Community Care Act was 
introduced. The Act was introduced, as noted above, in 1993 and required that local 
authorities contract out 85% of social care services with the remainder provided in-house by 
local authority employed social care employees. Figures for 1999 are thus quite different and 
suggest that 67.1% of domiciliary care in England was provided by the private sector 
(Matosevic et al 2001). By 2013 the figure had risen to over 70% (Bessa et al 2013). Precise 
current figures for private sector providers of domiciliary care are difficult to obtain. In part, 
this is because of various changes to the way the data is collected and also because of the 
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conflation of different sectors within the umbrella term of independent sector. However, 
current estimations suggest that in the region of 75% of all forms of social care services are 
delivered by the private sector (Skills for Care 2016). This change has important 
consequences for social care: 
 
‘…the expansion of ever more independent providers reconstitutes a myriad of 
services as ‘business units’ which may concentrate introspectively upon core business 
interests whilst neglecting wider public service objectives’ (Carey 2015 p.2409). 
 
To illustrate this point, an example is the increased volume of private equity involvement in 
the social care sector over the last ten years. This form of financing and ownership within 
social care organisations is particularly dominant amongst private for-profit companies yet 
less so when compared to public companies or not-for-profit organisations (Care Quality 
Commission 2014). Private equity involvement adds an additional layer of complexity to the 
social care sector which is captured in the following quote: 
 
‘Private companies may be owned by an individual or by several individuals or by 
another company (or companies). In turn this other company (a “holding company”) 
may also be owned by individuals or by another company (or holding companies). 
(Care Quality Commission 2014 p.21). 
 
This reconstitution of social care services highlights the change in thinking discussed as part 
of the history of the social care sector above. There has been a move away from thinking 
about social care as a service towards thinking about social care as a business; which can 
create tensions between different priorities (Carey 2015). For-profit social care organisations 
may be structured in particular ways for very specific reasons, such as for tax purposes3 or to 
maximise opportunities to borrow money, and, where they have substantial assets, such as 
physical buildings, they are regarded as attractive to outside investors (Care Quality 
Commission 2014). Nevertheless, the differences in the constitution of social care 
organisations, specifically the vehicle through which social care is delivered, has an important 
bearing on those who are employed in the sector and how they express their voice. 
 
  
                                                          
3 An example of alleviating financial pressures was through the tax incentives for employee-owned enterprises, 
these include relief on capital gains tax and an exemption from income tax of £3600 for certain payments made 
to employees (www.gov.uk).  
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5.2.3 Contemporary social care and social care employees 
Of those employed in social care in England approximately 500,000 deliver services to adults 
in their own homes (i.e. domiciliary care) and are overwhelmingly (80%) women, (NMDS-
SC 2017). The largest age group of social care employees is between 25 and 54 and 65.4% are 
of British origin. Reviewing the literature on the nature of contemporary social care work 
presents a grim picture suggesting myriad challenges facing those who work in the sector. 
These challenges include an increasing use of employment practices such as zero hour 
contracts compounding the casual and insecure nature of the work; staff turnover4 and 
employment vacancies are relatively high compared to other sectors (ekosgen 2013); an 
absence of procedures to resolve disputes; and, opportunities for career development are low 
(Bach and Kessler 2012; Grimshaw et al 2015; Hussein et al 2016; ONS 2014; Rubery et al 
2015; Unison 2016). All of which place further pressure on a profession contending with 
multiple challenges by the very nature of the work itself. 
 
Social care is a service that is available 24 hours a day, seven days a week (Grimshaw et al 
2015). Providing social care to people in their own homes is solitary work (Rubery and Urwin 
2011). Depending on the needs of the service user sometimes social care employees ‘double-
up’ but for the most part they work alone (Rubery et al 2015). The work is ‘off-site’ and 
dispersed, there is no factory or shop floor: ‘…working in clients’ homes, of course, means 
that work is spatially highly fragmented’ (Breslin and Wood 2015). It involves a workplace 
that is ever-changing, i.e. the service users’ home that can differ in various aspects, e.g. 
cleanliness, layout, inhabitants and equipment all of which creates tensions in terms of 
monitoring and controlling care and making difficult the maintenance of efficiency levels 
(Bolton and Wibberley 2014). Working alone at night is prevalent for employees delivering 
domiciliary care (ekosgen 2013). The work itself is highly taxing both emotionally and 
physically: 
 
 ‘Despite the complexity, autonomy and gruelling physical and emotional work 
involved in domiciliary care, it is not a role that is either highly regarded, thus 
attracting status, or highly rewarded, thus attracting decent pay and conditions. On 
paper at least, domiciliary care is reduced to a tick list of basic physical tasks to be 
completed in a set period of time; the required physical, mental and emotional stamina 
and skill that are needed to care for clients are entirely neglected’ (Bolton and 
Wibberley 2014 p. 687). 
 
                                                          
4 Staff turnover is calculated by dividing the number of staff who have left an organisation by the total number of 
those employed. 
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This description implies a standardisation of social care work which suggests employees have 
limited agency given the highly procedural nature of the role (Atkinson and Lucas 2013). An 
insight into the procedural nature of the work is provided by Bolton and Wibberley (2014) 
through their discussion of the ‘rota’ and the ‘care plan’ arguing that the former shapes care 
work whilst the latter defines it. Typically the care plan lists the tasks that need to be 
performed during a visit. Social care employees have to read the plan before starting their 
work and then follow its instructions and they are forbidden to perform tasks not on the plan. 
The authors regard this as a bureaucratic means of controlling employees and, far from being 
benign, it represents the dominant interests of the social care organisation but rarely those of 
the social care employees. However, this also highlights a paradox regarding the 
standardisation of care work on the one hand whilst implying flexibility on the other.  
 
The standardisation of care plans has enabled a situation where any employee is able to 
deliver the service to a service user. The care plan is standardised whilst also being flexible in 
terms of which employee delivers the service. A practice used by some managers is for 
employees purposely not to be given the same service user in order to retain flexibility of 
provision (Lucas and Carr-West 2012). This is contradictory to the preference of social care 
employees who cite the opportunity to be able to offer continuity of care to service users as a 
key feature of their work (Rubery et al 2015). This presents a conflict between standardising 
the way work is organised and the flexibility of the service. This is compounded by new 
technologies, such as mobile handheld devices, that are increasingly used to standardise care 
work whilst simultaneously ensuring greater flexibility. Further, though the new technologies 
have been designed to standardise the work they can be regarded negatively if seen as a 
device to monitor the use of resources, save costs and increase efficiencies (Carey 2015).  
 
Despite such practices, Bolton and Wibberley (2014) argue social care employees are 
remarkable at time management. They evaluate the situation, work quickly, develop 
efficiencies and prioritise what is done and when, all within the context of there being no 
account in the care plan for the unpredictability of the work nor the relationship with the 
service user. Further, employees often do off-plan tasks, e.g. putting out bins. The rotas, they 
argue, define time parameters and intensify the work; care plans offer a control agenda via a 
task-based approach: 
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 ‘…as the political economy of domiciliary care changes within the context of 
financialised capitalism, more activities that used to be in the formal labour process 
are now squeezed out, such as time to talk to clients or cleaning tasks, and new 
activities such as health care tasks are squeezed in, and consequently the labour 
process is intensified’ (ibid p.694). 
 
Such intensification is compounded by factors discussed above such as limiting the time an 
employee spends with a service user. These relentless pressures brought by the marketization 
of the care sector provide examples of the perception of care work as a ‘cost’ that must be 
reduced in order for social care organisations to be more competitive (ibid p.695). Further, 
these pressures impact on choices and decisions about internal mechanisms regarding 
employee voice and how it is expressed. The next section turns to the second part of the CMO 
configuration by considering the employee voice mechanisms typical of the social care sector.  
 
5.3 The mechanisms of employee voice in social care 
The mechanisms of employee voice in social care are affected by the challenges faced by 
social care organisations discussed above, i.e. social care needs are rising whilst budgets are 
reducing. One of the biggest expenditures in a social care organisation’s budget is employees. 
Staffing costs make up approximately 80% of total costs in domiciliary care (Low Pay 
Commission 2016).  The majority of those providing social care are working part-time and, as 
noted above, are women, both of which have implications vis-à-vis employee voice 
mechanisms.  
 
Part-time working, casualisation and other such practices impair the ability of employees to 
have any influence at work (Dundon et al 2017). Despite an abundance of new technologies, 
if employees are not physically in the workplace their ability to have any influence or any say 
becomes severely restricted. Furthermore: ‘Women, particularly those in part-time jobs, may 
have limited access to representation and decision-making processes in the labour market’ 
(Piasna et al 2013 p.4098). A key finding from research by Piasna et al (ibid) is that 
vulnerable workers, such as women, had the least opportunity for participation in decisions 
that shaped their work environment. This finding is borne out in the social care sector.  
 
As noted above, the majority of social care organisations are for-profit and, much the same as 
their counterparts in other economic sectors, the employee voice mechanisms that were 
discussed in chapter two are also typical of social care. In other words, they are likely to 
reflect an efficiency objective and management preferences which are for mechanisms that 
are direct and individual (Bryson et al 2004), often limited to opening up lines of 
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communication (Barry and Wilkinson 2015) and regarded as being low-level (Wilkinson and 
Fay 2011). Additionally in social care, employees are observed to be subjected to more 
autocratic management styles (Atkinson and Lucas 2013). This means as well as employee 
voice being low-level, it is also subordinated whereas management voice is privileged. 
Another characteristic of the social care sector that can work against voice is, as noted above, 
the fragmented nature of social care work which is such that employees often work in 
isolation. Unless employees are continuously present in the workplace, their use of employee 
voice practices can be restricted (Dundon et al 2017; Piasna et al 2013). Moreover, such 
fragmentation restricts opportunities to come together collectively. 
 
Restricted opportunities for employees to come together collectively have further 
consequences on employee voice, one of which is a negative impact on the traditional 
methods of employee representation and organising (Murphy and Turner 2014). Collective 
action concerning, for example, terms and conditions of employment such as holiday 
entitlement or sick leave may not be so reconcilable where there is no representative or 
protective structure in place in an organisation. Indeed, social care in particular is 
characterised by weak examples of employment relations institutions, such as trade unions, 
collective bargaining, working time and protection rules - only 8% of domiciliary social care 
organisations recognise a trade union (Grimshaw et al 2015). Therefore it is employers rather 
than employees who are provided with significant opportunities to shape employment 
conditions at a local level. Such restricted opportunities for a collective voice and low trade 
union representation reflect a unitarist philosophy in the social care environment.  
 
Within the hard unitarist frame, when employees are not satisfied they can simply choose to 
leave the organisation. Through the market mechanism employers are at liberty to hire and 
fire whilst employees have the choice to leave. For those who remain, practices designed to 
increase labour productivity such as Performance Related Pay may be experienced. Writing 
over twenty years ago Rubery (1995) cautioned about Performance Related Pay. She argued 
that the nature of the payment system and the context in which it is applied, such as the use of 
management discretion and the individualisation of pay, would lead to the fragmentation of 
pay systems. In turn, this would reduce the likelihood of any collective resistance to pay and 
reduce opportunities to monitor pay trends meaning less transparency. Additionally she 
argued it can mean any form of collective organisation is hampered. Unsurprisingly then, a 
further characteristic of this frame is a negative view of trade unions - trade unions would 
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hamper an efficient social care market. Similarly, soft unitarists regard trade unions as 
unnecessary. 
 
Trade unions in the soft unitarist frame serve only to highlight weaknesses in HRM practice 
and are therefore regarded as a failure of these practices. Notably, trade unions featured at the 
higher level of the continuum (Gollan et al 2015) and escalator (Marchington et al 1992) 
which were discussed in chapter two (The varieties of employee voice) suggesting they confer 
greater depth of voice. However, the mechanisms that are more likely to be found in social 
care reflect those with less depth.  
 
Common practices in social care are an open door policy, meetings, employee observations 
and supervisions and newsletters (ekosgen 2013) and an annual appraisal system (Grimshaw 
et al 2015). A study by Grimshaw et al (ibid) highlights the importance of embedding such 
practices into the organisation and reported that the majority of social care employees had 
some influence over day-to-day work tasks. However the same study stated that whilst 
employees did not have any influence in strategic or corporate decision-making, nevertheless, 
they did want a voice in their employing organisation. Similarly, Lucas et al (2009) found that 
social care employees regarded positively the opportunity to be involved in decision-making 
in their employing organisation. This reflects findings across all employment sectors reported 
in chapter two (e.g. Bryson and Freeman 2007; Freeman et al 2007; The Smith Institute 2016; 
Wilkinson et al 2015). In other words, employees in the social care sector are no different to 
employees in other sectors when it comes to wanting to have a voice at work.  
 
However, research by Lucas et al (2009) found that social care employees recognised there 
were limits to how involved they could be with decision-making and over what decisions: 
working hours was provided as an example of where they would not be able to have any 
influence. The same report also acknowledged that some employees felt that change was 
imposed on them rather than them having some influence over that change. Interestingly, this 
study also acknowledges movement in the social care sector by employees; employees move 
from one social care organisation to another. A similar finding was revealed by Franklin 
(2014). This presents an interesting paradox: though turnover in social care is high, 
employees are not necessarily leaving the sector but moving within it. This paradox will be 
explored in more detail in the section below which considers the outcomes of social care. 
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5.4 Outcomes of employee voice in social care: why ownership matters 
Decreasing social care budgets and increasing demand for services mean social care 
organisations have to look at ways of remaining viable in a competitive market. Given that the 
majority operate as private for-profit organisations, they compete on service and on price; 
referred to as the ‘parameters of profitability’ (Turnbull et al 2004). Key to service and price 
in social care, i.e. creating the parameters of profitability, are the social care employees. 
Following the logic that ownership matters, some interesting anomalies exist in social care 
regarding outcomes.  
 
One anomaly is that employee turnover is greater amongst for-profit social care organisations 
when compared to turnover in either the local authority or not-for-profit sectors (Care Quality 
Commission 2014; ekosgen 2013; Hussein et al 2016). In other words, social care employees 
who are employed by either a local authority or a not-for-profit social care organisation are 
more likely to remain with that organisation longer. A second is that employment standards 
are especially poor in for-profit social care organisations, a particular concern expressed by 
employees being the insecurity of working hours: ‘…while the favoured policy approach 
towards public service contracting emphasises the innovating capabilities of the for-profit 
private sector, our findings point to the reality of a hard-nosed HRM approach towards pay 
and quality of working conditions’ (Grimshaw et al 2015 p.522). These two anomalies will be 
explored further in the next sections. 
 
5.4.1 Recruitment and retention 
The challenges faced by the social care sector regarding the recruitment and retention of 
employees has been highlighted by several academics (e.g. Hussein et al 2016). The vacancy 
rate across the social care sector is 4.8% compared to 2.6% for the whole economy 
(Humphries et al 2016). A possible factor contributing to this issue is that, given there is 
parity of funding awarded to local authorities which is then used to purchase social care from 
mainly private for-profit social care organisations, the latter struggle to differentiate 
themselves from other providers, i.e. their competitors. To address the issue of recruitment, 
several practices are used by social care organisations.  
 
One of the most common recruitment practices is word-of-mouth, followed by advertisements 
in the local press and advertising in local Jobcentre Plus offices (ekosgen 2013). An important 
factor in determining a decision to apply to a particular social care organisation by a potential 
employee is its reputation locally (Lucas et al 2009) whereas pay was not regarded as being a 
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factor in determining whether or not to apply for a job and, importantly, pay is not hugely 
variable across competitors (ekosgen 2013). This last point is unsurprising given, again, the 
point about the parity of funding awarded to individual local authorities. Other practices that 
are used include various incentive schemes such as pay premiums for working bank holidays, 
store vouchers and free uniforms. Where staff were offered incentives, social care 
organisations were found to have particularly good staff retention (ibid). There are however 
some social care organisations reportedly using more questionable practices when recruiting 
employees in order to keep costs to a minimum.  
 
Such questionable recruitment practices include employees having to pay for their own 
uniforms or paying upfront costs such as the cost of being checked by the Disclosure and 
Barring Service5 (DBS; Grimshaw et al 2015). In addition, there are reportedly practices that 
are illegal such as ‘cash-in-hand’ payments to employees or paying below National Living 
Wage (Franklin 2014; Humphries et al 2016). Other less malignant practices, though also 
having consequences, are those designed to keep costs down such as reducing training 
opportunities, paying staff at the lowest possible level and encouraging service users to seek 
more assistance than was agreed within the local authority contract (Bolton 2015). A related 
issue is retaining employees once they have been recruited. 
 
The social care sector experiences high staff turnover rates when compared to turnover rates 
for the economy as a whole. Staff turnover figures for the UK economy are approximately 
12% (CIPD 2013; cited in Franklin 2014). In contrast, a report by the NAO (2014) states that 
the annual turnover in the social care sector is 22%. Another report, by UKHCA (2016), 
suggests a much bleaker picture when focusing specifically on domiciliary care. The report 
states that in England in 2015, the turnover rate for home care workers was 32.4% and by 
2016 this figure had risen to 41.4%. Similar figures are reported by NMDS-SC (2017) who 
state that for the social care sector in general, i.e. including senior care workers, registered 
nurses and registered managers, turnover rates are 27.3%. However, when focusing 
specifically on employees in domiciliary care, the figure rises to 38.1%. Further analysis 
shows that the turnover rates are highest amongst for-profit care providers (Hussein et al 
2016). In contrast, below average turnover is reported when social care is provided through a 
                                                          
5 DBS is part of the UK Home Office and provides a service which enables organisations from the public, 
private and third sectors to check whether a potential candidate is suitable for certain work, such as working with 
vulnerable adults (https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/disclosure-and-barring-service).  
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local authority (ekosgen 2013). There are several consequences of a high staff turnover for 
both employers and employees. 
 
For the social care organisations, the consequences of a high staff turnover rate include the 
costs involved in constantly having to recruit staff (Hussein et al 2016); possibly having to 
recruit agency workers; and using a manager’s time to recruit, cover shifts and train new 
recruits (ekosgen 2013).  A further implication is that social care organisations are reluctant to 
‘invest’ in their staff if they are likely to leave (NAO 2014) and social care organisations are 
particularly nervous of losing staff to competitors (Skills for Care 2016). For social care 
employees, the consequences are numerous and include financial insecurity and instability; 
reduced opportunities for career progression; and, they may not reach the relevant stage to 
become eligible for statutory employment rights and therefore do not enjoy the terms and 
conditions of employment of those with more stable employment. These adverse 
consequences of social care beg questions regarding the cause of such high turnover rates. 
 
5.4.2 Employment in social care 
One reason for the high employee turnover rates in social care relates to the increasing use of 
zero hour contracts. Zero hour contracts mean an employer is not obliged to offer work nor is 
the employee obliged to accept work when it is offered; and workers are entitled to the same 
rights as regular workers though they may have breaks in their contracts which would affect 
their accrued rights (www.acas.org.uk). Approximately 30% of those employed in social care 
have zero hour contracts (NAO 2014). This figure rises to approximately 60% when 
controlling for domiciliary care (NMDS-SC 2017). A second reason is the pay in social care. 
 
Though now paid the living wage, this rate is less attractive considering social care employees 
typically purchase their own uniforms (NAO 2014) and are typically not paid for the time 
they spend travelling between service users’ homes (Hussein et al 2016). A further issue is the 
length of time employees have to provide care to service users. A report by Unison (2016) 
suggests 74% of local authorities in England commissioned domiciliary care visits that lasted 
15 minutes or less. This is a key concern raised in the report in terms of employees effectively 
working for nothing as they stay with the service user longer than the ‘paid for’ time. Whilst 
some employees may prefer such flexible terms of employment for others it presents 
challenges, such as not being able to secure a mortgage or borrowing for other purchases.  
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Importantly, the national level environment has played a part in influencing the types of 
mechanisms available at organisational level (Piasna et al 2013). The national level and 
organisation level environments both place pressures on employee voice that affect its 
outcomes from the perspective of employees, illustrated in the figure below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Downward pressures on employee voice 
 
 
A significant outcome of this pressure, as it relates here, is the recruitment and retention of 
employees as discussed above. A second, and related outcome, is the poor terms and 
conditions of employment that social care employees have. Furthermore, as noted in the 
section above concerning mechanisms, employee voice mechanisms are likely to be low-level 
affording employees little influence in their employing organisation. Given such challenging 
conditions begs the question of why anyone would work in social care. Yet, by asking this 
question a paradox in social care regarding outcomes is revealed. Despite such high turnover 
rates, poor employment conditions and limited opportunities to influence decision-making, 
social care employees consistently report a love of the job and a desire to make a difference to 
the lives of service users. As such, approximately one-third of those who leave a job in care 
move to another job in care; they do not leave the sector (Franklin 2014).  
 
5.5 The paradox of social care 
Given the downward pressures that ‘strip out the care from caring labour’ (Bolton and 
Wibberley 2014 p.695) and the derisory conditions of social care work, an obvious question 
would be why do people work in the sector? Indeed, such conditions may go some way to 
explain the high turnover rates in social care with some employees choosing to ‘exit’ 
(Hirschman 1970) the employing organisation. The answer becomes clear when employees 
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are asked. Paradoxically, despite the challenges, employees express a positive experience of 
delivering social care to service users. A common finding from research in this area is the 
desire to make a difference to the lives of service users. Over 1000 social care employees 
responding to an on-line survey stated that they did the job because they wanted to make a 
difference (Unison 2016). Similarly, a study of American home care providers reported 
positive aspects of the work which included the companionship and caring relationship 
developed with clients (Stacey 2011). This however highlights a further paradox. 
 
Social care employees express a love for the job with relationships with service users being 
integral to this and in particular, as with the study by Unison (2016), the desire to make a 
difference to the lives of service users. Paradoxically, one of the features employees dislike is 
the poor wages; the love of the job however is often used as a reason to offset this paradox 
(Hebson et al 2015). In other words, how employees feel about their work overrides a desire 
for higher wages. Love of the job however is only part of a complex set of factors that affect 
the choices made, and constraints experienced, by social care employees and why leaving an 
organisation is not quite as straightforward as the ‘exit, voice and loyalty’ configuration 
(Hirschman 1970) might suggest. 
 
Gendered social norms are often suggested as shaping the intrinsic motivation to care for 
others but this can act as a form of constraint on employees involved in social care as 
altruistic attachments to caring for others may prevent them from expressing their voice over 
other aspects of their work, such as pay (Folbre 2012). Such social norms are based on a 
caring identity that is concerned with fulfilling others’ needs combined with the selflessness 
of the employees and also on the fulfilment of the desire of the employees to feel valuable 
(Skeggs 1997). Hebson et al (2015) take the paradox further by looking at how economic and 
cultural conditions shape the norms and values of social care employees.  
 
For Hebson et al (ibid) economic and social factors can be just as influential as the actual job 
of care provision itself in terms of shaping reported levels of high job satisfaction. They cite 
numerous research studies that highlight the paradox of care: high job satisfaction and low 
pay, the former due to caring motivations including relationships with service users explained 
by gendered norms, values and preferences. For example, Palmer and Eveline (2012; cited in 
Hebson et al 2015) refer to a ‘family care logic’ that is used by employers and employees to 
mean work is done for emotional not financial rewards. In so doing, these social norms can 
lead social care employees to privilege altruism over financial gain (Atkinson and Lucas 
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2013). In other words, the strength of social norms is such that employees are manoeuvred 
towards expressing the positive aspects of their work whilst downplaying less appealing 
aspects. However, Hebson et al (2015) counter this argument by suggesting that regardless of 
intrinsic motivation, it does not explain why care work should mean less money and contend 
that the picture is more complex.  
 
A more useful way to understand the paradox, they argue, is from the perspective of the 
employees and the circumstances and complexities of their lives. Viewed in this way, the 
situation for an employee is one of ‘satisficing’ compared to ‘satisfied’ (Hebson et al 2015 
p.317). To highlight this point they cite research by Stacey (2005) who found social care 
employees liked the autonomy of the work when compared to their experience in other parts 
of the service sector; shop work was regarded as more controlling. A study by Lucas et al 
(2009) bears similar findings. They reported employees regarded the repetitiveness of jobs 
such as shop work negatively whilst positively pointing to the variation of care work.  
Further, ekosgen (2013) found employees in social care organisations with high retention 
were afforded high levels of autonomy, e.g. being involved in designing a service users’ care 
plan. This supports the argument put forward above by Bolton and Wibberley (2014) 
discussed earlier regarding the negative effects of standardising care plans and employees 
having no input. The point from the perspective of Hebson et al (2015) is that work history 
bore some effect on a social care employees’ judgements vis-à-vis their current experiences. 
A further influencing factor which they highlight was the social networks of employees, such 
as family and friends, who were also working in care provision (see also Lucas et al 2009). 
 
The social networks of employees often means they enter care work because someone they 
know works in the sector: 49 of the 70 people interviewed by Hebson et al (2015) had family 
or close friends working in care provision. As such, by including circumstances, a more 
nuanced picture of employee motivation is revealed that helps us understand this paradoxical 
outcome of care work. Further, it becomes clearer why care work is seen as more attractive 
within a context where there is a limited pool of alternative options. Viewed from an 
employee’s perspective, despite the restricted choices, not to mention contending with other 
constraints and responsibilities, care work becomes the best option over other poor options.  
 
Of course another possibility is that employees are well aware of the negative aspects of the 
job but to counteract this they focus on the positive aspects rather than the derogatory ones 
that are often portrayed. In other words, social care employees acknowledge it is a bad job but 
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to ‘save face’ (Goffman 1956) they present a picture that care work is something that is 
worthwhile. A further plausible explanation is that employees do enjoy the work and believe 
they are doing something worthwhile; what they do is of value. These points are reflected in 
an earlier study which highlighted that favourable views commonly expressed by social care 
employees include the autonomy of the work, being able to use their own initiative, regarding 
care work as a vocation and, not something everyone could do (Lucas et al 2009). In other 
words, the social care employees valued, and were proud, of the work they did.  
 
Such valuing of, and pride in, their work is reflected in what Bolton and Wibberley (2014) 
refer to as an ‘ethic of care’ which is maintained by employees by going above and beyond 
what was contractually required such as the example provided earlier; putting the service 
user’s bins out for them. Similarly Breslin and Wood (2015) highlight the informal rules at 
play in the relationship between social care employees and service users that were more 
aligned with employees’ own values of social justice and allowed them to redress what they 
perceived to be as an imbalance in the moral economy. It is also reflected in their idea of 
‘gifting’. This means extra services are gifted to service users despite the presence of formal 
rules. In other words, social care employees were giving more than was required and in so 
doing, exercising their voice through breaking or ignoring, the rules. The idea of gifting seems 
quite different to the philosophy underpinning the concept of ‘going the extra mile’ (Legge 
2005; Piasna et al 2013). This presents a number of additional paradoxes.  
 
The first paradox is that the HRM literature suggests it is employers imploring employees to 
go the extra mile whereas gifting implies it is the employees who are choosing to do so. This 
presents a problem for social care organisations highlighting the second paradox. Whilst 
relying on the extra effort provided by employees, the social care sector is at the same time 
seeking to increase its profitability through standardising and rationalising the pace of care-
giving activity (Bolton and Wibberley 2014). In other words, when employees are gifting a 
difficulty is created for the social care organisation regarding the standardisation and 
commodification of the work. This creates a third paradox: social care organisations need to 
differentiate themselves from their competitors, other social care organisations.  
 
Combined, these factors suggest that there are national level downward pressures on social 
care organisations which have consequences for employees. It is social care employees who 
bear the downward pressure of fierce competition within the care sector (Bolton and 
Wibberley (ibid) as illustrated in figure 5.1 above and who are regarded as a cost which needs 
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to be reduced. Importantly, this affects how employee voice is expressed through mechanisms 
that reflect efficiency objectives, chosen by management and are typically low-level thus 
creating a problem of a high staff turnover rate in social care. In so doing, exiting becomes the 
mechanism through which employees express their voice. Yet, many employees go on to 
work in another social care organisation, they do not leave the sector.  
 
5.6 Summary 
This chapter has discussed social care as it is the sector in which the studied case operates. 
Having provided a summary of the historical development of social care, it then referenced a 
key policy turn, the 1990 National Health Services and Community Care Act which, it was 
argued, changed the landscape of the social care sector through marketization. Using the lens 
of the frames of reference, marketization was evidenced through the changed language of 
social care and that organisations providing social care changed from being local authority 
and voluntary sector providers to private for-profit companies. Following the argument that 
ownership matters, this in turn, influenced and shaped the choices of employee voice 
mechanisms made by social care organisations.  
 
Section two considered the choices of employee voice mechanisms in social care 
organisations. It found that voice mechanisms are akin to those in other parts of the economy, 
i.e. reflect efficiency objectives, are chosen by management, rarely involve trade unions and 
are low-level thus affording social care employees little influence in the organisation and 
risking voice going unheard. These findings impacted on the outcomes of employee voice. 
The third section examined the outcomes of employee voice in social care. This highlighted 
national level pressures on social care organisations bringing challenges such as high 
employee turnover, poor terms and conditions of employment and the use of zero hour 
contracts. These challenges highlighted a paradox in social care which were discussed in the 
final section. Social care employees expressed a love of the job and a desire to make a 
difference. However, that it is for-profit companies delivering the majority of social care, 
compounds the recruitment and retention problem with employees choosing to exit the 
employing organisation rather than express themselves through low-level voice mechanisms. 
Their voice is heard only inasmuch as they leave the company, though some remain in the 
sector. This raised questions regarding the way in which employee voice in social care is 
valued. Against this backdrop, the studied case, Vivo-Co, provides a fruitful example to 
highlight the multiple contextual factors that influence the mechanisms through which 
employee voice is expressed and the outcomes for social care employees.  
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Chapter Six: Findings 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the findings of research undertaken at Vivo-Co. The findings are set 
against the backdrop of the social care sector (chapter five), follow a methodological 
approach that draws on data from observations, semi-structured interviews and documentary 
evidence, (chapter four), use the theoretical lens of the frames of reference (chapter three), 
address the limitation concerning alternative ways of understanding employee voice (chapter 
two) and address the research questions (chapter one). Of which all derive from the aim of the 
study concerning whether employee voice is different in an employee-owned enterprise 
compared to that of conventional businesses. The chapter is separated into five sections.  
 
Section one begins with an overview of the company. Section two discusses organisational 
features such as actors and how space is occupied, company values, communication systems 
and conventional voice mechanisms. Section three presents findings regarding the context in 
which employee-ownership emerged in Vivo-Co. This includes the challenge to Vivo-Co of 
reduced funding from the local authority and its response, which was through a strategy of 
growth and addressing the recruitment and retention of employees. Section four discusses the 
mechanism of employee-ownership and the assumptions which were made about what it 
would achieve. This included increasing efficiency, garnering employee commitment and 
encouraging employees to ‘go the extra mile’. Section five discusses the outcomes of 
employee-ownership in relation to employee voice. This reveals some opportunities, such as 
employee representatives being able to influence aspects of the governance processes. The 
findings also revealed that employee voice often went unheard or was closed down as it was 
hampered by employee compliance, organisational hierarchy and management resistance. 
Significantly, this was not an outcome of the mechanism. Rather, it was revealed that it was a 
result of the way in which voice was valued in Vivo-Co. 
 
6.2 Organisational profile: Vivo-Co 
Vivo-Co is an employee-owned enterprise which provides health and social care services. It 
was established in the mid-2000s with approximately thirty staff, most of whom were social 
care employees as distinct from other types of employee, such as managers or health care 
professionals. Since that time it has grown to six branches which are spread geographically 
across England. Until recently, each branch operated independently albeit as a franchise of the 
original company (Source A).  
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Two of the branches are regarded by Vivo-Co as ‘super-branches’ because they cover large 
city-wide areas. The remaining four branches cover smaller local authority districts. There is a 
head office that is physically separate from all of the branches though geographically close to 
one of the branches. The head office is occupied by a Chief Executive Officer, a senior 
executive team (five people including the Chief Executive Officer) and technical and 
administrative support staff. During the research period, there were approximately 800 
employee-owners, the majority of whom were women providing social care services. 
 
The services offered by Vivo-Co fall into three broad categories (Source A). Firstly, 
domiciliary care services are provided within a service user’s own home. This includes 
personal care such as assistance with bathing, as well as other tasks such as cleaning or 
cooking. Secondly, supported living services are provided to service users who have a range 
of disabilities, enabling them to live independently. Thirdly, there are complex care services 
that are delivered to service users who have more complicated needs including, sometimes, 
medical needs. Domiciliary care and supported living services are provided by qualified social 
care employees whilst complex care services are delivered by qualified nurses. The majority 
of services provided by Vivo-Co fall into the category of domiciliary care. 
 
Of the services delivered by Vivo-Co, most are commissioned by local authorities, though 
they do have some private paying clients, the latter constituting about 10-15% of the total 
income (Source B). The commissioners (local authorities) of services provided by Vivo-Co 
use a ‘time and task’ model of care, i.e. payment is based on the time it takes an employee to 
carry out specific tasks on behalf of the service user. This model of social care delivery is 
relevant here as it impacts on social care employees and therefore is returned to below 
(Organisational Communications).  
 
The types of contract used by the commissioners are in the form of a ‘zoned prime provider’. 
Typically, a prime provider is a single provider procured by the local authority to deliver a set 
of services at an agreed price. It then sub-contracts the work and manages the local supply in 
the market to deliver the required service (Bolton 2015). However, in Vivo-Co the contract 
was described by one of the senior executives as:  
 
‘Us [Vivo-Co] and another provider are commissioned to provide all of the work but 
we are not guaranteed volume – it is essentially a mix of a block and spot contract’.  
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In other words, and in contrast to how most prime provider contracts operate, Vivo-Co did not 
sub-contract the work but rather delivered it themselves. This meant a layer of regulation and 
cost was removed given that the prime provider would typically sub-contract the work and 
then oversee its delivery. It also meant Vivo-Co secured a greater volume of social care 
provision. Securing ever-greater volume of contracts was a key goal for the Chief Executive 
Officer as it was related to his objective of achieving efficiency. As such this issue will be 
discussed in more detail below (Context of Employee-Ownership).  
 
6.3 Organisational features 
There are several notable features evidenced in Vivo-Co which had a bearing on the way 
employee-ownership manifested. Those discussed in this section are organisational structure 
and actors, space, values, communications and employee voice mechanisms. 
 
6.3.1 Organisational structure and actors 
Vivo-Co organises and delivers social care services through a conventional hierarchical 
structure which is illustrated in figure 6.1 overleaf (Source C). As noted above, most of the 
800 employee owners are social care employees whilst the remainder are senior management, 
line management, co-ordinators, team leaders and office support workers. As the focus here is 
on employee voice through employee-ownership, it is the key employee-ownership actors that 
are of primary interest: senior executive team, operating board and social care employees. 
Given their importance to this research, more detail on each of the groups is provided below. 
 
As with conventional organisations, the Chief Executive Officer of Vivo-Co is at the top of 
the organisational structure. He is responsible for the strategic development and business 
development of the organisation, identifying and developing new branches, employee 
engagement, new product development and financial planning (Source B). His role is 
supported by an operating board and a senior executive team.  
 
The operating board was made up of non-executive directors who were external to the 
organisation and senior executives (see below). The role of the board was to oversee the 
operational aspects of Vivo-Co, set and deliver its strategy and meet its performance targets. 
The board met quarterly and at each meeting a particular issue was focused on, e.g. 
compliance, finance, engagement. Two of the four non-executive directors as well as the 
Chief Executive Officer regularly attended meetings of the General Council, the governance 
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arm of the employee-ownership model. By contrast, none of the employee-owners other than 
the senior executives attended meetings of the operating board. This is an important point 
regarding employee voice within the governance mechanism and will be discussed in more 
detail below (Outcomes of Employee-Ownership).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        Figure 6.1: Vivo-Co organisational structure  
Of the senior executives, one is a Director of Engagement. His role was to devise and 
implement strategies for the engagement and recruitment of employees. A point to highlight 
here as it will be of relevance later in this chapter (Context of Employee-Ownership) is that 
this was a new post which brought with it changes to the way social care employees were 
recruited. A second member of the senior executive team was the Director of Quality and 
Compliance. His responsibility was to ensure Vivo-Co fulfilled its statutory regulatory 
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obligations which are monitored by the Care Quality Commission (CQC) – an independent 
regulator of health and social care services in England. Of the two remaining members of the 
senior executive team, one was a Director of Finance and the other a Director of Operations.  
 
As well as meetings with the operating board, the senior executive team met separately and 
more frequently to discuss the day-to-day aspects of the company. As highlighted in figure 
6.1, the senior executive team is supported by a number of middle managers as well as a 
number of individuals providing technical and administrative support.  
 
The largest occupational group in Vivo-Co, as noted above, are social care employees. Many 
of the characteristics of social care work in Vivo-Co corresponded to those of social care 
work discussed in chapter five. For example, the majority of work is performed by employees 
in Vivo-Co who are women, the work they perform is off-site and the work is fragmented and 
isolating as it was typically carried out by a single employee in the home of a service user. A 
notable point, which was observed when visiting one of the branches, was the limited 
opportunities for social care employees to come together as a group. This issue is discussed in 
more detail below (Organisational Space). 
 
Nevertheless, despite these limited opportunities to come together, and reflecting findings of 
earlier studies (e.g. Hebson et al 2015), there was evidence of social care employees in Vivo-
Co having high levels of satisfaction with their work and citing close relationships with 
service users as a reason for this (Source D, E, F and G). Again, this, as well as other aspects 
of the role of the social care employees, will be discussed in greater detail in subsequent 
sections. Of the social care employees, five became employee representatives when the 
mechanism of employee-ownership was introduced in Vivo-Co.  
 
The role of employee representative formed an integral part of the governance structure of 
employee-ownership. Their role was to represent all of the social care employees. They did 
this in several ways, such as representing social care employees at meetings of the General 
Council. As such, the representatives’ role and the function of the General Council will be 
discussed in greater detail below (The Mechanism of Employee-ownership). 
 
6.3.2 Organisational space 
The organisational space of Vivo-Co offered an interesting first sight of employee-ownership 
in practice. What was notable when entering Vivo-Co, was the way in which space was 
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occupied, by whom and for what purpose. Particularly notable was the space which was 
available to social care employees. As noted in chapter five, much of the work of social care 
employees is carried out in isolation, in a service user’s home. As such, opportunities to meet 
with colleagues, for example, to share information about service users and to interact and 
communicate with one another, though valuable, are rare.  
 
The physical aspects of Vivo-Co were not conducive to creating opportunities for its social 
care employees to meet one another. To illustrate this point, the head office of Vivo-Co is 
contrasted to one of the branches. The head office and the branch in question occupy two 
buildings that are physically separate from one another although geographically close, being 
only one street apart. The senior executive team and office support staff occupied one 
building which was referred to as the ‘Group Office’.  
 
The Group Office was a large old building spread over three floors all of which was occupied 
by the organisation. The space was tastefully decorated in what were referred to as the 
‘company colours’. This building did not have a reception area meaning sometimes there was 
no-one there to greet visitors. Nevertheless, the building had a relaxed feel, it was spacious, 
clean and tidy and it was reasonably inviting. Each person had their own desk and ample 
room. People, whether employees or visitors, could walk into the building straight off the 
street and then move freely around the building. There was no form of security preventing 
access to any part of the building. Each time the researcher visited, the atmosphere was calm 
with classical music playing in the background and people working quietly at their desks. 
 
Similarly, the second building, that housed social care employees and additional office 
support staff, was a large old building and occupied three floors. Again, the décor reflected 
the company colours. In contrast however, there was a reception area and there was always a 
receptionist at the desk. There were a number of notable artefacts in this area. One was a 
board displaying a traffic light system. This was an important visual mechanism used to 
impart information about the performance of the company and is therefore discussed in more 
detail below (Organisational Employee Voice Mechanisms). A second artefact was a sign that 
was displayed in the reception which read:  
 
‘Putting people before profit’.  
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Another sign was hanging in the training room, just off the reception area. This read:  
 
‘Be the owners, act like owners’.  
 
 
Another sign, which was handwritten, was on a locked door leading to the upstairs offices that 
read:  
 
‘No [social care employees] beyond this point without an appointment’.  
 
This locked door was a further difference to the Group Office. In this second building it was 
only the reception area that was accessible to social care employees. The door leading to the 
second and third floors of the building was locked. Behind these locked doors were the offices 
for the branch manager, managers, co-ordinators, supervisors and the office support staff. 
There was also a ‘social space’. However, as this was behind the locked door it meant social 
care employees were unable to access it. In contrast, open and accessible social space was 
provided to everyone in the Group Office.  
 
Asked about the separation of offices, the Director of Quality and Compliance stated:  
 
‘It’s good to have a separation between ‘workers’ and ‘management’.  
 
For him, the separation between employees and management was a positive feature of the 
organisation. As it was, the social care employees used the reception area as a place to meet 
and interact with colleagues. For example, whilst it was possible for them to complete and 
return time sheets electronically, it was observed that many social care employees chose to 
complete the forms by hand and then physically return them to the reception. What is notable 
is that they did this voluntarily as they were not paid for returning forms to the reception. 
Asked why they did this, the reason given by the receptionist was, importantly, that it 
provided a rare opportunity for them to communicate with their colleagues.  
 
When the social care employees were observed congregating in the reception space it was 
noisy, vibrant and animated. During fieldwork, social care employees came in and out, 
stopping for conversations, sharing information and catching up on news. During this time, 
they appeared relaxed in the space and seemed to be taking ownership of it. Their voices were 
clear and expressive. However, there were no facilities provided here, such as tea and coffee 
making facilities nor were there any toilet facilities; facilities such as these were behind the 
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locked door. This limited the length of time social care employees occupied the reception 
space. The company values of Vivo-Co offered further insight into the organisation. 
 
6.3.3 Organisational values  
The company values of Vivo-Co, which were written by its Chief Executive Officer, reflect 
the dual nature of the organisation as a provider of social care and an employee-owned 
enterprise that was evidenced through documentary data (Source A). As a provider of care 
services, there is an emphasis on the values concerning the personal characteristics of social 
care employees. For example, there are words used on the company website such as:  
 
‘Trustworthiness, reliability, committed, integrity, positive mental attitude, honesty’.  
 
In so doing, it is the personal attributes of the employees that are emphasised not the skills, 
experience or knowledge required to perform the work. Reflecting the employee-ownership 
status of the company, one of the values states:  
 
‘Employee-owners will share responsibility as well as benefits’ (Source A).  
 
In other words, the responsibilities associated with employee-ownership are stated first and 
the benefits are second. Another value was:  
 
‘To go the extra mile to deliver a quality service. Doing it because we care’.  
 
As well as this being one of Vivo-Co’s values per se, this particular value was invoked by the 
Chief Executive Officer and other key actors several times and in different settings. For 
example, a competition was held in each branch that involved employees writing on a board 
any instances where they had ‘gone the extra mile’ during the previous week.  
 
The board was placed in the reception area of each branch in order that it was clearly visible 
for everyone to see. Depending on the number of those putting themselves forward, the 
branch manager would decide who won. The winner of the competition was given a prize, 
typically a gift voucher. A specific example of a social care employee going the extra mile 
was observed during a visit to one of the branches. It read:  
 
‘Saving a service user’s life’. 
 
6.3.4 Organisational communications 
The communication systems in Vivo-Co operated at both organisational and branch level. 
Mirroring the organisation’s hierarchical configuration, illustrated in figure 6.1 above, 
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communication systems in Vivo-Co flowed from the top to the bottom of the whole 
organisation (Source C).  
 
At organisational level, the Chief Executive Officer and other senior executives 
communicated key messages and information through branch managers and layers of other 
personnel to the social care employees. Such communications might include raising 
awareness of changes to existing policies. The forms of communication were both direct and 
indirect via phone calls, electronic communications, quarterly manager forums, face-to-face 
meetings and memos.  
 
At branch level, communications were predominantly through team meetings and meetings 
between social care employees and their supervisors. Discussions were observed at a meeting 
of the managers’ forum regarding the implementation of a more sophisticated 
communications system that would be introduced across the whole organisation. The new 
system would consist of a mobile telephone given to each social care employee to enable 
them to check in and out of a service user’s home via the device.  
 
At the meeting the external representatives who were responsible for the new technology, 
including recording its usage, gave a presentation on how the technology would be 
implemented and used by employees. The phones would mean Vivo-Co would receive reports 
on individual employees regarding how they had used the phones, as well as monitoring 
aspects of their work such as the length of time they were with a service user. Given the ‘time 
and task model’ of care delivery which Vivo-Co was commissioned to deliver, being able to 
monitor aspects of a social care employees’ work provided the company with valuable 
information.  
 
During implementation of the system, a middle manager informed those attending the 
meeting that there would be strict guidance provided to all social care employees on how they 
should use the phones. She also stated clearly that any employee found to be abusing the 
phone, for example making personal calls, would have money deducted from their wages. The 
new communication system was also discussed at a team meeting of social care employees 
which the researcher was invited to attend (Source E). 
 
The team meeting was attended by six social care employees, their employee representative of 
the General Council and their branch manager. The employee representative and the branch 
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manager stated that the rationale for introducing the new communication system was to 
collect information more efficiently. They went on to explain that the attendance rate of each 
branch was set and monitored by the commissioning local authority. The new system would 
help to ensure that information provided to the local authority was collected more efficiently.  
 
The information that was to be collected would include whether the social care employee 
arrived at the service user’s home at the contracted time, left early or did not arrive at all. The 
last is referred to as a ‘no show’ in Vivo-Co. If the branch had consistently low attendance 
scores, it risked having its contract withdrawn by the local authority. An example however 
was given by a social care employee at the meeting where she had changed the order of her 
scheduled visits set out on her rota, something she would not be able to do when the new 
system came into being.  
 
The employee explained that on her rota, she was scheduled to see Mrs Smith first and 
Mr Wilson second. However, she knew that Mr Wilson was always up out of bed 
before Mrs Smith. Also, Mr Wilson was geographically first on her route. As such, it 
made more sense, she suggested to her employee representative and the branch 
manager, to visit Mr Wilson before visiting Mrs Smith. Further, this would enable Mrs 
Smith to have a little longer in bed – which she liked. However, because of her 
decision, the employee representative and the branch manager explained, the visit to 
Mrs Smith had resulted in a ‘no show’ even though she had attended. 
 
This example highlights the pressures facing Vivo-Co to meet the targets set by the local 
authority and particularly the pressures of a ‘time and task’ model of delivery. To address this 
issue, Vivo-Co was introducing new systems that would monitor the use of ‘resources’, in 
other words, the social care employees. In so doing, the company would save costs and 
increase efficiencies. However, it also highlights the more pragmatic approach taken by the 
employee.  
 
To her, the approach she used made practical sense as both service users would be up and out 
of bed when she arrived. Moreover, what she is suggesting is an efficiency measure: it was 
more efficient to see Mr Wilson first. And, in so doing, she was ‘gifting’ Mrs Smith some 
extra time in bed. The new system would prevent opportunities for such autonomy and 
therefore might have the opposite outcome of increasing costs and decreasing efficiencies: the 
rigidity of the system would not allow for the flexibility needed for care provision. Though 
the voice of the social care employee had been heard by the employee representative and the 
branch manager, it went unheard in terms of having any value regarding costs and 
efficiencies. 
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6.3.5 Organisational employee voice mechanisms 
Separate from the communication systems described above, and mechanisms yielded through 
the employee-ownership model which will be dealt with in detail later in this chapter, the 
Chief Executive Officer informed of various voice mechanisms that are used in Vivo-Co 
which, though preceding it, continued once employee-ownership was implemented.  
 
Seven mechanisms were listed: trade unions, staff survey, a suggestion scheme, a ‘yes’ policy, 
an ‘open door’ policy, newsletters and a traffic light system. Aside from trade unions, all of 
the mechanisms were initiated by the Chief Executive Officer. With the exception of the ‘yes’ 
policy, all are regarded as typical of voice mechanisms used by conventional businesses 
(Marchington et al 1992) which were discussed in chapter two. The mechanisms used in 
Vivo-Co and the degree of influence each yields according to the escalator metaphor (ibid), 
are presented in figure 6.2 below.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2 Vivo-Co conventional voice mechanisms 
 
 
The first mechanism was through the traditional route of a trade union. It was noted several 
times by the Chief Executive Officer that Vivo-Co recognised trade unions. However, it 
transpired that the company did not have a formal collective agreement with a trade union. 
When the Chief Executive Officer was asked specifically about this issue he answered: 
 
 ‘There is no formal union recognition but [social care employees], through their 
supervisors, know that they could join a trade union if they want to’.  
 
Despite this endorsement, several, often disparaging, comments were made by organisational 
actors in relation to trade unions. For example, the need for a trade union within an employee-
owned enterprise was questioned by one of the founder members whilst the Director of 
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Quality and Compliance and the Director of Finance expressed suspicion of trade unions. 
Again, the significance of this issue lends itself to further discussion which will be provided 
in a later section (Outcomes of Employee-Ownership).  
 
The second mechanism, which was administered in every branch and analysed by branch 
managers, was a staff survey that sought employee voice regarding levels of job satisfaction. 
The researcher was able to analyse findings from the most recent survey which had been 
administered in one of the branches (Source D). The survey reported that:  
 
‘Overall 80% of staff are happy working for their own company’.  
 
However, closer examination of the figures revealed that the survey had only been completed 
by 17% of the employee-owners. Of this cohort, 80% were either satisfied or very satisfied, 
whereas the satisfaction levels of the remaining 83% of staff who did not complete the 
questionnaire were unknown. 
 
The third mechanism was a scheme that, according to the Chief Executive Officer, enabled 
employees to make suggestions on ways to improve aspects of their work or the organisation. 
He regarded the suggestion scheme as an efficient way of receiving ideas from social care 
employees. There was a box in each branch for their suggestions which was placed in the 
reception area. Ideas were then assessed by the branch manager and if the branch manager 
deemed the ideas ‘good suggestions’, they forwarded them to the Chief Executive Officer. A 
document produced by the Chief Executive Officer outlined the process of the suggestion 
scheme (Source G) and stated:  
 
‘A key ambition of [Vivo-Co] is to act swiftly on any great suggestions to be made by 
workers – they are after all the people working at the ‘coal-face’ who will confront 
day-to-day issues and are best placed to identify ‘[Vivo-Co] fixes’…employees will 
act like owners when their voice is heard – have a say in how their company is run’.  
 
There are several notable points regarding the scheme. Firstly, the de-personalised process of 
sharing ideas, i.e. via a box. Secondly, the lack of an explanation of what a ‘good suggestion’ 
might be. Thirdly, the weighted language of ‘good’ suggestion as opposed to the less loaded 
and much simpler request of ‘suggestions’. Fourth is the contradictory ways social care 
employees are referred to: as ‘workers’, ‘owners’ and ‘employees’.  
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The fourth mechanism was a ‘yes’ policy. This was intended to encourage all employees to 
communicate directly with the Chief Executive Officer on any matters of concern to them. He 
explained that the policy meant he was open to all conversations about any topic.  
 
The fifth mechanism was an ‘open door policy’. Similar to the ‘yes’ policy, this policy meant 
anyone could speak to the Chief Executive Officer about any matter of concern whenever 
they felt the need. Though participants of this research were not asked directly about the 
efficacy of this mechanism, two participants stated they felt that the Chief Executive Officer 
was always accessible: one of these was a supervisor and an employee representative of the 
General Council and the second was a middle manager. The middle manager stated that the 
Chief Executive Officer was more readily available compared to those in other places he had 
worked and voluntarily described him as a ‘consultative paternalist’. His experience however 
is in contrast to that of social care employees, whose experience was, as noted above, of 
locked doors. Indeed this policy seemed contrary to the notion of locked doors.  
 
The sixth mechanism was newsletters (Source F). The Vivo-Co newsletters were largely made 
up of ‘good news stories’ and produced by someone at either social care employee or 
supervisory level. The nature of each newsletter was information-sharing and fun bringing 
positive news of individuals within the branch who, for example, had been promoted or had 
achieved something in their work they were particularly proud to share. It also provided an 
opportunity to share personal news, such as a birth or wedding. What is relevant here, is that 
the newsletter also provided an outlet through which to share information about the General 
Council, one of the main governance processes of employee-ownership, including the names 
and contact details of its representatives. 
 
The final mechanism was a traffic light system. This was a visual, succinct and simplistic 
mechanism used within each branch to express the voice of the Chief Executive Officer. The 
system was used to indicate the performance of the branch as well as providing information 
on the number of care hours per week, social care employee capacity and service quality. Red 
signalled that a branch was under-performing, amber signalled no change and green signalled 
improvements to performance.  
 
During interviews, the Chief Executive Officer was enthusiastic about the system regarding it 
as a key way to share what he regarded as important information with social care employees. 
This information would aid their understanding of, and involvement with, the business aspects 
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of the company. In his view, it was through this system that employees would become 
knowledgeable of the business side of Vivo-Co and would be enthused to take responsibility 
for it. However, during the six month observation period, the evidence suggested the 
ambitions of the Chief Executive Officer were not being realised.  
 
In one branch, the board displaying the traffic lights was on a wall directly behind the 
reception desk in the office used by the social care employees. In other words, it was very 
visible when entering the reception area, but, the information on the board was never updated 
nor were employees seen to look at the system, make any comment about it, or ask any 
questions about it. As such, in this particular branch the system was not effective in achieving 
the results desired by the Chief Executive Officer.  
 
The next set of findings address the research questions presented in chapter one and follow 
the format of the CMO configuration discussed in chapter four. As such, the section begins by 
considering the context in which employee-ownership emerged in Vivo-Co. 
 
6.4 The context of employee-ownership 
The first research question in chapter one asked: what contextual factors influenced the choice 
of mechanism in the studied case? To address the question, this section presents the findings 
of the context in which employee-ownership emerged in Vivo-Co.  
 
There were myriad challenges regarding the external environment that placed pressure on 
Vivo-Co, which affected the choice of mechanism. Of these, the key challenge was reduced 
funding from the local authority. This was addressed internally by, firstly adopting a ‘growth 
strategy’ and secondly addressing the ‘recruitment and retention problem’. Combined, these 
factors led to the ‘solution’; employee-ownership.  
 
6.4.1 Reducing funds 
One of the most pervasive challenges faced by Vivo-Co was continuously reducing funding 
from national government awarded to local authorities. This meant, according to its Chief 
Executive Officer, that he was constantly having to reassess the way social care services were 
provided and seek ways to reduce costs. The biggest single cost to Vivo-Co, he said, was 
staffing: social care employees. To combat these pressures, he argued: 
 
 ‘The company has to become more efficient and agile’.  
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He used both of these terms frequently in a variety of settings. Reflecting these needs, at a 
Managers’ Forum meeting, he outlined the challenges facing Vivo-Co, an example of one of 
these is provided below.  
 
‘We now have to pay the living wage…this is making it harder to make a profit…our 
profit margins are tight’. 
 
He went on to explain that the situation was exacerbated by the fact that:  
 
‘The labour market has shifted and there is less unemployment…there are more 
people looking for work in the retail rather than the care sector. Less unemployment 
means a smaller pool of people for us to attract into social care’.  
 
To address the challenges he argued:  
 
‘We need to work harder at aligning individual behaviour with the business goals’.  
 
He informed the meeting of several ways of achieving greater efficiency, agility and 
behaviour alignment with the goals of the business. Providing evidence are examples such as 
planned changes to the way training was being delivered to social care employees and the 
planned changes to the organisation’s communications systems discussed earlier 
(Organisational Communications). These were important changes bringing consequences for 
social care employees and therefore the impact on employee voice. As such, both of these 
issues are discussed below (see Outcomes of Employee-ownership). There were also 
examples of market-oriented practices adopted in Vivo-Co. 
 
6.4.2 A strategy of growth 
To combat reduced local authority funding, the Chief Executive Officer referred to having a 
‘growth strategy’. The purpose of the strategy was to achieve economies of scale by 
increasing the volume of contracts. In so doing, the company would become more efficient, 
agile, and behaviour would be aligned with the goals of the business.  
 
Achieving economies of scale was one way of increasing the efficiency of Vivo-Co according 
the Chief Executive Officer. As noted above (Organisational Profile: Vivo-Co), the company 
is a prime provider, though unlike other prime providers it did not sub-contract the work, 
rather it was delivered by Vivo-Co. This achieved economies of scale by increasing the 
volume of contracts.  
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The importance of increasing the volume of contracts is reflected in a presentation given at a 
social care sector event by the Chief Executive Officer (Source H). He stated that one of the 
ways that value is created in the business is through:  
 
‘…the volume of the services we provide. The more hours we deliver, the more 
profitable the business becomes, which allows us to provide better terms and 
conditions [of employment] and a higher quality service’.  
 
This emphasis by the Chief Executive Officer to become more efficient through achieving 
economies of scale by increasing the volume of contracts helps to highlight the challenging 
environment in which Vivo-Co was operating. This led to internal changes by way of 
responding to these challenges. Further evidence of this was expressed by one of the non-
executive directors, who is also the chair of the General Council. He explained:  
 
‘Vivo-Co is competing with other [social care organisations], some of them have the 
advantage of having access to loan finance and they could win a contract through 
‘loss-leading’.  
 
Asked what loss-leading practices were, he stated: 
 
 ‘In the social care sector, loss-leading involves an organisation lowering its costs of 
care delivery compared to the costs of its competitors. The purpose of doing this is to 
secure a contract from the local authority in the short-term, but then by increasing the 
number of contracts it has, it achieves sustainability in the longer term.’  
 
Other practices were also in evidence. The Chief Executive Officer was particularly anxious 
of being taken-over by a competitor. He referred to this as:  
 
‘A hostile take-over’.  
 
His anxiety about a hostile take-over was observed to manifest in two ways. The first was 
through his concerns regarding commercial confidentiality. This concern is important as it 
was to directly affect the General Council, the main employee-ownership process enabling 
employee voice. What it meant in practice was that the operating board of Vivo-Co had 
representation on the General Council whilst there was no representation from the General 
Council on the operating board. This was to have a fundamental impact on employee voice. 
As such, this issue will be discussed in more detail below (Outcomes of Employee-
ownership). The second manifestation of anxiety concerned the assets of Vivo-Co.  
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Social care organisations with significant assets can be vulnerable to hostile take-overs (Care 
Quality Commission 2014). Vivo-Co was not vulnerable regarding capital assets as its offices 
were rented. However, there were other ‘assets’ that were of potential value to competitors 
and therefore a cause for concern to the Chief Executive Officer. These were, firstly, Vivo-
Co’s contracts for social care delivery from the local authority and, secondly, the social care 
employees.  
 
To combat competition for contracts, the solution was to increase the volume of contracts 
achieved through a growth strategy of securing more and more branches. In so doing, Vivo-
Co would be in a stronger position to avoid a hostile take-over according to the Chief 
Executive Officer, the specific term he used in this regard was ‘strength in numbers’. His 
rationale was that individual branches were vulnerable to practices such as take-overs and 
loss-leading. However, if the company was operating as a whole, it was in a much stronger 
position. Combatting the potential of losing social care employees to competitors was a bigger 
challenge the Chief Executive Officer argued and highlighted what he referred to as the 
internal challenge of the ‘recruitment and retention problem’. 
 
6.4.3 The ‘recruitment and retention problem’ 
Within Vivo-Co, the Chief Executive Officer was heavily focused on what he regarded as the 
‘recruitment and retention problem’. It was, he stated,  
 
‘The greatest challenge in Vivo-Co’.  
 
This is illustrated further by the following example. At a Managers’ Forum meeting attended 
by branch managers and managers (Source I), the Chief Executive Officer asked everyone 
what kept them awake at night. Having listened to their replies he went on to share with them:  
 
‘Recruitment. That’s what keeps me awake at night’.  
 
The reason that recruitment and retention of social care employees was of so much 
importance to him was because it incurred a cost. He explained that this cost was exacerbated 
by high staff turnover through, for example, managers’ time having to re-recruit, managers 
having to deliver care services themselves and utilising agency workers. In contrast, he stated, 
high staff retention can help to create a competitive advantage for a social care organisation.  
 
The way a competitive advantage is achieved in a social care organisation, the Chief 
Executive Officer explained, was through being able to ensure the continuity of care delivery. 
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Such continuity led to a better quality of care for service users. To deal with the retention 
problem, he argued, Vivo-Co, needed to:  
 
‘Fix the recruitment problem’.  
 
Several methods of recruitment were being used in Vivo-Co. Reflecting those discussed in 
chapter five, these included word-of-mouth, advertising in the local press, company website, 
working with local agencies such as Jobcentre Plus and further education colleges and 
offering financial incentives to social care employees who were able to attract someone to the 
company. However, given what he felt to be the gravity of the problem, the Chief Executive 
Officer identified three ways to deal with fixing the recruitment problem. The first was 
through implementing new recruitment procedures.  
 
The new procedures would involve an across-company, centralised, single process for 
recruitment including a single access point (rather than via individual branches), generic 
paperwork, shared recruitment tracker, data and metrics and key indicators and performance 
measures. In other words, whereas previously multiple systems had been used, the new 
system provided a way of standardising procedures with the intention of being more efficient 
and cost-effective. 
 
The second way of fixing the recruitment problem, according to the Chief Executive Officer, 
was through creating a new post of Director of Engagement. One aspect of the new role was 
the recruitment of social care employees, a role which had previously been carried out by 
each of the six branch managers and one other person from their branch – Vivo-Co did not 
have a dedicated Human Resource Management department which meant several employees 
were involved in the process. At a meeting of branch managers, where recruitment was 
discussed, the Director of Engagement stated that the aim of the new process was:  
 
‘To get a better quality of people as [social care employees]. Recruiters have to be in a 
position to act really quickly otherwise we’ll lose the ‘hot’ ones [i.e. social care 
employees] to our competitors’.  
 
Importantly, though the branch managers said they welcomed the new centralised recruitment 
system and the offer of support to recruit social care employees, they stated they wanted to 
retain some involvement in the process. They expressed concern that the new system could 
deter some people from applying as it was less personal than the current arrangement. Their 
preferred arrangement relied heavily on the existing networks of employees. They were 
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concerned the new system might lose some of what they referred to as the ‘localness’ of the 
current system, in other words, existing social care employees making their own 
recommendations from amongst friends and family.  
 
Though acknowledging these concerns, the Chief Executive Officer stated that it was 
important that the company became more: 
 
‘Lean and efficient in its recruitment processes’.  
 
He further commented: 
 
‘We have got to work flatter, we can’t keep going up and down the hierarchy before 
decisions can be made; we have to be agile; we’re not the NHS [National Health 
Service]; we can’t lose our edge’. 
 
As such, and despite branch managers’ concerns about the new processes, the efficiency 
argument invoked by the Chief Executive Officer, and supported by the Director of 
Engagement, took priority. In so doing, the voice of the branch managers, not to mention their 
experience and knowledge of recruitment processes commonly used in the social care sector, 
was suppressed. A further issue is that social care employees were not asked about a solution 
to this problem despite it being them who were the focus of the new system.  
 
The third way of addressing the recruitment problem in Vivo-Co, according to the Chief 
Executive Officer, was through employee-ownership. That it was his decision to choose this 
particular mechanism is important as it would shape and influence the way employee-
ownership evolved in Vivo-Co. That it was his decision was conferred through his position as 
Chief Executive Officer. Whilst his position did not preclude seeking the views of others 
regarding the mechanism, these were not sought. His choice was underpinned by his own 
motivation and rationale regarding employee-ownership. 
 
His motivation was driven by what he saw as the problem of needing to increase company 
efficiency and reduce its costs and one of the biggest costs to Vivo-Co was the recruitment of 
social care employees and their retention. Whilst Vivo-Co was growing in size through 
increasing its number of branches, it was struggling to retain social care employees: the more 
Vivo-Co grew in size the bigger the issue of retention became. Solving the recruitment and 
retention problem in Vivo-Co through employee-ownership would, the Chief Executive 
Officer argued, alleviate some of the financial challenges and contribute towards a more 
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successful business. As such, the motivation in Vivo-Co for employee-ownership was framed 
by him as a way of addressing the ‘problem’ of staff retention.  
 
His rationale for choosing employee-ownership was based on an assumption that ownership, 
and the associated financial benefits, would attract people to the company. Attracted by the 
financial benefits, those people would be less likely to leave given they would own the 
company. Financial benefits yielded through ownership was, he thought, the incentive to 
attract potential recruits. Moreover, employee-ownership would help address the efficiency 
objective. The CEO stated:  
 
‘Employee-ownership is about improving performance’. 
 
Performance would be improved, he believed, through social care employees being more 
committed to the organisation and therefore they would be more likely, he argued, to: 
 
‘Go the extra mile’. 
 
This statement made by the Chief Executive Officer was reflected in the company values 
discussed earlier (Organisational Values). In other words, employee-ownership was being 
implemented to address a financial problem in the company; it was not being implemented 
because of any perceived benefits to the employees such as providing them with a voice in the 
organisation. His assumption was that the employee-ownership model would help to: 
 
a) Solve the problem of staff retention, by  
 
b) Financially incentivising potential recruits, which would  
 
c) Develop in those new recruits a sense of ownership, and would  
 
d) Lead to greater employee commitment and involvement.  
 
Combined, these four points provided the foundation for implementing employee-ownership 
from the perspective of the Chief Executive Officer. His purpose for employee-ownership was 
to ‘fix’ the recruitment problem and lead to greater staff retention. It would garner social care 
employees’ commitment through the process of financially incentivising them. They would 
become owners of the business helping to create a more efficient and agile business. Through 
ownership, social care employees would take on more responsibility and be more committed 
to Vivo-Co, they were implored by the Chief Executive Officer to: 
 
‘Think like owners and act like owners’. 
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Furthermore, when social care employees began to think and act like owners, according to the 
Chief Executive Officer, they would have an incentive to ‘go the extra mile’. The key person 
then driving the choice of mechanism, employee-ownership, was the Chief Executive Officer, 
a situation which in turn influenced the way it evolved. 
 
6.5 The mechanism of employee-ownership 
The second research question in chapter one asked: how did the mechanism differ to those in 
conventional businesses? The conventional voice mechanisms used in Vivo-Co have been 
described above. The findings of those yielded through employee-ownership in Vivo-Co are 
presented in this section, all of which differ from those of conventional businesses in relation 
to employee voice. 
 
6.5.1 The type of employee-ownership 
Once he had decided on the mechanism, the Chief Executive Officer worked with some of the 
operating board and with a legal advisor to decide on the type of employee-ownership that 
would be adopted by Vivo-Co. Those from the operating board became the ‘founder 
members’, the first members of the employee-ownership governance mechanism. The 
decision was for a model of employee-ownership which would apply across all six branches 
and the Group Office and so would be entirely owned by the Vivo-Co workforce via an 
Employee Benefit Trust6.  
 
Through this Trust, employee-ownership in Vivo-Co is involuntary and indirect; individuals 
are automatically entered into an Employee Share Ownership Plan once they have served a 
six month probationary period (Source J). In practice, this means that employee-owners in 
Vivo-Co receive shares without any direct cost or risk on their part unlike, for example, direct 
ownership where individual employees purchase shares. This type of employee-ownership 
also yields particular governance processes. These processes are significant as they provide 
the means of enabling employee voice. There were three processes in Vivo-Co which are 
described below: governing document, Annual General Meeting and a governing body.  
 
 
 
                                                          
6 As it operated in Vivo-Co, the Employee Benefit Trust involved the company taking out a loan to finance the 
distribution of shares to employees. The Employee Benefit Trust uses its share of the company profits to pay off 
the loan before then giving shares to employees. 
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a. Governing document 
The first process is a governing document – the Articles of Association (Source K). All UK 
limited companies are required by company legislation to have a governing document7; more 
simplistically referred to as ‘Articles’. As with conventional companies, the Articles in Vivo-
Co provide the infrastructure for the company. However, in contrast to conventional 
companies, the ‘infrastructure’ in Vivo-Co was employee-ownership. As such, there were two 
aspects to the design of the Articles. The first is setting the technicalities, parameters, rules 
and regulations of Vivo-Co as an employee-owned company. The second is setting the 
powers and procedures of the governing body, referred to as a ‘General Council’ in Vivo-Co.  
 
The Articles in Vivo-Co were designed by the legal advisor, who is an expert in employee-
ownership, and were then agreed by the founder members and some of the senior executives, 
including the Chief Executive Officer, and then lodged with Companies House8. However, 
once lodged, this does not mean the Articles cannot be changed. An opportunity to amend the 
Articles was presented at the first meeting of the General Council. This provided an 
opportunity for ‘employee representatives’, those representing social care employees, to 
express their voice on behalf of the social care employees. This is discussed in more detail 
below (Outcomes of Employee-ownership). 
 
b. Annual General Meeting 
The second governance process is an Annual General Meeting. As with a governing 
document, an Annual General Meeting is a mandatory requirement of all incorporated 
companies9, in other words it includes those which are Employee Share Ownership Plans as 
well as conventional companies. As the name implies, meetings are held annually, and 
importantly, they are held with members. It is here that there is a difference between 
conventional businesses and those that are employee-owned such as Vivo-Co. 
 
                                                          
7 Source: https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/companies-house. 
 
8 Source: www.gov.uk/guidance/model-articles-of-association-for-limited-companies  
 
9 Companies House is a national government body responsible for incorporating and dissolving limited 
companies.  
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Typically, members of a conventional company are shareholders. In contrast, the members in 
Vivo-Co are the employee-owners; the largest group of which are social care employees. 
Members are invited to attend and vote on particular matters concerning the organisation at 
Annual General Meetings. By Vivo-Co holding an Annual General Meeting, an opportunity is 
provided for the direct involvement of employee-owners, i.e. predominantly social care 
employees. Further, this would give them the opportunity to come together in one place as 
well as the opportunity to express their voice. Again, this is discussed in more detail below 
(Outcomes of Employee-ownership). 
 
c. Governing body 
The third process is a governing body. As noted earlier, this was referred to in Vivo-Co as a 
‘General Council’. The General Council was the body through which the Articles were 
enacted. Of the three governance processes, it offered a more frequent process of enabling 
employee voice. 
 
Meetings of the General Council were held quarterly, lasted one full day and were rotated 
between the different branches. Most of the meetings followed prescribed agenda items set by 
the Chief Executive Officer and chair of the General Council. This included items such as 
apologies for absence, minutes from the previous meeting and a report by the Chief Executive 
Officer. These meetings were important as a means of enabling indirect employee voice. 
Significantly, this was through representatives who attended meetings and acted on behalf of 
employee-owners. Given the significance of the role of representatives, a more detailed 
explanation of the process of electing them to the General Council and an explanation of the 
specific role of the ‘employee representatives’, those representing the voice of social care 
employees, is presented below.  
 
6.5.2 Electing the General Council 
The process of electing the constituents of the General Council was prescribed by the Articles. 
The Articles stated the categories of constituents and the number of representatives within 
each constituency. The same process was used to elect representatives to each of these 
constituencies. Table 6.1 below illustrates the General Council constituents, the maximum 
number per constituency and the actual number at the time of the fieldwork.  
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Constituent Maximum Actual Gender 
Managers 1 0 No representative 
Group office 1 1 Female 
Non-executive directors 5 2 1 male; 1 female 
Employees 8 5 3 male; 2 female 
Table 6.1 Demographics of the General Council 
 
 
As highlighted in table 6.1, the Articles provided for one manager representative, one Group 
Office representative and a maximum of five non-executive director representatives.  During 
the fieldwork, no manager was appointed to this role given that, according to the Chief 
Executive Officer: 
 
‘They can’t make up their minds who it should be’. 
 
However, it emerged from discussions at General Council meetings that a suitable system was 
not yet in place to elect a manager representative. By the fifth meeting, a system was agreed 
and subsequently a manager representative was appointed. Though not directly involved with 
meetings of the General Council, the managers did discuss the General Council and the 
broader subject of employee-ownership at the Managers’ Forum meetings. In addition, 
managers had direct contact in each branch with an employee representative.  
 
There was one Group office representative who, as suggested by their title, represented all of 
the Group office staff, approximately 20 people. This category also included the Chief 
Executive Officer who was always present at meetings in his role as an officer of the 
organisation and therefore not as an elected representative.  
 
There were two non-executive directors on the General Council. Both were regarded as 
experts in employee-ownership by the Chief Executive Officer. One of the non-executive 
directors was also the chair of the General Council; he was recommended by the Chief 
Executive Officer.  
 
With regard to the last category, employee representatives, all Vivo-Co supervisors, co-
ordinators and social care employees fell into this category and therefore were eligible for 
election within it. To elect employee representatives, each of the six branches elected one 
person from within the branch; the two remaining places were kept for a time when Vivo-Co 
increased its number of branches. The person with the most nominations became a constituent 
of the General Council.  
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This ability to elect employee representatives is an important expression of employee voice. 
To illustrate its significance, an alternative process would be for senior executives to select 
the employee representative. In this scenario, it is the voice of senior executives, not 
employees, that is heard. By contrast, through electing a representative, all social care 
employees in Vivo-Co had an opportunity to express their voice in the process. Of equal 
importance, each social care employee had the opportunity of becoming a representative.  
 
Of the elected employee representatives, there were originally six, three men and three 
women, though this total was subsequently reduced to five; one female left the organisation 
after the first General Council meeting and was not replaced. Four of the five had been social 
care employees but were now holding supervisory roles whilst the fifth was a social care 
employee. The four who held supervisory roles were not additionally remunerated for their 
role on the General Council as it was regarded integral to their salaried post. The 
representative who was a social care employee was not a salaried employee and was on a zero 
hour contract. As such, she was remunerated for her role on the General Council.  
 
The role of the employee representative provided an important democratic voice mechanism 
given that they had the task of representing the majority of employee-owners, social care 
employees. Social care employees were the primary group in Vivo-Co that employee-
ownership was targeted at. They constituted the largest single group. The significance of the 
role of employee representative is therefore crucial in providing a voice to the 800 social care 
employees as employee-owners.  
 
6.5.3 The role of employee representatives 
The employee representatives were fundamental to employee voice in Vivo-Co. The role gave 
life to employee-ownership and in so doing meant employee voice would become a reality. 
By way of introducing them, table 6.2 overleaf provides a brief summary of each. To protect 
their identity whilst retaining their personality, each has been given a pseudonym. 
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Representative Profile 
Susan Susan is female and in her 50s. Before joining Vivo-Co she 
worked outside of the care sector. She came to Vivo-Co via 
the job centre and has been there for about three years. She 
began as a social care employee, progressed to a supervisor 
then to a senior supervisor. She still provides social care on 
an ad hoc basis. 
Kevin Kevin is male and in his 30s. Before joining Vivo-Co he 
worked outside of the social care sector. However, he 
wanted a better work-life balance and a friend suggested 
working in the social care sector. He has been at Vivo-Co 
for ten years. He began as a social care employee, 
progressed to supervisor and then manager. He still 
provides social care. 
Peter Peter is male and in his 60s. He has substantial previous 
experience in the social care sector. He came to Vivo-Co as 
a career progression from a different social care 
organisation. He has been at Vivo-Co about seven years 
and has always been at supervisory level in the 
organisation. He no longer provides social care. 
Joanne Joanne is female and in her 50s. She has substantial 
previous experience in the social care sector. She came to 
Vivo-Co via a friend’s recommendation. She has been at 
Vivo-Co for several years. She had held the role of social 
care employee, then progressed to supervisor and then, on 
her request, reverted to back to a social care employee. 
Tom Tom is male and in his 20s. He came to Vivo-Co after 
leaving school via a family contact. He began as a social 
care employee and then progressed to supervisor. He no 
longer provides social care. 
Table 6.2 Summary of each employee representative 
 
 
The purpose of the role of employee representative, from the perspective of the employee 
representatives, was to be the voice of social care employees; to ensure the voices of social 
care employees were heard. This point was made by all of the employee representatives, the 
following provide examples: 
 
‘The most important thing for us is having a seat at the table [that will enable us] to be 
the voice of the [social care employees]; get the carers’ voice heard; we are the go-
between for the [social care employees]’ (Kevin). 
 
‘I want to get my staff’s voice through, I want the staff to understand their voice can 
be heard; I want them to understand they can be involved; I want them to take 
ownership’ (Susan’s emphasis). 
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‘I think my role on the General Council is to facilitate the views of the [social care 
employees]; take ideas and suggestions to [the General Council]; I think as a rep you 
have to stand your ground on issues you think are important to the [social care 
employees]’ (Tom). 
 
A clear sense of responsibility is expressed in all of the statements above. The representatives 
felt it was their responsibility in the role to represent social care employees. The quote from 
Susan highlights this point; she saw it as her role to invigorate and energise social care 
employees and she wanted them to ‘want’ employee-ownership. The employee 
representatives also noted the opportunity their role gave them to work with one another. The 
main opportunity they had to do so was through the General Council meetings.  
 
The contact between employee representatives at General Council meetings was regarded by 
the representatives as a distinct advantage of the employee-ownership model. They stated it 
provided a valuable opportunity to discuss ideas and ambitions for their branch as well as 
sharing innovations they were currently involved with.  
 
Kevin spoke about holding a sports event to encourage social care employees to come 
together whilst Joanne was hosting a charitable event. Susan discussed wanting to take this 
contact further by organising visits to one another’s branches. She felt that it would provide 
an opportunity to find out the ways in which each branch were communicating with social 
care employees about the General Council.  
 
In support of Susan’s idea, Tom suggested establishing an internal system which would 
enable all representatives to communicate with one another outside of General Council 
meetings. Again, this would provide a means of learning about employee-ownership as it was 
being implemented in each branch and it was used by social care employees. Tom noted:  
 
‘We are one team working towards something that’s important and fulfilling’.  
 
The role of employee representative was, importantly, to provide a way of transmitting the 
voice of social care employees. It was also regarded as a way of enabling the representatives 
to provide support to social care employees. All of the employee representatives recognised 
the dedication and commitment that was needed for, what they consistently referred to as, the: 
 
 ‘Profession of care provision’.  
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Whilst most were no longer involved day-to-day in providing social care, they all became 
animated and effusive when talking about it. They were determined to do everything they 
could to support their social care colleagues in their work. Indeed, given they all had 
experience of being a social care employee, they were aware of the challenges of the role 
which they made frequent references to during interviews.  
 
Each interview with the employee representatives began by asking questions about their 
employment background and finding out how they came to work at Vivo-Co. All of the 
representatives had taken a different route to working at Vivo-Co and whilst some had 
previous experience of working in the care sector others had not. One representative, Joanne, 
began as a social care employee and was then promoted to a supervisory role.  
 
After only a few months in her new role as a supervisor, Joanne requested that she return to 
providing social care. A factor in making this decision was that she found the role of 
supervisor to be too stressful. However, she also stated that she preferred the role of social 
care employee because of the contact it gave her with service users. The importance of this 
connection with service users was expressed by all of the employee representatives. 
 
Like Joanne, most of the employee representatives had begun as a social care employee and 
had progressed to supervisory level. Each of them was quite clearly proud of their continuing 
or previous role as a social care employee. Though now holding a supervisory role, Susan still 
occasionally provided social care. Talking about the role of a social care employee she 
commented: 
 
‘The job satisfaction I get, it’s one of those jobs that when you’re out in the field and 
you do even a very small thing for someone, [e.g.] just putting some sugar in their tea 
when they’re distressed, putting their clothes on the radiator to warm in the winter, 
that small thing has made a huge difference to that person’s life; so, happy service 
users; it’s a constant challenge but it is constantly rewarding. Everyone has to work, 
the difference here [Vivo-Co] is that you want to come to work’ (Susan’s emphasis). 
 
Similarly, Mike stated: 
 
‘Changing people’s lives; it’s hard to make that break away from actually caring for 
someone, but you have to realise that in your new role you can still make a difference, 
you can make changes to people’s lives just in different ways; I can make sure that 
I’m here to support [social care employees] to do a good job’. 
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The concern to make a difference is clear in both statements above and was reflected during 
interviews with the other employee representatives. Indeed, though most of the employee 
representatives were no longer involved in direct care delivery they were keen to emphasise 
that their current role still had an impact on the delivery of care. The following point made by 
Kevin reflects those made by other representatives: 
 
‘We’re able to take some of the stress away from [social care employees] so they can 
just focus on their job, on the service users, so they don’t have to worry so much about 
day-to-day things’. 
 
The role was therefore viewed by employee representatives as extending their ability to have 
an impact on the lives of service users through the support they gave to social care employees. 
Particularly notable was that though most of the representatives had moved on to more senior 
roles, they continued to provide social care and did so because they chose to rather than 
because they had to.  Mike stated:  
 
‘There is a culture of care here; there is a mentality; we are professionals’. 
 
The employee representatives saw their role as crucial in enabling social care employees to 
focus on their work with service users. A focus on service users was also evident amongst 
social care employees. 
 
At a team meeting of social care employees, they were asked to write on a post-it note the 
reasons they worked at Vivo-Co. Of the six who were present, all wrote that they worked at 
Vivo-Co because they wanted to make a difference to the service users. They expressed a love 
of the job and being able to make a difference to the lives of services users was fundamental 
in how they viewed their role. The role of employee representatives in helping to support 
social care employees through being their voice via the governance processes was therefore 
regarded by them as crucial. How far they were able to do so is considered in the next section 
which presents findings of the outcomes of employee voice through the governance processes 
of employee-ownership in Vivo-Co. The findings are organised into factors which aided and 
those which hampered employee voice.  
 
6.6 The outcomes of employee-ownership 
The two remaining research questions which were presented in chapter one asked: how did 
employee voice operate through the mechanism and what were the consequences of the 
mechanism for key organisational actors?  
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This section addresses these two questions by presenting the findings of how employee voice 
operated through the three governance processes which were described in the section above. 
This was either directly by the social care employees themselves or indirectly via the 
employee representatives. Also, by presenting findings of the outcomes for employee voice. 
In so doing, some opportunities for employee voice to be expressed which were yielded 
through the processes are discussed whilst a number of more challenging factors are also 
revealed.   
 
6.6.1 Governance processes 
Employee-ownership was introduced in Vivo-Co as a way to address the recruitment and 
retention of social care employees. The choice of employee-ownership and the decision to 
implement it were both made by the Chief Executive Officer. By not involving social care 
employees in this decision, he set the tone for the way in which employee voice would 
operate in Vivo-Co. The assumptions he made about employee-ownership, i.e. it would 
incentivise social care employees through generating a sense of ownership which would then 
lead to greater employee commitment and involvement, were to influence how employee-
ownership operated and its outcomes vis-a-vis employee voice.  
 
a. Employee voice: Articles of Association 
The first governance mechanism, the Articles of Association, was devised by the Chief 
Executive Officer, some members of the operating board and an employee-ownership expert. 
Social care employees played no part in this process and were not involved in the design of 
the Articles. However, some influence over the Articles was enabled through the mechanism 
of the General Council. 
 
At the first General Council meeting the opportunity arose to amend the Articles. The request 
to do so had been made by one of Vivo-Co’s external funders. The funder requested that the 
Articles were amended so that a decision to either fold the company or agree to its take-over 
had to be agreed by at least 75% of employee-owners. This was as opposed to the decision 
being made by the senior executives, which was how it currently was in the Articles. If the 
request was accepted, this would mean that the General Council, or the senior executive team 
or both could not agree to either scenario without the agreement of at least 75% of employee-
owners. At the meeting, the request, and its implications, were explained to the employee 
representatives who were then asked to vote on whether to agree to the amendment. 
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The representatives voted to accept the amendment. This was a substantial decision that gave 
majority control to employee-owners, the social care employees. Though it had been 
suggested by the funder, this amendment through the process of the General Council provided 
the employee representatives with their first opportunity to exert their voice on behalf of 
social care employees on a key governance mechanism. In so doing, they were able to ensure 
the voice of social care employees was heard in relation to the future of the company 
concerning closure or take-over. This finding provides an example of employee voice being 
heard which was yielded through having the right to a voice. 
 
b. Employee voice: Annual General Meeting 
The second governance mechanism yielded through employee-ownership which would 
potentially enable social care employees to express their voice was through an Annual 
General Meeting.  However, there was an absence of such a meeting in Vivo-Co during the 
research period. Two separate requests to hold such a meeting were made by Peter, an 
employee representative.  
 
The first time Peter made the request it generated some discussion between the Chief 
Executive Officer and other senior figures at one of the General Council meetings. A decision 
was not made however. The second time it was made was during a General Council meeting 
and again by Peter. This time the Chief Executive Officer responded that a decision on an 
Annual General Meeting had not yet been made. He went on to say that in the meantime, 
individual branches could organise a smaller version of an Annual General Meeting if they 
wanted. How this would have worked in practice was not discussed. For example, how 
decisions would have been made given that the smaller meeting would have had no powers. A 
decision about an Annual General Meeting that would cover the whole of the organisation 
was not made during the fieldwork. This was an important opportunity through which social 
care employees could have expressed their voice that was missed.  
 
The reason this was an important opportunity is because of items that are discussed at such 
meetings. For example, a key topic in Annual General Meetings of conventional companies is 
the allocation of profits. As noted above (The mechanism of employee-ownership: Annual 
General Meeting), in conventional companies, the members who attend Annual General 
Meetings are shareholders. It is therefore shareholders who make decisions about the 
allocation of profit. By contrast, in Vivo-Co, it is social care employees, in their role as 
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members, who would make decisions about profit allocation, for example whether it is 
extracted from the company or re-invested back into the company. The opportunity for social 
care employees to influence such decisions was through this Annual General Meeting process. 
Yet they were not afforded this opportunity. Nevertheless, this did not mean that they did not 
benefit at all.   
 
The social care employees in Vivo-Co did benefit from better terms and conditions of 
employment compared to their counterparts in other social care organisations. An assessment 
of job advertisements across the six Vivo-Co branches revealed favourable terms and 
conditions (Source A). Social care employees in Vivo-Co may receive the following benefits: 
 
 Holiday and sick pay 
 
 Employment contracts guaranteeing a weekly minimum of 16 hours 
 
 Training and qualifications including National Vocational Qualifications  
 
 Profit sharing 
 
 ‘Employee Advantage’ scheme 
 
 Mileage allowance 
 
 DBS checks 
 
 Enhanced rates for Bank Holidays 
 
 Paid training 
 
 One free uniform.  
 
The explanation given by the Chief Executive Officer for the differences in terms and 
conditions of employment compared to those of the competitors was that Vivo-Co did not 
have external shareholders. The absence of shareholders was noted (chapter two) to be an 
important difference between employee-owned enterprise compared to those social care 
organisations who do have shareholders, particularly, he noted when they are: 
 
‘Extracting profit from the organisation’.  
 
As such, social care employees did benefit from Vivo-Co being an employee-owned company 
through the terms and conditions of employment which were offered. There was also 
evidence of social care employees in Vivo-Co having high levels of satisfaction with their 
work and citing close relationships with service users as a reason for this (Source D, E, F and 
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G). However, what was absent, was their voice in the process of making the decision about 
profit allocation. An Annual General Meeting would have enabled them to express their voice 
on this issue; the absence of such a meeting was a missed opportunity. An equally relevant 
issue was whether social care employees were aware of this missed opportunity. 
 
Though the social care employees were the main target of employee-ownership, there was, 
according to a number of those taking part in the research, a perceived lack of understanding 
about the mechanism. The following comments were typical: 
 
‘There is a customised workforce who do not understand employee-ownership’ (Chair, 
General Council).  
 
‘It is the carers who are making the business but they don’t understand that’ (Susan, 
employee representative).  
 
This lack of understanding was exacerbated by several factors. One of these was the issue of 
space that was discussed in an earlier section of this chapter (Organisational Space), 
particularly the lack of opportunities for social care employees to come together. This meant 
limited opportunities for employees to discuss any topics - including employee-ownership. 
 
A second factor related to training. During fieldwork, the company changed the way training 
was delivered. Training had been provided by an appropriately trained employee-owner. In 
one of the branches, the trained individual went on long term sick so an external consultancy 
was commissioned to deliver the training. This method of training however incurred a higher 
cost to Vivo-Co that was compounded by a fear expressed by the Chief Executive Officer that 
social care employees would be ‘poached’ by other social care organisations. Subsequently, 
Vivo-Co changed its method of training delivery from face-to-face group training to an on-
line website training provider. This was an important change for Vivo-Co and for its social 
care employees.  
 
For Vivo-Co this change in the way training was provided reduced its costs. It also made 
redundant one of the conditions of employment in the list above; that social care employees 
are paid for training. For them, it meant they were no longer required to attend the office to 
receive training. Rather, they could access the virtual training provider from a location of their 
choice and at a time that was convenient to them. However, it is also important to note that 
this meant another opportunity for social care employees to meet was lost. Given the isolating 
nature of social care work described in chapter five, coming into the office for training 
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provided a rare and valuable opportunity for social care employees to meet and interact with 
their colleagues, and perhaps discuss employee-ownership.  
 
A third factor contributing to the lack of understanding of employee-ownership by social care 
employees were the communication systems in Vivo-Co, again these were discussed earlier in 
this chapter (Organisational Communications). It was noted by several General Council 
members and members of the senior executive team that the flow of communications into and 
out of the General Council was poor. For example, the chair of the General Council stated:  
 
‘There’s a communication malfunction from the General Council to the rest of the 
organisation; we’re not getting a two-way conversation; there’s only downwards 
communications’. 
 
The chair did acknowledge that communication needed to be two-way and that at that time, it 
was not happening. Rather than a lack of understanding or a lack of effective 
communications, a different, and more disturbing interpretation is offered by the Director of 
Quality and Compliance. He stated:  
 
‘They [social care employees] aren’t interested in ownership, they just don’t care, it’s 
mainly to do with apathy and they have busy lives’.  
 
Furthermore, he suggested, the organisation was dealing with what he referred to as:  
 
‘A ‘tough’ audience’.  
 
The tough audience, in his view, were the social care employees. He went on to explain this 
comment by stating that Vivo-Co had a policy to employ people who have been unemployed 
for a long time and from within the local community, many of whom, he stated,  
 
‘Would not be employable by other organisations’. 
 
One reason he gave for this was:  
 
‘For example, they’ve not got previous experience of providing social care’.  
 
However, implicit in the comment and its explanation was that some social care employees 
did not have the intellectual capacity to understand, nor were they interested in, employee- 
ownership. A further explanation for the lack of interest, he explained, was  
 
‘It’s also because of the fragmented nature of care work that makes it difficult for 
[social care employees] to come together’.  
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Certainly the physical aspects described above of one of branches bore this point out vis-à-vis 
there not being a communal space dedicated to social care employees. This was also borne out 
by a number of other research participants. Peter, one of the employee representatives stated: 
 
‘They have no workplace’.  
 
Nevertheless, there were no plans to address this issue by creating spaces where social care 
employees were able to meet together, or, for that matter, allowing them into the communal 
spaces behind the locked doors. Indeed, opportunities to meet together were being withdrawn, 
such as the changes to the delivery of social care training. The Chief Executive Officer 
commented that engaging social care employees was:  
 
‘A work in progress’.  
 
This suggested that involving social care employees in employee-ownership was a long-term 
project rather than something that could be achieved quickly. A related issue was that this 
lack of understanding and poor communication systems regarding employee-ownership 
created unrealistic expectations amongst those social care employees who did show some 
interest. This view was put forward by the Director of Quality and Compliance. 
 
He suggested that the employee-ownership processes had not been thought through before the 
General Council had been established. This lack of prescription was something he regarded 
negatively. He expressed concern that unless processes were carefully developed there was a 
risk that expectations would be raised amongst social care employees regarding what the 
General Council was able to achieve. If it was unable to deliver on these expectations then 
they would feel let down and betrayed which would lead to a lack of trust in the body. This 
issue of raising expectations was also commented upon by two of the employee 
representatives who noted: 
 
‘Expectations are raised; people expect they will get a bonus but don’t understand the 
process of a bonus being achieved, they just think it’s automatic; they don’t 
understand their role in affecting the bonus; it needs to be communicated better; it is 
the carers who are making the business but they don’t understand that, they don’t 
understand how they are making the business or how the bonus is made’ (Peter). 
 
‘Things move slowly; you enthuse the [social care employees] then they get frustrated 
when things happen slowly’ (Susan). 
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From the comments above, it is clear that for some, it was perceived that the social care 
employees lacked knowledge and understanding of employee-ownership. Importantly, this 
lack of knowledge was often presented as a failure on the part of social care employees rather 
than a problem of Vivo-Co. Furthermore, factors such as an Annual General Meeting would 
have provided an opportunity not only for social care employees to come together but also an 
opportunity for them to learn more about employee-ownership. As with the finding above, 
this finding provides an example of how the governance processes of employee-ownership 
enabled employee voice to be expressed. However, unlike the previous findings, this time it 
was closed down. 
 
c. Employee voice: General Council 
The third governance process that held the potential of enabling employee voice was the 
General Council. This would be achieved through employee representatives representing 
social care employees at General Council meetings. It is with this process that the role of 
employee representatives was fundamental. Given its greater frequency, more findings are 
provided compared to those of the other processes. There are eight examples and of those the 
first two provide evidence of representatives being able to express their voice and exert some 
influence via the General Council. The remaining six relate to evidence of representatives 
having their voice either closed down or not heard, again via the General Council.  
 
1. The weekly payment system 
The first example where an employee representative was able to express their voice and exert 
influence was through a discussion at one of the General Council meetings regarding the 
terms and conditions of employment for social care employees. Despite this being a topic 
several of the senior executives had stated on several occasions could not be discussed, the 
Director of Finance stated there would be changes made to one of the branches regarding the 
payment system. All of the staff at all of the branches were paid monthly except for this 
branch where social care employees were paid weekly. The rationale given was that it would 
standardise the payment system across the company.  
 
Kevin, the representative of the branch affected, was assertive in challenging this proposal. 
He explained that it would be impossible for social care employees to survive from one month 
to the next given the low wages and insecure nature of the work. Despite objections from the 
Director, the meeting eventually agreed that social care employees at the branch would 
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remain on weekly pay. This finding provides an example of how the governance process of 
the General Council enabled employee voice to be expressed.  
 
2. What’s in a name? 
The next example of employee representatives having their voice heard relates to something 
that was considered by the Chief Executive Officer to be a straightforward matter, though this 
ultimately proved not to be the case. It concerned whose names should go on the company’s 
legal documents. Ultimately, the decision was taken by the General Council to include the 
names of employee representatives on the document but the process of reaching the decision 
highlights how the mechanism of the General Council afforded employee representatives the 
opportunity to speak up, share their views and contribute to a decision.  
 
At the fourth General Council meeting there was a discussion of whose names should appear 
on the Trust Deed document. For this part of the meeting, the legal advisor, who is also a non-
executive director, was taking part in the discussion by telephone. The Chief Executive 
Officer was suggesting that he, the chair of the General Council and two non-executive 
directors should act as signatories; the two non-executive directors would be the legal advisor 
and the chair of the operating board.  
 
The chair of the General Council disagreed with this suggestion. He suggested that anyone 
reading the document would see three names of people who were external to the organisation. 
He argued: 
 
‘This will not look good, particularly to [social care employees]; it’d look better if at 
least one or two of the signatories were employee representatives’.  
 
An intense discussion followed between the Chief Executive Officer and the chair with the 
external legal advisor contributing every once in a while. During this part of the discussion 
there was no input from the representatives. The Chief Executive Officer responded by 
justifying his argument through stating:  
 
‘There’s no status to the role; there’s no remuneration; it’s just a technicality’.  
 
Given a lack of response to this statement from others in the meeting, the Chief Executive 
Officer then went on to provide further justification for his choice of signatories. He stated 
that there was the potential of reputational damage if an employee representative, who was 
also a signatory, was facing disciplinary procedures. Such a scenario, he stated:  
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‘Would make it awkward for the business’. 
 
He continued his argument by suggesting that an employee representative might leave the 
organisation or might not be contactable to sign paperwork because they were not office 
based. At this point Susan, an employee representative, offered to be a signatory.  
 
Following the Chief Executive Officer’s line of argument, i.e. that a signatory needed to be 
someone who was contactable, she made her offer given her role was office based meaning 
she would be available to sign documents. This was followed by an offer to be a signatory 
from another employee representative, Kevin.  
 
As with Susan, Kevin followed a line of argument used by the Chief Executive Officer, 
justifying his offer in terms of having been with the company for ten years, which he noted, 
was in contrast to the transient employment of some of the social care employees. In response, 
the Chief Executive Officer disregarded both offers, he stated:  
 
‘My view is with the long term future of the business.’  
 
In so doing, the offers by the two representatives are not acknowledged. What the Chief 
Executive Officer is doing in the above statement is reaffirming his initial justification. 
Furthermore, his comment suggests that the view of the others was not for the long term good 
of the business. In response, the chair replied:  
 
‘My view is more principle-oriented’.  
 
The suggestion by the chair is that the view of the Chief Executive Officer is not based on 
principles. Perhaps more disparagingly, particularly given the presence of the employee 
representatives, the Chief Executive Officer then went on to ask:  
 
‘What if an employee representative is a signatory and they have stolen some money 
from a client?’  
 
This response suggests a distrust of social care employees and is in contrast to the presumed 
trustworthiness of the signatories suggested by the Chief Executive Officer: one of whom is 
himself, another the chair of the General Council, another an external lawyer and the fourth, 
the chair of the operating board and a business owner, all of whom are white middle-class 
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men. This view was a direct challenge to the one put forward by the chair and the employee 
representatives that social care employees are trustworthy.  
 
Nevertheless, as a result of this discussion, and despite the efforts of the Chief Executive 
Officer to block employee representatives acting as signatories, Susan and Kevin did become 
signatories. This provides an example of how representatives were able not only to express 
their voice but also to challenge the views of others; the General Council had provided the 
opportunity to do so. However, their role was often undermined by the senior executives and 
non-executive directors which created challenges for the representatives. The first of these 
challenges relates to what they were allowed to discuss at General Council meetings. 
 
3. What can I talk about? 
The question ‘what can I talk about’ was asked at meetings of the General Council several 
times by the employee representatives. From their perspective, the purpose of the General 
Council was to express the voice of social care employees. It became clear however that this 
was not straightforward. The issue of what could and could not be discussed by employee 
representatives was an issue at every General Council meeting.  
 
At the first meeting Peter, one of the employee representatives, sought guidance about what 
could be discussed. Concerned about ensuring their inclusion at the meeting, Peter had 
consulted with social care employees within his branch about the General Council beforehand 
and asked them for topics that they would like to be included for discussion at the meeting. 
 
From this communication he compiled a list of 17 items (Source L) put forward by the social 
care employees. He distributed the list to everyone at the meeting and suggested that, as well 
as responding to the items, it could also be used to set the parameters for the topics that, he 
stated, ‘were allowed to be discussed’.  
 
The items fell into two categories: firstly, relating to the work of a social care employee and 
secondly, the terms and conditions of employment. The table below shows the number of 
items falling into each category as well as providing some examples of items within each 
category. 
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Category Frequency Examples 
Terms and conditions 9 More communication with supervisors 
Pay review 
Work-related 8 Umbrellas with company logo 
Car parking passes 
Table 6.3 Topics for discussion at the General Council 
 
 
As highlighted in the table above, there was an almost even split between items relating to the 
terms and conditions of employment and work-related items. Importantly, it reflects the topics 
social care employees wanted to talk about. What it does not include are issues concerning 
governance nor more general comments about Vivo-Co as an organisation.  
 
Some social care employees wanted to discuss topics relating to their terms and conditions of 
employment. Some social care employees wanted to discuss work-related items. As an 
example, there were issues at some of the branches relating to car parking, especially in the 
super-branches that were based in city centres. At one of these there were only three parking 
spaces outside the office that were usually taken up by office staff. This meant that when 
social care employees were visiting the office they either had to park some way away from 
the office or park on double yellow lines outside of the office and risk being fined. When they 
were rushing in between visits to service users they would often choose the latter.  
 
Peter was keen for a response to the list in order that he could feed back. The response from 
the Chief Executive Officer was one of resistance: 
 
‘Operational issues, such as terms and conditions of employment, cannot be 
discussed’. 
 
The explanation given as to why terms and conditions could not be discussed was that it was 
not the role of the General Council to discuss such issues though why this was the case was 
not explained. It was clear that some of the senior executives and non-executive directors had 
a well-defined idea of the subjects that could and could not be discussed by employee 
representatives, closing down any opportunity to discuss issues of an operational nature. Yet, 
there was a clear aspiration by employee representatives to discuss issues of this nature that 
reflected the very practical and real concerns of social care employees. Furthermore, the Chief 
Executive Officer stated that if any social care employee did have an issue with their terms 
and conditions they were, or should be, clear on the protocol: they should speak with their 
supervisor.  
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Peter would have to feed this back to the social care employees and ensure they were clear on 
the protocol. The view of the Chief Executive Officer was that it was not the role of the 
General Council to discuss terms and conditions of employment, despite it being discussed at 
the meeting described in the earlier example (The weekly payment system). His view was that 
there were specific topics that were allowed to be discussed and employee representatives 
must comply with those topics.  
 
This view was repeated by the Chief Executive Officer several times and in different settings. 
For example, at one of the General Council meetings, he stated: 
 
‘It’s not the General Council’s role to interfere with the operational side of things. We 
can’t let the General Council get in the way of having an agile business’.  
 
The implication in the statement above was that the governance side of Vivo-Co could 
obstruct the business side. To avert this, the Chief Executive Officer invokes the primacy and 
the physical prowess of the business whilst subordinating the governance arrangements. His 
view was echoed by others: 
 
‘The board of directors should be given the space to run the company’ (Director of 
Quality and Compliance).  
 
‘They [General Council] are not here to run the company; managers should be left to 
manage; they [General Council] are not here to talk about [operational] issues’ (Non-
executive director). 
 
The view that the General Council was not the place to discuss operational issues was clearly 
expressed. The reason given for this was that it would negatively impact on the business. The 
comments reveal a view that elevates the operational aspects of the business whilst 
subordinating the governance aspects. Though the General Council had provided the vehicle 
through which Peter could speak on behalf of social care employees, his voice, though heard, 
was closed down. In so doing, the voice of the social care employees had been suppressed. 
 
4. Little fishes like us 
A second challenge to employee voice concerned the relationship between the operating 
board and the General Council. According to the Articles, a close relationship between the 
General Council and the operating board was a prerequisite. Members of the operating board 
(made up of the five company senior executives, including the Chief Executive Officer, and 
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four non-executive directors) attended General Council meetings twice a year and the Chief 
Executive Officer attended every meeting to represent the operating board. In other words, 
and an important point to note, there was always representation on the General Council from 
the operating board. Yet, there was never representation on the operating board from the 
employee representatives making it questionable whether a close relationship was possible.  
 
Asked whether it was typical of employee-owned companies to have no representation from 
the General Council on an operating board, two of the non-executive directors, the same two 
who are considered experts in employee-ownership by the Chief Executive Officer, stated that 
the situation in Vivo-Co was not typical of other employee-owned companies. Most 
employee-owned companies, they stated, do have employee representatives on the operating 
board. The desire to be represented on the operating board was expressed by employee 
representatives a number of times. 
 
At the first meeting of the General Council, Peter, one of the employee representatives, asked 
whether it was possible to have an employee representative sit on the operating board. Both 
the Chief Executive Officer and the chair said the issue could be discussed at the subsequent 
General Council meeting. As it transpired, the issue was not discussed at the subsequent or 
any further meetings. The issue was however discussed separately during an interview by the 
researcher with the Chief Executive Officer.  
 
Asked whether employee representation on the operating board was something that could 
happen in the future, the Chief Executive Officer stated probably not. He explained that he 
had given some thought to the matter and had initially thought it was a good idea, but then he 
had changed his mind. He felt it could compromise the representative, then provided the 
following as an example of his point:  
 
‘If they [the representative] were party to a decision that was subsequently not 
endorsed by the General Council it could make it awkward for them. As it is, if the 
operating board make a decision that is not supported by the General Council then at 
least none of the representatives have been party to it’.  
 
He then went on to suggest that the operating board might be talking about disciplinary 
procedures that may affect that representative. Furthermore, there were issues of commercial 
confidentiality. Based on the potential of a disciplinary scenario or a breach of commercial 
confidentiality, he had decided that there would not be an employee representative on the 
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operating board. In contrast, it was proposed by the chair of the General Council and accepted 
by its representatives that of the four General Council meetings a year, two would be attended 
by the operating board for half of the meeting.  
 
What this meant in practice was that, whilst the senior executives and operating board were 
privy to the General Council, the reverse was not the case. The operating board had access to 
the General Council via attending its meetings and receiving its documentation whereas the 
same access was not afforded to the General Council. Whilst without the intervention of the 
chair there would have been no contact at all, it did however mean employee representatives 
were not fully knowledgeable of the whole organisation which could hamper their ability to 
make informed decisions given they only had access to part of the information. Additionally it 
meant a power base was created that favoured the operating board whilst impeding the voice 
of social care employees via the representatives. Despite this imbalance of power and a desire 
to be represented on the operating board, the employee representatives expressed feeling 
humbled and privileged to be undertaking the role.  
 
A sense of pride was evidenced by most of the employee representatives. It was something to 
be proud of and was regarded as an honour. This is captured in the following statement made 
by Kevin:  
 
‘It’s a brilliant opportunity for all the reps’.  
 
There was however also a sense of servility in the statement. This is more clearly expressed in 
the following statement made by Susan, another of the employee representatives:  
 
‘I’m privileged to be part of it’.  
 
A sense of privilege was also expressed by Kevin. He described the General Council as being 
made up of: 
 
‘An elite group’.  
 
A similarly deferential view was expressed by Tom, a third representative. He used the 
following words to describe the General Council:  
 
‘Exclusive’ and ‘influential’.  
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He followed this description by stating:  
 
‘It’s great for little fishes like us’.  
 
In contrast, the ‘big fish’ was identified by the representative as the Chief Executive Officer 
reflecting Vivo-Co’s organisational hierarchy, illustrated in figure 6.1 above. Some employee 
representatives did however recognise that there was a degree of autonomy and power 
brought about through the role, the following statements providing examples: 
 
‘The power to be able to direct the company; it gives you the power to achieve what 
you want to for your branch’ (Susan). 
 
‘It’s an opportunity to develop and build ourselves professionally’ (Kevin). 
 
‘It’s great for my CV, it gives you life skills and it means I have access to powerful 
people’ (Tom). 
 
Nevertheless, the distinction between those with power and those without continued, as 
evidenced in the last comment by Tom. By powerful people, Tom was referring, again, to the 
Chief Executive Officer and this again reflects the hierarchical nature of the organisation. He 
was clear that it was unlikely such an opportunity to interact with the Chief Executive Officer 
would have arisen if he were not an employee representative – this despite being an 
employee-owner himself in the same way as the Chief Executive Officer and despite Vivo-Co 
having an ‘open door’ policy as described earlier (see Organisational Employee Voice 
Mechanisms). As such, this finding provides an example of how the governance processes of 
employee-ownership were hampered by the organisational hierarchy which meant employee 
voice was not allowed to be expressed. Another example highlights this point further. 
 
5. What are we getting? 
At one of the General Council meetings, the Director of Finance posed a challenge to the 
employee representatives by stating:  
‘Some representatives are by-passing their line managers and taking issues straight to 
the General Council’.  
 
The view being expressed in this statement highlights again the tension between the 
hierarchical order of the organisation and the governance mechanism of employee-ownership, 
the former was being ignored in favour of the latter by the employee representative according 
to the Director. Similar tensions were experienced by employee representatives regarding 
their managers.  
160 
 
 
Joanne expressed a fear of challenging her managers stating that she did not have the 
confidence to do so. Others expressed a difficulty of challenging what they referred to as their 
‘superiors’. Peter commented:  
 
‘Managers will have to release the reins to the new owners’.  
 
However, this would present a challenge to managers he suggested, given the lack of respect 
afforded to the role of employee representative by some of them. Tom, another representative, 
felt that regardless of the new governance process, management would continue to make 
decisions without consulting either the General Council or social care employees.  
 
During an interview, though keen to point out the very good relationship he had with his 
manager, he stated he could nevertheless understand how this happened when the 
representative held a less senior position organisationally. He commented:  
 
‘I don’t know how those reps lower down the hierarchy can get respect, especially 
from those higher up in the organisation than them; it’s hard to ask a [social care 
employee] who is also a representative to ask their supervisor to do work on their 
behalf’.  
 
He also noted that, given the primacy of the organisational hierarchy, a further challenge of 
the General Council was making sure managers worked alongside employee representatives. 
Similar comments were made by other employee representatives that included feeling 
managers and executives did not fully understand the role of representatives whilst others 
stated they did not feel they were being supported in their role by their managers. This point 
was made by Susan.  
 
During an interview, Susan explained that when she returned from General Council meetings 
her managers wanted to know:  
 
‘What are we getting from your time spent at General Council meetings?’ 
 
She was keen to point out to them:  
 
‘I do come back with something’.  
 
This included sharing information and ideas that had been discussed at the meetings, 
communicating key action points to social care employees and the opportunity to work with 
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the other representatives. Unsurprisingly, these tensions were making it difficult for her to 
fulfil the role of representative and were sometimes causing direct conflict between her and 
the manager. Comments from Peter reflect this last point:  
 
‘Senior management impose things without asking the people it will affect whether it 
will work; they [senior management] seek ideas, but not our opinions and they don’t 
listen; the company is too hierarchical’.  
 
These tensions were observed by the Chief Executive Officer. He noted there were issues 
relating to the status given by managers to employee representatives. He explained this issue 
by suggesting that, given the employee representatives were operating within an organisation 
that had a hierarchical structure, position and status tended to be privileged. The 
implementation of employee-ownership created challenges to position and status as he saw it. 
In practice, this meant that employee representatives were sometimes cautious in their role. 
As with other examples, this provides an example of how the hierarchical configuration of the 
organisation disabled employee voice through the governance process of the General Council. 
This was noted in a further example concerning the employee representatives and some of the 
non-executive directors from the operating board. 
 
6. Being disrespectful 
A stilted dynamic was observed at General Council meetings between employee 
representatives and non-executive directors and could best be described as one of respectful 
distance. The operating board met twice with the General Council during the period of 
research. Outside of these meetings there was no mechanism whereby the two groups could 
communicate.  
 
During the two meetings observed, the non-executive directors were courteous and respectful 
to employee representatives as was the reverse. Interactions were however always formal and 
seemed to follow a particular protocol. For example, preceding both meetings lunch was 
provided by Vivo-Co. During lunch, the non-executive directors were observed to stand and 
talk to one another about work-related matters. The employee representatives were also 
observed to talk about work-related issues. However, both groups did this amongst 
themselves. The representatives sat at the meeting table separately from the non-executive 
directors who remained standing. In other words, there was very limited interaction between 
the two groups. A particular issue arose in the fifth General Council meeting that highlights 
the stilted dynamic between the two groups.  
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The meeting was attended by the operating board for the second half. At the meeting, the 
issue of attendance by employee representatives was raised by one of the non-executive 
directors. Attendance was considered low with only two of the five representatives present. 
The non-executive director was clearly unhappy at this.  
 
She asked whether the missing representatives had given apologies. One representative 
definitely had, a second definitely had not whilst it was unclear whether an electronic 
communication that had been sent by the third was providing apologies or not. She was 
particularly unhappy given the operating board were due to attend part of the meeting; 
regarding the low attendance as ‘disrespectful’. To combat this happening again she suggested 
that each branch had a second representative to attend when the main person was unavailable.  
 
The suggestion was challenged by the Chief Executive Officer who argued that it would 
undermine the role of the representative as well as the time and expense that had gone into 
training the current representatives. The non-executive director accepted the argument he put 
forward though remained annoyed. In her view the employee representatives had not observed 
the protocol of meetings, i.e. not respecting the gravitas of the operating board and therefore 
making every effort to attend, not giving apologies, and by not observing the protocol they 
had showed a lack of respect. None of the employee representatives spoke during this 
discussion. 
 
7. The bigger picture 
A further challenge to employee voice which was evidenced was a lack of respect for the role 
of employee representative by some of the senior executives and managers. Evidence of this 
is provided by the process of electing employee representatives, described above, and how it 
is questioned by the Director of Quality and Compliance. He suggested that: 
 
‘The process of recruitment to the General Council doesn’t lend itself to securing the 
best people onto the General Council’.  
 
Asked who the best people were he stated:  
 
‘The ones with an eye on the bigger picture’.  
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Asked what this meant he stated:  
 
‘The ones who understand the whole business, not just their part of it, and have the 
interests of the company at heart’.  
 
He followed this last comment by reflecting on what he regarded as the unfairness of the 
system for ‘recruiting’ (as opposed to electing) employee representatives, compared to that for 
senior executives. The former had to undertake what he referred to as: 
 
‘A rigorous recruitment process.’  
 
This process was considered rigorous because it was carried out by other senior executives as 
well as by members of the operating board. In contrast, employee representatives did not 
undergo such processes. Such rigour, he suggested, meant: 
 
‘The best people, those with the interests of the company at heart were employed as 
senior executives’.  
 
However, the same was not true of the employee representatives, in his view. Following his 
logic, the employee representatives were not the best people to be on the General Council as 
they did not have their eye on the bigger picture. Being allowed to attend operating board 
meetings may have alleviated some of the Director’s concerns regarding this matter. 
However, in his view, nor did they have the interests of the company at heart. A more 
appropriate process, if this logic is followed, might have been the one given as an example 
described above, i.e. senior executives selecting rather than electing employee representatives. 
This reveals hostility from this Director towards the democratic process of electing 
representatives. This is evidenced further in additional comments he made. 
 
He expressed a concern that employee representatives did not understand or appreciate the 
gravity of the role. According to him the role should be laid down for General Council 
representatives. He stated:  
 
‘If the role is not set out, some people will just follow their own interests. Some 
people don’t understand the bigger picture and so shouldn’t be on the General Council 
because they may only be representing their own views and these may not be what are 
best for the company. They [employee representatives] should know what they are 
dealing with and the implications of any decisions they take’.  
 
When the views of this Director are compared to those of the employee representatives there 
is a clear disconnection about how the role and its significance are perceived; the latter 
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expressing a clear understanding of the significance of the role. A similarly derogatory 
comment was made by the Director of Finance. At the fifth meeting of the General Council 
she requested to know: 
 
 ‘What is the company getting out of the representatives role?’  
 
The implication in the statement was that Vivo-Co was not gaining anything from the role. 
She went on to make the point that representatives are able to make a financial claim for their 
time spent on General Council business. In so doing, representatives were incurring a cost to 
the business though it was unclear what the organisation was getting in return, thus suggesting 
a distrust of, and a resistance to, the role of representatives. None of the employee 
representatives replied to the Director’s question. 
 
8. Stop acting like a shop steward 
The final challenge concerned what were perceived to be similarities between the role of 
employee representatives and the role of trade union shop stewards which produced 
conflicting views within Vivo-Co.  
 
The view was expressed by one of the founder members that although Vivo-Co ‘recognised’ 
them, if employee-ownership was working effectively there should be no need for trade 
unions. He stated:  
 
‘It saddens me that employee owners want to join a trade union because that suggests 
there is something wrong’.  
 
One of the senior executives, the Director of Quality and Compliance, in a manner that was 
critical of trade unions, suggested that some of the representatives were: 
 
‘Acting like trade union shop stewards’.  
 
This negative view of trade unions was expressed several times more by the same person 
during interviews where he made it clear he had little time for trade unions. Other derisory 
comments were made about trade unions in most of the General Council meetings.  
 
Despite the anti-union sentiment of these views, Susan, one of the employee representatives 
stated at a General Council that:  
 
‘I think my role is very similar to that of a shop steward’. 
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Before she was able to explain why she thought the role was similar and in what way, the 
Chief Executive Officer stated: 
 
‘That is precisely not the role of an employee representative; anyone saying this is the 
role is sending out the wrong message’ (Chief Executive Officer’s emphasis).  
 
The discussion then moved to the representativeness of the role. The Director of Quality and 
Compliance had already expressed concern about the capabilities of employee representatives 
in comparison to the senior executives and the rigorous recruitment processes they had to 
endure compared to representatives. During the General Council meeting he expressed the 
view that: 
 
 ‘Representatives are only representing the [employees] and not all employee-owners. 
Employee representatives should represent all employees. Each time an issue is raised 
in a General Council meeting by a representative I’d like to know which representative 
is bringing the issue and how many people are affected by it’.  
 
Notably, there was no counter-argument put to the senior executive by the employee 
representatives. Further, despite such animosity towards any kind of protection for social care 
employees, such as through a trade union, the same was not true of protecting the company. 
 
Peter, one of the employee representatives, explained that if any of the social care employees 
had concerns about aspects of their employment these concerns would be dealt with through 
the organisational hierarchy. In the first instance, they would speak to their supervisor and if 
the issue was not resolved it would make its way up the hierarchical chain of command. 
Interestingly though, anything not resolved through this process, Vivo-Co commissioned to 
an external HRM consultancy.  
 
The same HRM company was commissioned by Vivo-Co to ensure compliance with statutory 
employment requirements as well as more general advice and guidance on employment-
related issues. Asked about the role of the consultancy, the Director of Quality and 
Compliance stated: 
 
‘It is similar to that of an insurance company, it provides a level of protection for 
Vivo-Co against any matters brought by any of our employees [i.e. employee-owners] 
such as disciplinary or issues about terms and conditions. We have to follow the 
advice provided by the consultancy to the letter, if we don’t, it could invalidate any 
claims’. 
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This protection provided to Vivo-Co through the consultancy was in contrast to the protection 
for social care employees. Though some of the social care employees were voluntarily 
members of trade unions, the majority were reliant on statutory protection. As noted in 
chapter two, traditionally trade unions acted as a form of social insurance for employees 
(Mares 2001). The low numbers who were members of a trade union meant that social care 
employees in Vivo-Co were not benefitting from such protection. Furthermore, despite the 
founder member seeing it as a failure of the employee-ownership model that some social care 
employees wanted to join a trade union, the company itself was benefitting from external 
support. This example again highlights how the governance process of employee-ownership 
enabled employee voice to be expressed through employee representatives trying to explain 
their role. However, their voice was resisted by the Chief Executive Officer and other senior 
executives by being closed down. 
 
The Chief Executive Officer and other senior executives and non-executive directors were 
resistant to the representative nature of the role of employee representative. They used the 
organisational hierarchy to close voice down or simply not hear it and used employee-
ownership as a means to secure employee compliance. They valued voice though only in a 
narrowly defined way. To them, employee voice was a means to an end, the end being a more 
efficient business. When employee voice did not meet this definition, it was resisted by 
management who invoked the organisational hierarchy in order to gain employee compliance.  
 
6.7 Summary 
This chapter presented the findings of the case study undertaken at Vivo-Co, an employee-
owned social care organisation. The chapter began with a company profile of Vivo-Co. It then 
presented findings relating to particular organisational features such as some of the key 
organisational actors and how space is occupied. Section three presented findings in relation 
to the contextual factors in which employee-ownership emerged in Vivo-Co. This included 
reduced funding from the local authority which created problems regarding the efficiency of 
the organisation. The problems were addressed through a growth strategy and addressing 
recruitment and retention. Section four discussed the mechanism of employee-ownership 
which, it was assumed by the Chief Executive Officer, would increase efficiency by reducing 
costs, garnering commitment and encouraging employees to ‘go the extra mile’.  It also 
included the specific governance processes yielded through employee-ownership which 
differentiate it from conventional businesses. In Vivo-Co, these were the Articles of 
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Association, Annual General Meeting and the General Council. Section five discussed the 
findings in relation to the outcomes of employee voice through consideration of the way voice 
operated through the employee-ownership governance processes.   
 
The key findings from the research provided evidence of some positive outcomes, such as 
more favourable terms and conditions of employment for social care employees compared to 
their counterparts in other social care organisations. Also, there were opportunities for 
employee representatives to influence decision-making processes at General Council 
meetings. All of which point to the differences in employee voice compared to conventional 
businesses. These differences were yielded through the right to a voice, its embeddedness and 
the sophisticated governance processes, meaning employee voice had the potential of being 
part of the fabric of Vivo-Co. However, the pressures on, and the dominance of, senior 
executives often counteracted and weakened voice suggesting it was little more than a 
fabrication. Management regarded employee-ownership as a tool that would achieve the 
objective of company efficiency. This objective was reinforced through factors such as 
employee compliance, the organisational hierarchy and the resistance of management. As a 
result, even when employee voice did reflect an efficiency objective, it often still went 
unheard. In so doing, the way in which voice was valued in Vivo-Co was questioned. The 
next chapter will provide an analysis of these findings in the context of the employee voice 
literature (chapter two) and the frames of reference (chapter three). 
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Chapter Seven: Discussion 
 
7.1 Introduction  
This chapter addresses the aim of the research, to evaluate whether employee voice in an 
employee-owned enterprise is different to that in conventional business, through a discussion 
of the research findings presented in the previous chapter. The discussion compares and 
contrasts the findings with the employee voice literature, discussed in chapter two, and is 
underpinned by the frames of reference, discussed in chapter three (Fox 1966; 1974; Storey 
1989; Bray et al 2015). There are seven sections within the chapter. The first two provide a 
reminder of the key points arising from the employee voice literature and the frames of 
reference whilst the remaining sections provide the evaluation.  
 
Section three evaluates the context of employee voice through employee-ownership in Vivo-
Co. The literature suggested that employee-ownership is often introduced as a financial 
incentive. This was evident in Vivo-Co based on assumptions by senior executives that 
employees are motivated by financial gain. Section four evaluates how employee-ownership 
affects employee voice. Through factors highlighted in the literature, such as more 
sophisticated voice processes, there is the potential for all voices to be heard. The evidence 
here is consistent with this literature inasmuch as the potential was created by the mechanism. 
Section five considers the outcomes of employee voice through employee-ownership. The 
literature suggested potential challenges to voice in an employee-owned enterprise through 
management concerns of compliance, hierarchy and resistance. Consistent with this literature, 
employee-ownership in Vivo-Co was regarded as a management tool that would achieve the 
objective of company efficiency. A key finding here is that, even when voice reflected this 
objective, it often still went unheard. Within the context of literature regarding ‘unheard 
voice’, section six discusses voice in Vivo-Co being counteracted and weakened. This leads to 
the final section which discusses the recurring themes of voice as ‘fabric’ or ‘fabrication’. The 
potential did exist for employee voice to be part of the organisational fabric because 
employee-ownership yielded the right to a voice, the embeddedness of the mechanism and its 
sophisticated voice processes. However, given the pervasive nature of a hard unitarist 
philosophy within Vivo-Co, voice was also conceived as a fabrication. The thesis concludes 
that employee voice is not something that will spontaneously appear through employee-
ownership. Rather, employee voice is a philosophy concerning the value placed on the right to 
be heard. This leads to the contribution of this thesis; the difference in employee voice is 
created not because of a mechanism, but because of the way in which it is valued. 
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7.2 Employee voice literature: key aspects 
Chapter two argued that, by considering employee voice in a historical context, a richer and 
more substantive legacy is revealed (Wilkinson et al 2014). By drawing on the Employment 
Relations literature, the chapter highlighted the origins of employee voice which was 
channelled through trade unions. Trade unions were the key employee voice mechanism 
during much of the twentieth century and focused on the equity concerns of employees. 
However, a changed government during the 1980s and the introduction of HRM practices into 
the workplace led to a transformation of employee voice (Dundon et al 2017).  
 
Contemporary employee voice is more likely to be channelled through an array of 
mechanisms via an HRM function. By drawing on the escalator metaphor developed by 
Marchington et al (1992), it was revealed that through HRM, employee voice mechanisms are 
likely to be initiated and designed by managers, reflect an efficiency objective and are 
regarded as low-level in terms of the influence they afford employees. This was in contrast to 
employee voice either in trade unions or through other non-union employee representation 
schemes (Gollan et al 2015) which are regarded as affording employees greater influence. 
Furthermore, rarely are employees’ views sought in terms of voice preferences (Marchington 
2007). Within the context of an HRM-defined employee voice, a recent debate amongst some 
Employment Relations scholars is that voices may go unheard (Gunawardana 2014; 
Wilkinson et al 2018). 
 
Unheard voice can be as a result of practices such as agenda-setting by managers which 
design-out employee voice (Donaghey et al 2011a). In other words, managers include on 
agendas items they wish to discuss whilst omitting those employees want to discuss. This 
debate helped to highlight the point that much of what we know about contemporary 
employee voice is drawn from conventional businesses whilst less is known about it through 
alternative mechanisms through which voice may be heard. This prompted an exploration of 
employee voice through employee-ownership. 
 
The exploration of employee-ownership in the UK revealed two primary forms, worker co-
operatives and ESOPs. These two forms were argued to yield different levels and intensities 
of voice. Employee voice through worker co-operatives was regarded by Marchington et al 
(1992) to yield a high level of influence whereas forms such as ESOPs were positioned at the 
middle range of the voice continuum by Gollan et al (2015). What the discussion also 
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revealed was the growth in popularity of ESOPs during the 1980s. One reason for this growth 
was a conducive political and public policy environment (Pendleton 2001). Characteristic of 
this environment was a neo-liberal philosophy (Hall and Soskice 2001) that privileged the 
market and emphasised individualism (Legge 2005). At company level, reasons for adopting 
ESOPs were to promote employee involvement, assist with the recruitment and retention of 
staff, increase remuneration, improve productivity and prevent take-overs. A renewed interest 
in ESOPs more recently was attributed to factors such as the 2008 global financial crisis 
(Findlay et al 2017; Heery 2016; see also Boxall and Purcell 2011). The rationale being that 
employee-ownership provides an alternative way of organising a business compared to that of 
conventional businesses. This prompted further investigation of the factors that could aid 
employee voice through employee-ownership. 
 
The literature highlighted factors that could aid employee voice through employee-ownership 
which were yielded through the governance processes of such enterprises. Employee-
ownership bestows a right to a voice (Pendleton 2001), through its embeddedness within the 
organisation (Bernstein 1976) and which is channelled through sophisticated voice processes 
(Flanders et al 1968; Salaman and Storey 2016). This can lead to employee voice being 
considered as part of the organisational fabric. However, there were also challenges to 
employee voice which were identified through the mechanism of employee-ownership. These 
included factors such as ‘employee compliance’ (Cathcart 2014), ‘organisational hierarchy’ 
(Atzeni 2012) and ‘management resistance’ (McCarthy and Palcic 2012). Combined, these 
factors suggested employee voice in an employee-owned enterprise may be nothing more than 
a fabrication.  
 
To evaluate whether employee voice in an employee-owned enterprise is different to that in 
conventional businesses, the frames of reference (Fox 1966; 1974; Storey 1989; Bray et al 
2015) provided a theoretical framework. The frames of reference were discussed in chapter 
three, therefore the following section provides a reminder of some of the key characteristics of 
the three frames that were relevant to the findings of this study: hard and soft unitarism and 
collaborative pluralism. 
 
7.3 The frames of reference: key aspects 
The frames of reference provide a useful tool to analyse the findings of Vivo-Co. Given the 
detailed discussion of the frames of reference in chapter three, this section is restricted to a 
reminder of the key points of the three frames as they related to employee voice in Vivo-Co: 
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hard and soft unitarist frames (Storey 1989) and the collaborative pluralism frame (Bray et al 
2015). Table 7.1 summarises these key points of each frame.  
 
 
Frame Key features 
Hard unitarism Efficiency focused; resource-based; outcomes oriented; gaining 
competitive advantage; regards employees as calculative and 
driven by financial reward; emphasis on hierarchy and 
standardisation; direction and control is via a unified chain of 
command, close supervision and based on rewards; ‘enforced 
compliance’ (Bray et al 2015); employee voice has a transactional 
value and relates to the ‘labour problem’ of absenteeism and 
turnover; key voice mechanisms are incentivisation and ‘exit’ and 
trade unions are unnecessary. 
Soft unitarism Efficiency and process focused; assumes a commonality of 
interests and harmony in the workplace; regards employees as 
assets; information-sharing; direct consultation; task-based 
participation, profit-sharing and employee engagement; need for 
unions regarded as a failure; employee voice has an instrumental 
value which is to increase organisational performance and 
efficiency; performance is related to bottom-line results and 
‘going the extra mile’ (Legge 2005). 
Collaborative 
pluralism 
Efficiency and equity focused; managers, employees and their 
representatives are legitimate parties to co-operative relationships 
with sometimes separate and sometimes shared goals; based on 
values of mutual respect, loyalty, trust and equity; employee voice 
is a moral imperative (Budd 2004) and regarded as the ‘right to be 
heard’ (Gollan 2013). 
Table 7.1 Key features of the frames of reference 
 
 
The frames are helpful to the analysis for three reasons. Firstly, they draw attention to the 
contextual environment in which Vivo-Co operates which influenced the choice of 
mechanism. Secondly, they draw attention to the philosophy of the key employee-ownership 
actors, which in turn influenced how it evolved and how it affected other organisational 
actors. Thirdly, they enable comparisons to be made of employee voice between the frames. 
For example, the Chief Executive’s concern regarding the ‘problem’ of employee recruitment 
and retention which is akin to hard unitarism was quite different when compared to the 
concern of employee representatives which was to ensure the voice of social care employees 
was heard which is akin to collaborative pluralism.  
 
The intention of the forthcoming evaluation is to address the aim of this thesis; to explore 
whether employee voice in an employee-owned enterprise is different to that in conventional 
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businesses. The evaluation is organised according to the CMO configuration (Pawson and 
Tilley 1997) which was discussed in chapter four and was also followed in chapters five and 
six. It is therefore separated into three sections, each of which begins with a reminder of the 
research question that is being addressed within that section. As such, the first section 
evaluates the context in which the mechanism of employee-ownership emerged in Vivo-Co. 
 
7.4 The context of employee voice: national, sector and organisational pressures  
The first research question presented in chapter one asked what contextual factors influenced 
the choice of mechanism in the studied case. Context is regarded as an important factor in 
shaping how a phenomenon emerges and develops within an organisation (Bryman and Bell 
2011; Heery 2016; Myers 2013). An evaluation of contextual factors in relation to Vivo-Co 
enabled insight into the national environment which influenced the manifestation of employee 
voice within the social care sector and in turn influenced the decision for employee-ownership 
in Vivo-Co.  
 
7.4.1 The national context of employee voice 
Employee voice in the UK has tended to be shaped by the national level environment 
(Dobbins and Dundon 2017). The national level environment during much of the twentieth 
century meant that employee voice was about equity, i.e. pluralist, concerns and was 
channelled through the mechanism of trade unions. Trade unions provided a level of 
protection to employees by acting to correct or mediate the employment relationship when 
necessary (Benson and Brown 2010). They enabled a collective voice that was independent of 
management and designed to act predominantly on behalf of employees in areas such as pay 
negotiations and terms and conditions of employment. Voice in this context was conceived as 
a form of ‘social insurance’ (Mares 2001). In so doing, the concept of equity shaped an 
understanding of employee voice during this period (Budd 2004). However, changes in the 
national environment meant a ‘transformation’ of employee voice (Dundon et al 2017) 
skewing it towards efficiency with much less focus on equity concerns (Dobbins and Dundon 
2017). 
 
The contemporary environment as it relates to employee voice has a much greater emphasis 
on the unitarist concern of efficiency (Cullinane and Dundon 2014).  Within this environment, 
key concerns of managers in conventional businesses include fears of hostile take-overs and 
breaches of commercial confidentiality; all of which present challenges for employee voice. 
In such an environment, Employment Relations scholars argue, employee voice in 
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conventional businesses is expressed through low-level and often weak mechanisms that 
reflect the preferences of employers and amount to little more than opening up lines of 
communication (Barry and Wilkinson 2015; Bryson et al 2004; Croucher et al 2010; Dobbins 
and Dundon 2011; Johnstone and Ackers 2015). Similarly, Cullinane and Dundon (2014) 
argue ‘…reservoirs of adversarial employer unitarism still flourish in obstructing workplace 
voice’ (p. 2586).These challenges to employee voice at national level are reflected at sector 
level, the social care sector as it relates here.  
 
7.4.2 The social care context of employee voice 
Against the backdrop of a unitarist environment, the myriad challenges facing the social care 
sector were discussed in chapter five and provide an example of how the national 
environment of employee voice can have an impact at sector level. The marketization of 
social care led by the Thatcher government during the 1980s was highlighted as a specific 
turning point that changed the nature of social care provision. During this period, social care 
changed from being a ‘service’ to becoming a ‘business’ (Carey 2015). This means that in its 
contemporary form, the social care sector is dominated by organisations which operate 
privately for-profit (Hussein et al 2016) which has consequences for employee voice.  
 
A consequence of privately run social care organisations is often poor terms and conditions of 
employment for the mainly female workforce whose work is fragmented, whose employers 
continuously seek to reduce ‘costs’ and whose access to voice is through low-level voice 
mechanisms (Hussein et al 2016; ONS 2014; Rubery et al 2015; Unison 2016). Again, this 
reflects a unitarist environment, whether via a hard version as discussed by Storey (1989) 
reflected in practices such as standardisation of care work (Bolton and Wibberley 2014), or, a 
Traditional version discussed by Cullinane and Dundon (2014) reflected in employers 
directing activities in relation to time, place, content and method of work. All of which 
mitigates against social care employees being able to express their voice, except, by taking the 
‘exit’ route (Hirschman 1970).  
 
Social care is plagued by high staff turnover (NMDS-SC 2017; UKHCA 2016). This brings 
costs to employees and employers alike. Yet, paradoxically, when social care employees do 
express their voice they consistently report a love of the job and a desire to make a difference 
to the lives of service users (Hebson et al 2015; Unison 2016). As such, there is a tendency for 
some social care employees to move between social care organisations rather than leave the 
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sector (Franklin 2014). The evidence from Vivo-Co corresponds to some of these national 
level and sector level factors whilst contradicting others.   
 
7.4.3 The organisational context of employee voice 
Similar to the concerns expressed by managers in conventional businesses, the unitarist 
concern for company efficiency was expressed in Vivo-Co. Efficiency was of paramount 
importance. Reflecting this objective, the challenges of providing social care meant it was 
difficult to predict ‘peaks and troughs’ in service delivery that in turn created ‘uncertainty’ for 
the organisation.   
 
Peaks in the context of social care translate as higher demand for services whilst troughs refer 
to a decrease in demand such as a service user being hospitalised or because they have died. 
This uncertainty was compounded by pressures of reduced funding from the local authority 
who were purchasing social care services from Vivo-Co. Given reducing funding from 
national government, the local authority were continuously having to reduce their own 
budgets as well as imposing rigid monitoring of targets and attendance rates, recording data 
such as when there had been a ‘no-show’. These pressures manifested in Vivo-Co as a 
continuous stress on efficiency by senior executives. Drawing on the frames of reference, this 
emphasis on efficiency manifested in ways akin to a hard unitarist frame. 
 
Consistent with hard unitarism, senior executives were constantly seeking ways of increasing 
income and reducing costs. The ‘strategy of growth’ involved increasing ‘income’ (i.e. local 
authority funding), gaining a ‘competitive advantage’, avoiding ‘hostile take-overs’ and 
avoiding breaches of ‘commercial confidentiality’. This meant increasing the volume of social 
care through acquiring more and more branches and by Vivo-Co delivering contracts 
themselves rather than sub-contracting to other social care organisations. In so doing, this 
would reduce the risk of ‘hostile take-overs’ (Croucher et al 2010). Avoiding breaches of 
‘commercial confidentiality’ was evidenced through a concern that employee representatives 
might breach commercial confidentiality and therefore meant they could not be trusted to 
have their names on the company’s governing documents nor attend meetings of the operating 
board. This strategy also involved reducing costs which also bore a resemblance to the hard 
unitarist frame. 
 
The strategy to reduce costs was evidenced in various ways such as the ‘standardisation’ of 
the communication system and changes to the way in which training was delivered, from 
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group to web-based training. In so doing, important opportunities for social care employees to 
express their voice were reduced whilst also compounding the fragmented nature of social 
care work by reducing the already limited number of opportunities they had to come together 
collectively. The most profound part of the cost-reduction strategy however, was the 
‘solution’ to the ‘labour problem’ of ‘staff turnover’. The solution being the choice of 
employee-ownership.  
 
7.4.4 The choice of employee-ownership 
That it was a senior executive choice to implement employee-ownership corresponds with the 
literature regarding who chooses mechanisms in conventional businesses. In conventional 
businesses, it is typically managers who make the decisions about voice mechanisms 
(Dobbins and Dundon 2011; Gomez et al 2009; Johnstone and Ackers 2015; Wilkinson et al 
2015). Similarly, Croucher et al (2010) suggests that the same is true of employee-ownership 
which tends to be a ‘management choice’, as it was in Vivo-Co. However, the literature, also 
states that the choice of mechanism is driven by a manager’s own philosophy (Budd 2004; 
Kochan et al 1984; Wilkinson and Fay 2011). The choice of employee-ownership as a 
mechanism in Vivo-Co was influenced by the senior executives, particularly the Chief 
Executive, and based on a hard unitarist philosophy which was as a means of incentivisation.  
 
Based on an assumption that employees are calculative and driven by financial gain, 
incentivisation is a key way of motivating employees in the hard unitarist frame (Legge 2005; 
Le Grand and the Mutuals Taskforce 2012). In Vivo-Co, it was assumed it would encourage 
social care employees to stay with the organisation rather than ‘exit’ (Hirschman 1970). The 
philosophy of the Chief Executive Officer regarded employee-ownership as a ‘perceived pay-
off’ (Wilkinson and Fay 2011) based on his assumption that it would bring tangible benefits 
to the business. He assumed employee-ownership would solve the hard unitarist ‘labour 
problem’ of staff retention by incentivising social care employees. Here, social care 
employees are regarded by the Chief Executive Officer as a resource who are calculative and 
driven by financial reward. By having a financial ‘stake’ in the company through the 
ownership structure, he believed, a sense of ownership would develop amongst social care 
employees. 
 
7.4.5 Employee preferences for employee voice mechanisms 
The social care employees had had no say in the choice of mechanism. The autocratic 
philosophy of the Chief Executive Officer meant that the social care employees were never 
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asked for their views on the recruitment and retention problem. They had no voice in 
influencing the choice of mechanism despite it being them who were its main target. This is 
consistent with the point that few studies incorporate the views of employees in terms of 
voice preferences (Marchington 2007). Moreover, had they been asked, then their motivation 
would have been revealed.  
 
Corresponding to previous studies (Hebson et al 2015; Unison 2016), social care employees 
in Vivo-Co were motivated by factors such as a love of the job and a concern to make a 
difference to the lives of service users. This finding is also borne out in studies of employee-
owners in other sectors (e.g. Brown et al 2019). A further similarity with the literature 
(Hussein et al 2016; NAO 2014) was that they were not motivated by financial gain. Rather, 
their motivations reflected what Bolton and Wibberley (2014) referred to as an ‘ethic of care’. 
This revealed a disparity between the way the senior executives thought social care employees 
were motivated and the way they actually were.  
 
Never did it occur to the senior executives that the motivation of social care employees would 
be the greater well-being of service users, or that they might not be incentivised by financial 
gain nor would financial gain motivate them to go the extra mile. Indeed, when they were 
heard, social care employees in Vivo-Co expressed a love of the job and provided several 
examples that could be regarded as going the extra mile, such as the example in the previous 
chapter of saving a service user’s life; they did not need to be incentivised to go the extra 
mile, they were doing so already. Had they been asked about their motivations and their 
preferences for voice mechanisms then the choice of mechanism may have been the same or 
may have been different, the important point being that they were asked. That it was the 
choice of senior executives, which was influenced by their own philosophy, in turn had a 
bearing on the way the mechanism evolved. 
 
7.5 The mechanism of employee ownership 
The second question presented in chapter one asked how the mechanism differed to those 
typical of conventional businesses. To address the question, this section begins by evaluating 
the findings from Vivo-Co in relation to the literature regarding the strengths of employee-
ownership.  
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7.5.1 The strengths of employee-ownership 
Three factors were identified in the literature relating employee-ownership, discussed in 
chapter two (Employee Voice through Employee-ownership), which were considered to 
positively affect employee voice by providing the opportunity for it to be part of an 
organisation’s fabric: employee-ownership bestows a right to a voice (Pendleton 2001) 
through its embeddedness (Bernstein 1976) and its expression through sophisticated 
governance processes (Flanders et al 1968; Salaman and Storey 2016). This section deals with 
each of these propositions in relation to Vivo-Co. 
 
a. The right to a voice 
The first factor identified in the literature that can positively affect employee voice in an 
employee-owned enterprise is yielded through the ‘constitutional establishment of rights’ 
(Pendleton 2001 p.110). In other words, rights are established that are enshrined in the 
organisation’s governing document and enacted through various processes. In so doing, 
employees are able to use their right to a voice to influence decisions. The idea of a right to a 
voice is akin to the collaborative pluralism frame alongside the right to be heard. It is through 
having a right to a voice that a key difference between employee-ownership and conventional 
businesses is provided. An example of this right to express voice was provided in the previous 
chapter. 
 
The example related to the proposal by the Director of Finance that one of the branches that 
was still paying social care employees on a weekly basis should change to being paid 
monthly. Having the right to a voice enabled one of the employee representatives to argue 
against this proposal. Reflecting the equity-based nature of collaborative pluralism and the 
right to exercise voice, he put forward the case from the perspective of the social care 
employees who would not be able to afford to go from one month to the next without being 
paid. He was successful in making the case and it was through having a right to a voice that 
he was able to do so. Through having the right to a voice yielded by the mechanism of 
employee-ownership, this example highlights that the representative had provided an 
opportunity. However, if the concept of a right to a voice in an employee-owned enterprise is 
applied to all employee-owners, then a different picture emerges. 
 
There was an expectation by the Chief Executive Officer that social care employees would 
take increased responsibility through their new role as employee-owners. This was invoked 
through one of the company values emphasising employee-owners ‘sharing responsibility’.  
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Similarly, the signs displayed in the office used by social care employees, which were 
discussed in the previous chapter, portrayed quite different and contradictory messages to that 
of having rights.  
 
One of the signs required social care employees to have an appointment in order to speak to 
their managers. Social care employees did not have a key to enter the locked door in order to 
attend ‘appointments’ with their managers. The idea of having locked doors seemed to 
contradict the ‘open door’ policy advocated by the Chief Executive Officer. Open door 
policies were regarded as a common mechanism in the social care sector (ekosgen 2013), 
however, they seem anathema to employee-ownership. Why would an owner of an enterprise 
need to gain access through a locked door for which they had no key, in order to speak with 
another owner? As employee-owners, there is an expectation they would have access to all 
parts of the building. This seemed to reflect the hard unitarist philosophy of the organisation’s 
hierarchical configuration that demarcated managers and social care employees rather than 
reflecting employee-ownership.  
 
Yet, according to another sign, employees were expected to ‘act like owners’. Combined, 
these signs correspond to the notion of ‘employee compliance’ discussed by Cathcart (2014) 
in relation to the employee-owned John Lewis Partnership. As such, the collaborative pluralist 
idea of voice as a right in Vivo-Co seemed counterintuitive to the hard unitarist philosophy 
espoused by management. In contrast, the idea of voice as a right is an integral feature of 
collaborative pluralism, with all parties to the employment relationship having legitimacy to 
express their voice. In Vivo-Co this right to, and legitimacy of, employee voice was not 
realised. 
 
b. The embeddedness of voice 
The second factor in the literature affecting employee voice in an employee-owned enterprise 
is through its ‘embeddedness’ (Bernstein 1976) within the organisation. This embeddedness 
comes through employee voice being enshrined and actualised through various governance 
processes. And, though ostensibly a governance mechanism, through these governance 
processes, employee-ownership provides the potential for an inter-relatedness between 
employee voice at different hierarchical levels, such as workplace level and corporate level 
(ibid). In other words there is a potential to connect organisational voices.  
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Creating the potential to connect voices reflects the collaborative pluralism frame which 
regards managers, employees and employee representatives as legitimate parties to co-
operative relationships based on values of mutual respect, loyalty, trust and equity (Bray et al 
2015) and creates the potential for voice to be heard (Gollan 2013). These governance 
processes are therefore important as they can send a strong message to employees that their 
voice is important and cannot easily be ignored nor easily removed. In this sense, employee-
ownership is deemed to have more permanence. This is in contrast to the voice initiatives that 
are argued to be typical of conventional businesses.  
 
As noted in the discussion above concerning the right to a voice, in conventional businesses 
employees either have no voice mechanism at all or, when they do, those mechanisms are 
fragile: they are ad hoc and low-level (Dundon et al 2017; Wilkinson and Fay 2011). By 
contrast, mechanisms that are embedded and inter-related, such as employee-ownership, are 
regarded positively (e.g. Boxall and Purcell 2011; Purcell and Georgiadis 2007). Indeed, 
through its embeddedness yielded from employee-ownership, employee voice becomes 
integral to what Dundon et al (2017) refer to as the ‘organisational infrastructure’.  
 
In theory at least, employee-ownership in Vivo-Co provided a sophisticated means through 
which voice could be expressed which is untypical of conventional business and also 
untypical in the social care sector (Grimshaw et al 2015; Rubery et al 2011). A specific 
example was provided in the previous chapter that related to employee representatives being 
allowed to have their name on various legal documents.  
 
Being able to exert their voice on this issue sent out a strong message to those representatives 
concerned that their voice did matter whilst also sending a strong message to the remaining 
representatives as well as all those who looked at the documents. Indeed, their voice mattered 
to the extent that they were able to overturn the original choice of those who would be named 
on the document. This example highlights the possibility of integrating employee voice into 
the fabric through the governance processes of employee-ownership.  
 
c. Employee-ownership governance processes 
The third factor identified in the literature which can positively affect employee voice in an 
employee-owned are the governance processes. These processes were regarded favourably by 
Flanders et al (1968) and were considered by Salaman and Storey (2016) to encourage all 
forms of voice at all organisational levels in their discussions of the John Lewis Partnership.  
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Such processes created structural relationships within the Partnership enabling conversations 
throughout the whole organisation rather than segmented organisationally, departmentally or 
hierarchically. In agreement with the points made by Flanders et al (1968) and Salaman and 
Storey (2016), the governance processes in Vivo-Co did provide the opportunity for 
relationships within the organisation and the expression of voice. However, the evidence also 
suggested contradiction as there were mixed findings regarding whether the processes ensured 
employee voice was part of the fabric of Vivo-Co. The governance processes of employee-
ownership in Vivo-Co were the Articles of Association, an Annual General Meeting and the 
General Council.  
 
1. Governance processes: Articles of Association 
The Articles of Association in Vivo-Co were designed by the Chief Executive Officer and 
other senior figures in the organisation. Social care employees had no direct involvement with 
the formation of the Articles. An example did arise at one of the General Council meetings, 
discussed in the previous chapter, which created the opportunity for employee representatives 
to influence the Articles and have them amended meaning that all employee-owners had to 
have a voice in a scenario where someone wanted to sell the company. 
 
2. Governance processes: Annual General Meeting 
As discussed in chapter six, an Annual General Meeting is held with members, i.e. employee-
owners in Vivo-Co, who are invited to attend and vote on particular matters concerning the 
organisation. By Vivo-Co holding an Annual General Meeting, an opportunity is provided for 
the direct involvement of employee-owners, predominantly social care employees. Further, 
this would give them the opportunity to come together in one place as well as the opportunity 
to express their voice. Notably, an Annual General Meeting, had not been planned in Vivo-
Co. Information about such a meeting, though requested several times by the employee 
representatives, was not forthcoming.  
 
3. Governance processes: General Council 
In contrast to the two governance processes above, the General Council did provide a means 
of expressing employee voice, particularly through its representatives who brought life to the 
model. The General Council provided evidence of how employee-ownership could be used to 
link together voices across Vivo-Co similar to that of the John Lewis Partnership.  
 
181 
 
As illustrated in figure 7.1, though far from perfect, voice was conceived as taking a circular 
route around the organisation and provided a means of inter-connecting the different voices 
within Vivo-Co. This reflects collaborative pluralism regarding the legitimacy of all voice 
which is in contrast to the linear and typically downward route of voice in conventional 
businesses and that of the way employee voice travelled in Vivo-Co as an organisation which 
was illustrated in chapter six, figure 6.1 (see Vivo-Co organisational structure).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1 Vivo-Co governance structure 
 
 
Employee-ownership, as it is conceived in figure 7.1 provided the potential of the upward, 
downward and sideward flow of communication. This is a positive feature of the mechanism 
as such a flow of communication was considered essential in developing a mutually 
supportive employment relations environment by Pateman (1970) and Budd (2014).  
 
Employee-owners 
Operating Board Senior Executive 
Team 
General Council 
Chief Executive 
Officer 
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As such, the mechanism of employee-ownership did provide the means for conversations 
between different constituents in Vivo-Co. It enabled different constituents of the General 
Council to bring with them their own philosophies and their own ideas about, and aspirations 
for, employee-ownership and were therefore able to influence how it would evolve. This 
reflects the collaborative pluralism frame in terms of the legitimacy of voice. Employee-
ownership enabled such legitimacy, such as enabling employee representatives to be the voice 
of social care employees. Importantly, that the voice of representatives was at times either 
ignored or closed down was not a problem of the mechanism, rather, a problem in the way it 
was executed through a hard unitarist frame. To highlight this point, what is particularly 
notable in figure 7.1 is the red line between the operating board and the General Council. 
 
This line serves to highlight a one-way communication system between the operating board 
and the General Council that was revealed in Vivo-Co. According to the two employee-
ownership experts who were non-executive directors of Vivo-Co, this was unusual. Typically, 
there would be a two-way communication system between the two groups, as it is in the John 
Lewis Partnership. However, in Vivo-Co, whilst there was representation from the operating 
board on the General Council there was no representation from the General Council on the 
operating board, this despite requests for representation from employee representatives. This 
lack of representation is emblematic of the Chief Executive Officer’s hard unitarist 
philosophy for, and his execution of, employee-ownership. It also serves to highlight a 
paradox of the model.  
 
Consistent with the literature on employee-ownership, the evidence from Vivo-Co reveals it 
can form part of the organisation’s fabric. Employee -ownership has the potential to enable 
voice and ensure voice is heard when compared to a conventional business. This is because 
employee voice is provided through the governance processes, e.g. an Annual General 
Meeting, where employees have a real opportunity to express their voice when compared to 
other lower-level mechanisms. Processes such as an Annual General Meeting are the means 
for enabling employee voice as they are integral to the organisation’s fabric in an employee-
owned enterprise. However, if employees are not able to exercise their voice, because for 
example an Annual General Meeting has not been considered, then the point is redundant. 
This highlights a grey area in the literature regarding the influence yielded by the mechanism.  
 
The escalator metaphor (Marchington et al 1992) was used in chapter two to highlight how 
managers’ choices in conventional businesses tend toward the lower end of the escalator. In 
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conventional businesses, as noted above, voice choices reflect the preferences of managers for 
low-level, direct and individual forms (Bryson et al 2004; Freeman et al 2007; Marchington et 
al 1992; Wilkinson and Fay 2011). Furthermore, mechanisms are introduced in a manner 
regarded as ad hoc (Dundon et al 2017; Wilkinson and Fay 2011) and as ‘flavour of the 
month’ (Legge 2005) meaning employee voice can be fragile in its structure and its efficacy 
and is regarded by employees as having been bolted on, or lacking coherence or integration, 
to other policies and practices (Wilkinson and Fay 2011). Similarly, in Vivo-Co, the choice 
was made by senior executives. However, the choice was for a mechanism which was 
regarded as being more sophisticated, which, given it was underpinned by a hard unitarist 
philosophy, therefore seemed counterintuitive.  
 
7.5.2 The philosophy of employee-ownership 
Employee-ownership is regarded as having greater ‘strength’ (Gollan et al 2015) in terms of 
enabling employee voice. To understand why, the escalator metaphor (figure 2.1; p.22) and 
employee voice continuum (figure 2.2; p.26), which were discussed in chapter two, are used 
here to further explore employee voice through employee-ownership compared to other 
mechanisms. The escalator metaphor (Marchington et al 1992), placed employee-ownership 
at the highest level and specifically referenced the John Lewis Partnership as an example of a 
company yielding this level of influence. In contrast, conventional mechanisms, such as team 
briefings, were placed at the lower level. The ‘voice continuum’ (Gollan et al 2015) was also 
discussed in chapter two. Though also conceiving employee-ownership at a higher level than 
conventional voice mechanisms, Gollan et al (ibid) placed it on the middle level of their voice 
continuum. The reason they placed it lower is that employee voice is not independent of 
management. This highlights an anomaly of employee-ownership regarding employee voice 
between the escalator and the continuum.  
 
Following the escalator, employee voice through employee-ownership will be strong. By 
contrast, following the continuum, voice will be stronger in an employee-owned enterprise 
compared to conventional businesses though not as strong as if it had been combined with an 
independent voice, such as through a trade union. However, neither Marchington et al’s 
escalator nor Gollan et al’s continuum take account of the point that the ability to exercise 
voice is not only dependent on the mechanism but also on the philosophy of those choosing 
and implementing the mechanism. The argument here, drawn from the evidence in Vivo-Co, 
is that the strength of voice is yielded not because of the mechanism but rather the philosophy 
of those introducing it. Whilst that philosophy could be collaborative pluralism, in the case of 
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Vivo-Co, employee-ownership was actually underpinned by a hard unitarist philosophy akin 
to that espoused by Le Grand (2003) and Kurtulus and Kruse (2017; cited in Brown et al 
2019). In so doing, the potential of the mechanism was not fully realised. Furthermore, it 
helps to explain why the choice of mechanism by the Chief Executive Officer, prima facie, 
seems counterintuitive. However, when considering his philosophy rather than the 
mechanism, the reason for this anomaly becomes clearer. 
 
7.6 The outcomes of employee-ownership on employee voice 
This section is concerned with the remaining questions presented in chapter one which were 
how employee voice operates through the mechanism and what were the consequences of the 
mechanism for key organisational actors. The literature highlighted three factors in employee-
owned enterprises which could negatively affect employee voice. These were hierarchy, 
compliance and resistance. Consistent with this literature, these factors were evident in Vivo-
Co which meant employee voice not only went unheard, but was at times closed down 
revealing hostility towards, lack of trust in and fear of, employee voice suggesting it was a 
fabrication.  
 
7.6.1 Employee-ownership and employee compliance 
The first area for discussion that was highlighted was the concerning theme of ‘employee 
compliance’ found in the employee-owned John Lewis Partnership (Cathcart 2014). What this 
meant in practice was that regardless of their status as employee-owners, the partners were 
placed in a situation where they had little option other than to be compliant with the will of 
their managers. A contrasting view of employee-ownership, which was discussed earlier, was 
that it can act as an incentive for employees.  
 
This latter view is supported by Le Grand (2003) who argued employee-owners are 
incentivised by the prospect of financial gain. Incentivisation via employee-ownership also 
corresponds to the research by Gospel and Pendleton (2010). They stated that whilst 
employee-ownership can provide participating employees with governance rights as owners, 
for the most part it had not provided a vehicle for either a widespread or effective role in 
corporate governance. They found that in most cases, companies ‘market’ share plans to 
employees on the basis of financial reward rather than as a means of gaining control or indeed 
providing employees with a voice. This reflects a hard unitarist frame which regards 
employees as calculative and driven by financial reward; employee-ownership would provide 
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such a reward. However, the aforementioned study by Cathcart (2014), revealed a soft 
unitarist frame being used as a vehicle to promote employee-ownership.  
 
Cathcart (ibid) noted how partners were implored by management to put the business first, set 
aside their personal preferences and ‘give that little bit extra’ in recognition of their status as 
owners. A similar sentiment is in the work of Kurtulus and Kruse (2017; cited in Brown et al 
2019) who claim that employee-ownership can stimulate employees to work harder and more 
effectively thus creating a more harmonious workplaces through aligning incentives. 
Similarities were found in Vivo-Co in relation to both frames.  
 
One of the Vivo-Co values related directly to going the extra mile which is synonymous with 
soft unitarism. Going the extra mile was something Piasna et al (2013) stated involves an 
employee exerting greater effort in their work and demonstrating ‘commitment’ to the 
organisation, also synonymous with the soft unitarist frame. Importantly, when it is invoked 
by a company, as it was in Vivo-Co, employees are expected to do more than has been 
contractually agreed. This is quite different to the idea of ‘gifting’ (Bolton and Wibberley 
2014) that was discussed in chapter five. 
 
Gifting was something a social care employee does of their own accord. The Vivo-Co value 
implies that social care employees give more of themselves on the basis that they care, the 
latter of which was also reflected in the personal characteristics. Further, there is an 
implication that they will do this because the company is employee-owned and, therefore they 
will ‘go the extra mile’ as invoked in the second value. In turn, going the extra mile becomes 
part of the expectation that employees will also ‘share responsibility’. Important here are the 
assumptions that are made about employees and as such, employee voice.  
 
Both hard and soft unitarist frames are underpinned by particular philosophies that make 
assumptions about employee voice and determine what it ought to be; the overriding purpose 
of which is not employee equity, as in a collaborative pluralist frame, but rather business 
efficiency. In so doing, other assumptions and interpretations are closed down and alternative 
suggestions are not heard. The standardisation of the work and training provided to social care 
employees in Vivo-Co provided examples. The point being that the nature of social care 
work, i.e. part-time and fragmented, can restrict opportunities for employee voice (Breslin and 
Wood 2015; Carey 2015; Dundon et al 2017; Piasna et al 2013). In agreement with this point, 
that the nature of social care work restricts opportunities for employee voice, and taking it 
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further, by reducing opportunities for social care employees to meet collectively in Vivo-Co 
reduced further the opportunity for employee voice. However, despite such mitigating factors 
concerning opportunities to express their voice, when they were heard, social care employees 
in this study discussed various factors, such as a love of the job.  
 
Social care employees predominantly discussed service users. Notably, they never discussed 
financial gain nor ever used the phrase ‘going the extra mile’, despite this being one of the 
company values. The literature concerning the social care sector, discussed in chapter five, 
stated that social care employees are motivated by the desire to make a difference, the 
relationships they have with service users (Unison 2016) and the usefulness and 
meaningfulness of the work they do (Borzaga and Depedri 2009; Pestoff and Vamstad 2014). 
Corresponding to this literature, for social care employees in Vivo-Co, the job was about 
providing care, evidenced during observations of social care employees at a team meeting and 
whilst coming into their office.  
 
Of the six social care employees attending the team meeting, all stated that they worked at 
Vivo-Co because they wanted to make a difference to the service users. For them, social care 
is about the job they do, it is seeing the difference they make and where what they do, not the 
profit the company makes, matters. The observations of - approximately fifty - social care 
employees coming into their office bore similar findings. Alongside an opportunity to pick up 
supplies, coming into the office gave them the opportunity to meet with their colleagues and 
have discussions about service users. This was a rare and highly exploited opportunity for 
them to meet with one another and discuss their work.  
 
This serves to highlight the point that, despite the challenges they faced in the fragmented 
nature of their work compounded by reducing opportunities to meet collectively, they still 
found space to meet with their colleagues. And, though not acknowledged by the senior 
executives, such opportunities could bear efficiencies through, for example, information-
sharing. Indeed, a point which is not alluded to in the literature is that, despite an apparent 
aversion to profit by social care employees, this did not preclude their ability to identify 
efficiencies.  
 
Several suggestions were made by the social care employees that would bring efficiencies to 
Vivo-Co. The example presented in chapter six which illustrates this point was of a social 
care employee who had made changes to her rota. For her, the changed rota was regarded as 
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the most efficient way of dealing with the job in hand. Simultaneously she combined this with 
a ‘care logic’, a concept used by Bolton and Wibberley (2014), which meant that Mrs Smith, 
one of the service users she was visiting, could stay a little longer in bed, which she liked to 
do. Yet, the suggestion went unheard by her manager at the team meeting where it was 
suggested. Another example of unheard voices despite efficiency suggestions is the list of 
concerns from the social care employees that was brought to a General Council meeting.  
 
One of the representatives, Peter, brought a list of concerns to the meeting from the social 
care employees. This was discussed in the previous chapter (What can I talk about?). The 
senior executives regarded the items on the list as operational matters. However, they can be 
interpreted differently; they can be regarded as efficiency concerns that affect not only the 
social care employees but also the business. For example, one item on the list was an 
expressed desire for car parking permits. The social care employees chose to park outside of 
their office but in doing so they ran the risk of a fine, which, given their low wages, they 
could ill afford. However, they may be in the middle of visits to service users. Risking a fine 
meant they would be anxious. Arriving at a service users’ home in a state of anxiety is not 
good for them nor the service user and risks impacting on the quality of care as perceived by 
both.  
 
The important point is that not having access to a car parking permit impacted on how 
efficiently a social care employee could move from one service user to another and ultimately 
on the quality of care. Further, it risks being recorded as a ‘no show’ by the local authority 
and therefore jeopardises future contracts. What the social care employees were expressing 
was a collaborative pluralist concern for the efficiency of Vivo-Co whilst retaining high 
service quality. However, their voice was unheard in preference for the hard unitarist 
conceptualisation of efficiency by the Chief Executive Officer which focused on business 
‘growth’ through being ‘agile’ and gaining ‘competitive advantage’ through ‘commercial 
confidentiality’ and avoiding ‘hostile take-overs’ and ‘reputational damage’. A second and 
equally important aspect of the list was also overlooked. 
 
The list provided a link, the first through the employee-ownership structure, between the 
General Council and the larger body of employee-owners, the social care employees. The 
social care employees were speaking to the General Council through the mechanism of 
employee-ownership via the list. Had the list been acknowledged and responded to, this could 
have begun the process of building a more permanent employee voice mechanism between 
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the General Council and the social care employees. This would have contributed to the 
circular motion of voice illustrated in figure  7.1 that is in contrast to a downward voice 
typical of conventional businesses. It would have enabled the beginning of a more 
collaborative relationship. Most importantly, it would have meant the voice of social care 
employees was heard. What happened however, was that the voice of social care employees 
was not heard.  
 
The list was never acknowledged by the General Council other than representatives being told 
they were not to discuss matters included on the list. Further, the way social care employees 
were spoken about, and factors such as locked doors and having to make an appointment to 
speak to managers was not reflective of, indeed was counter-intuitive to, employee-
ownership. Though, as noted earlier, the social care employees in Vivo-Co did enjoy better 
terms and conditions of employment - such as holiday and sickness entitlements - compared 
to their counterparts in other sectors, their voice through employee-ownership though 
reflecting that of collaborative pluralism was closed down by that of a voice which was hard 
unitarist in nature.  
 
In the hard unitarist frame, employee voice has a transactional value and is related to the 
‘labour problem’ of high turnover. Against this backdrop, employee-ownership was used to 
achieve what Cathcart (2014) referred to as ‘employee compliance’. It suggests that social 
care employees’ voice was not valued in the organisation. Other examples of Vivo-Co as an 
organisation, i.e. as opposed to an employee-owned organisation, support this argument. Two 
are discussed here, the way space was utilised in Vivo-Co and the inter-relationship of 
conventional mechanisms with employee-ownership. 
 
a. Social care employees did not have a dedicated space to meet with one another. Space 
was considered an important factor, particularly how it can be used to encourage 
communication and interaction (Spear and Thomas 2015). The way space was used in 
Vivo-Co was contrary to this. For example, it could have provided somewhere for 
social care employees to share information about service users and to interact and 
communicate with one another. Further, it could have aided communication and 
interaction between other levels of the organisation. Space is also important to an 
employee in having a sense of somewhere that they can regard as their place of work 
and developing a sense of ownership of the work-space, especially pertinent in an 
employee-owned enterprise. Indeed the (lack of) space provided for social care 
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employees reflected and reinforced a hierarchical separation between them and 
managers. This manifested in several ways such as the grand space occupied by the 
senior executives compared to the locked doors experienced by social care employees. 
The right to a voice and its embeddedness within the structure of employee-ownership 
lead to a further feature of the model: the governance processes.  
 
b. One of the conventional voice systems used in Vivo-Co was newsletters which are a 
common mechanism in social care organisations (ekosgen 2013). The newsletter did 
appear to provide a means of communication between social care employees as well as 
including information about the General Council and names and contact details of its 
representatives. Co-ordination of this with other systems could have provided further 
opportunities to link voice across many levels of the organisation, particularly that of 
social care employees, as well as linking organisational factors to that of employee-
ownership; the traffic light system providing an example. The traffic light system 
could have been an important mechanism for sharing information about the business 
aspects of Vivo-Co yet it was never updated nor was key information communicated 
in any meaningful way.  
 
The suggestion schemes also provided an interesting example. It asked for ‘good 
ideas’ which were determined by the branch manager and/or the Chief Executive 
Officer. By implication, they were also determining what bad suggestions were; it was 
their version of voice rather than that of social care employees. Further, given the pre-
determination of ‘good’ suggestions it is questionable whether such a scheme would 
confer a sense of ownership, or encourage individuals to act like owners or to express 
their voice. The document implies that ‘workers’ through ‘having a say’ (via ‘good 
suggestions’) would act like ‘owners’.   
 
For the most part, the conventional voice mechanisms in Vivo-Co seemed to be operating in 
isolation of one another and were not operating particularly effectively. Of greater concern 
was that some of these mechanisms seemed antithetical to employee-ownership. Indeed, 
employee-ownership was marketed to social care employees in relation to its financial 
benefits and used as a form of compliance to implore them to go the extra mile. Similarly, 
employee representatives had to be compliant regarding specific topics that could be 
discussed whilst those the representatives wanted to discuss were ‘designed-out’ of agendas 
(Donaghey et al 2011a). Yet, when they were heard, social care employees and employee 
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representatives did speak about factors that could be regarded as efficiencies, albeit framed 
differently to those of the Chief Executive Officer.  
 
7.6.2 Employee-ownership and organisational hierarchy 
The second theme for discussion highlighted concerned employee-ownership and 
‘organisational hierarchy’ (Atzeni 2012). The necessity for hierarchy in an employee-owned 
enterprise was, Pendleton (2001) argued, underpinned by a fear that employee-owners would 
act like workers and put short-term gain ahead of the longer-term sustainability of the 
enterprise. This view again resonates with the hard unitarist frame and corresponds with the 
view also in this frame that employees are calculative and driven by financial reward as well 
as the belief that hierarchies are necessary.  
 
The nature of work within a capitalist system such as that of the UK, Atzeni (2012) argued, is 
regarded by many social science disciplines as something workers need to be encouraged to 
do. He refers to labour economics that has described work over the last thirty years as 
something that has to be done and emphasised monetary rewards as a way of encouraging 
workers to work. The need to motivate employees is something which underpins the HRM 
narrative and, again, bears similarities to hard unitarism in terms of hierarchy. As such, 
organising work hierarchically is so deeply embedded in the UK that alternatives are not 
considered (Atzeni 2012; Markey et al 2010). Yet, employee-ownership does provide an 
alternative to the conventional organisation though, paradoxically, it would seem hierarchies 
are still necessary. 
 
One of the key features of employee-ownership, according to Oakeshott (1990), was the 
ability to incorporate it into a conventional hierarchical management structure. The image this 
presents is one of employee-ownership sitting comfortably alongside a hierarchical 
configuration. However, the literature review also highlighted that hierarchies can bring 
rigidity (Pateman 1970), disrupt voice and create professional pecking orders (Wilkinson et al 
2015). Rothschild (2000) argued that flatter, non-hierarchical organisations have the potential 
for balancing market concerns with issues of ownership and control bridging the gap between 
those who manage and those who are managed. Furthermore, Bernstein (1976) suggested that 
employee-ownership means employees, in their role as owners, are able to challenge without 
reprisal. The evidence from Vivo-Co however was more consistent with the view of Atzeni 
(2012) relating to a perceived need for hierarchy.  
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Consistent with a hard unitarist frame, and bearing similarities to the Traditional form of 
unitarism discussed by Cullinane and Dundon (2014), there was an emphasis in Vivo-Co on 
hierarchy and standardisation whereby ‘direction and control’ was through a ‘unified chain of 
command’ and ‘close supervision’. An example was provided in the section above through 
the separation of space between ‘workers’ and ‘management’. This separation was regarded 
as something positive by the Director of Quality and Compliance yet seems to contradict the 
idea of ‘employee’ ownership, placing the hierarchical configuration over ownership. 
Significantly, organisational hierarchy often took priority over the governance structure of 
employee-ownership which affected the expression of employee voice. This was particularly 
evidenced in the examples of employee representatives trying to fulfil their role of 
representing social care employees, their attempts reflecting a collaborative pluralist frame.  
 
From their perspective, the purpose of their role as employee representatives and the purpose 
of employee-ownership was to enable a voice for ‘all’ employee-owners; they each had a 
‘right to a voice’ and the legitimacy to express their voice. To achieve this purpose, they 
described their key role as being to facilitate and maintain relationships with the 
constituencies of the General Council. They showed respect for the other General Council 
constituents such as the senior executives and the non-executives and displayed evidence of 
characteristics of collaborative pluralism conceived by Bray et al (2015), by recognising their 
‘common interests’ and ‘mutual goals’. This frame is also evident in the statement made by 
Tom, one of the employee representatives who stated they were one team working towards 
something that was important and fulfilling. This perspective was in contrast to some of the 
senior executives. 
 
The Director of Quality and Compliance questioned the role of representatives. He saw it as 
his right to question the role and indeed the capability of representatives but in so doing, he 
was also questioning the legitimacy of the employee representative role. As noted above, the 
employee representatives did have a right to carry out the role, endorsed as it was by the 
Articles of Association, however, in practice, it was made difficult by the senior executives. 
There were a number of examples of the Chief Executive Officer closing down some voices, 
employee representatives, whilst allowing others, the senior executives, to be heard. This 
suggests a superiority regarding the senior executive and specifically the Chief Executive 
Officer, endorsed by the hierarchical structure of Vivo-Co, which presented challenges to 
employee representatives given their role was to represent the concerns of social care 
employees. 
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In their own words, the role of an employee representative was ‘to be the voice of the social 
care employees’, and this was unreservedly how they interpreted their role. To this end, they 
continuously made suggestions to improve current practice as well as suggesting innovation. 
For instance, Susan suggested at a General Council meeting that all of the representatives visit 
one another’s branches. The purpose of this was to learn how employee-ownership was being 
implemented, learn about the processes that were being used in the other branches and to look 
at possibilities for introducing those processes in their own branch. In other words it was 
about learning and sharing good practice. If something was working in one branch it could be 
replicated in another meaning less time spent on creating something new. This innovation was 
not acknowledged by senior executives at the meeting.  
 
As another example, at two of the branches the representatives were hosting charity events 
which served several functions. Firstly, they raised awareness of Vivo-Co within its local 
community, providing positive publicity about the organisation and a valuable marketing 
opportunity. Secondly, they provided an opportunity to involve social care employees in 
collaborating on discreet projects of which they had ownership and which they were able to 
plan and organise. Importantly, this provided the opportunity for them to work together, 
something which was rare given the fragmented and part-time nature of their work. Thirdly, it 
provided a vital and rare opportunity for employee representatives to communicate with social 
care employees about employee-ownership. As such, through the process of organising 
events, employee representatives uncovered a way of contributing to the efficiency of Vivo-
Co. However, these examples of efficiency improvement were not recognised as such by the 
senior executives. As with social care employees, the voice of employee representatives in 
making efficiency suggestions went unheard. Moreover, their interpretation of the purpose of 
employee-ownership were challenged by the senior executives.  
 
To senior executives, the concerns of employee representatives centred on equity. Yet, as with 
social care employees, closer analysis of discussions amongst employee representatives 
reveals that as well as having equity concerns vis-à-vis social care employees – and therefore 
emulating the role of a ‘shop steward’ according to one of the representatives - there were 
innovations that they suggested which erred as much towards efficiency as they did equity. 
Significantly, the senior executives used the organisational hierarchy to challenge and 
disempower employee representatives.  
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Whereas the voice of the senior executives was legitimised through the organisational 
hierarchy, the voice of representatives was legitimised through the Articles meaning they did 
have the right to a voice at General Council meetings. However, the extent to which the 
representatives’ voice was heard was questionable. The example of appointing non-executive 
directors to the General Council was provided in the previous chapter. Despite suggestions 
from representatives for the positions, none were followed through nor was there an 
explanation of why they were not.  Suggestions that were heard were those put forward by the 
chair, Chief Executive Officer and one of the founder members. In other words the most 
senior people in the organisation decided who the non-executive directors ought to be whilst 
the voice of employee representatives was not heard. Subsequently, one of the employee 
representatives did join the panel thus providing a partial counter-balance to the power of the 
senior representatives in terms of that particular decision-making process. A further challenge 
related to the hostility displayed by some of the senior executives. 
 
Employee representatives were often met with hostility from the senior executives such as 
asking what the company was getting from the role as well as the comments that they were 
acting like ‘shop stewards’; notable because of the derogatory manner in which these 
comments were made. Another example relates to the list of concerns raised by social care 
employees that was brought to a General Council meeting by a representative as noted above. 
Corresponding to the literature (Bryson and Freeman 2007; Freeman et al 2007; The Smith 
Institute 2016; Wilkinson et al 2015), some of the issues in the list were of an operational 
nature. What was important, was that they were what employees wanted to talk about. Also 
important, was that this was an instance of employees, employee-owners in this case, 
expressing their voice on matters of concern to them. However, such issues were treated in a 
derogatory manner by senior executives. Interestingly, it is a view which is mirrored in some 
of the academic literature. 
 
A number of scholars refer to these as ‘tea and toilet’ issues (e.g. Purcell and Hall 2012). In 
other words they are important to employees though ostensibly not so academically. In a 
similar vein, Gollan et al (2015) pose a ‘what if’; asking what if all companies were required 
by corporate governance law to include one or more employee representatives on the 
executive board. They correctly suggest that such a policy would bring more balance and 
greater accountability. However, they then argue that in so doing, employees would be given 
a voice at the top of the organisation, where, they suggest, it matters. An alternative approach 
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to this is a preparedness to discuss issues of importance to employees regardless of their 
perceived importance to others.  
 
Rather than viewing them disparagingly, Rathkey (1983) refers to such issues as ‘grass-roots’ 
and Budd (2004) ‘workplace level concerns’. Similarly, Wilkinson et al (2015) note the array 
of issues at workplace level that voice can include such as canteen food through to more 
strategic concerns such as financial planning. Yet, such issues were not allowed to be 
discussed within Vivo-Co and therefore contradicted the notion of ‘meaningful voice’ 
conceived by Budd (2004). Moreover, through closing down these conversations, the actual 
voice of social care employees in Vivo-Co, and ideas they suggested, went unheard.  
 
Through their employee representatives, social care employees were told that it was not the 
role of the General Council to discuss operational issues. In this way, voice was confined by 
senior executives to certain subjects. They had a clear view of the subjects that could be 
discussed. Attempts by employee representatives to represent social care employees was 
prevented and the voice of social care employees was not acknowledged, no response was 
given to the representative regarding the points made, the voice of the social care employees 
and the representative was stifled. Implicit in this example is a superiority that what the senior 
executives discussed was more important than what social care employees wanted to discuss. 
Other examples provide further evidence of such superiority reflected in the subordinated 
voice of employee representatives. 
 
In an analogy by Tom, about his role as an employee representative, he describes it as being 
like ‘little fishes’ which he then compared to the ‘powerful people’ on the General Council, 
who were regarded by Kevin, another employee representative as ‘an elite group’ and 
therefore, according to Susan, a third employee representative, employee representatives were 
‘privileged to be part of it’. All of which suggests the representatives were subordinating 
themselves to the Chief Executive Officer and other senior executives.   
 
In contrast, the governance processes of employee-ownership in Vivo-Co suggest some 
degree of parity amongst all of the ‘fish’ which is not reflected in the analogy given by the 
employee representative. However, given the primacy of the organisational hierarchy, it is not 
surprising that there was such a conflict between employee representatives assuming a right to 
express their voice, particularly when it was under constant question from the senior 
executives. Indeed, the primacy of the organisational hierarchy was acting as a barrier to 
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employee voice. Nevertheless, to suggest that employee representatives lacked agency in their 
role would present an inaccurate picture. 
 
There were instances where the Chief Executive Officer did concede his voice. Examples 
include the representatives voting to make a change to the Articles, being named on the Title 
Deeds and the representative arguing for social care employees from his branch to remain on 
weekly pay; the mechanism of employee-ownership had afforded such opportunities. Another 
example were the attempts to devise a system of ensuring the voice of social care employees 
into, within and outwith the General Council – it was a topic discussed at every meeting, 
though a system was not in place during the course of the fieldwork. Importantly employee 
representatives were given responsibility for devising the system, with the help of one of the 
non-executive directors. The reasons for this were not clear, however, it enabled the 
representatives to take some ownership of the process. It would also mean the opportunity to 
discuss appropriate systems with social care employees ensuring a system that was fair and 
which reflected their concerns. In so doing, the employee representatives, through their role, 
were afforded some degree of voice, the legitimacy of which was yielded by the mechanism.  
 
Nevertheless, more common were examples of voice suppression. More often than not, the 
Chief Executive Officer overrode voice manifested through employee-ownership, his 
hierarchical position allowing this. This brought challenges to employee representatives in 
being able to express and effect their voice highlighting a contradiction between the 
organisational hierarchy and the governance structure of employee-ownership in Vivo-Co. 
Whereas Oakeshott (1990) suggested that combining employee-ownership with a pre-existing 
organisational structure was straightforward, it presented challenges in Vivo-Co that 
negatively affected employee voice.  
 
Given the many examples of voice suppression, and following Wilkinson et al (2015), the 
organisational hierarchy in Vivo-Co acted as an impediment to the mechanism, of employee-
ownership, by disrupting the flow of voice. In addition, not all voices in Vivo-Co were equal. 
Following the observation by Heery et al (2008), Wilkinson and Fay (2011) and Wilkinson et 
al (2015), legitimacy was afforded to particular voices and not others. It is argued here that 
this is an outcome, not of employee-ownership – theoretically, all voices in Vivo-Co were 
legitimate, but of some voices being valued more than others, a point which helps to highlight 
the third of the key themes regarding management resistance.  
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7.6.3 Employee-ownership and management resistance  
The third theme for discussion which was highlighted in the literature relates to ‘management 
resistance’ of employee-ownership. Such resistance, McCarthy and Palcic (2012) argued, can 
stem from an unwillingness to empower employees and a belief that it can over-complicate 
decision-making. Similarly, findings from Pendleton’s (2001) case studies of employee-
ownership revealed the overriding goal of management was to retain ‘conventional’ structures 
of management and avoid what they saw as the ‘threats’ to efficiency and a belief employees 
could not act as ‘responsible’ entrepreneurs. These factors were evident in Vivo-Co as 
employee-ownership evolved, manifested as distrust and fear by the Chief Executive Officer 
as well as other senior executives such as criticising employee representatives for not having 
their eye on the ‘bigger picture’. A further example of this was evidenced during a discussion 
about having employee representatives’ names on the Trust Deed.  
 
During the discussion the Chief Executive Officer asked, in relation to the employee 
representatives: ‘what if they stole money?’ whereas his nominations presumably would not 
do anything that he considered to be ‘awkward for the business’; in other words the people 
suggested by him could be trusted. Similarly, the Director of Quality and Compliance 
demonstrated distrust when he suggested that employee representatives were only 
representing the social care employees whereas his argument was that they should represent 
all employees. Each time an issue was raised in a General Council meeting by a representative 
he wanted to know which representative was bringing the issue and how many people were 
affected by it. There are several potentially contentious issues with these comments, space 
limitations mean that only three are discussed here.  
 
Firstly, the comments bring into question the trustworthiness of the representatives to relay 
issues raised by social care employees. Secondly it raises issues of confidentiality: social care 
employees are more likely to raise concerns and representatives are more likely to represent 
those concerns if they think they will be dealt with in confidence. A third issue is that, 
according to this view, the role of employee representatives should include the views of senior 
executives and management as well as those of social care employees. However, this is 
contradictory to the Articles. 
 
The Articles have categories of representatives which reflect each hierarchical layer in Vivo-
Co. As such, employee representatives represent the social care employees. If they were to 
represent all employees then the role becomes redundant. Moreover, the employee 
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representative is there to represent the views of social care employees regardless of how many 
of them raise that issue. The representative in this sense is merely bringing the issue/s forward 
for discussion on behalf of the social care employees. It is not for any one person to determine 
how many of them need to raise the same issue in order for it to be discussed nor is it for any 
one person to determine the validity of the concern. As employee-owners, the social care 
employees have a right to express their view to the General Council and employee 
representatives provided a means of doing so. The view expressed above challenges the 
nature of such representation. 
 
Similarly, fear was expressed by the Chief Executive Officer regarding the hard unitarist 
concern with breaches of ‘commercial confidentiality’. This was something Bernstein (1976) 
argued could weaken participation in an employee-owned enterprise when management 
reserved the right to commercial confidentiality as it would create an imbalance of power. 
This was shown to be the case in Vivo-Co through the absence of employee representatives 
on the operating board as illustrated in figure  7.1 above.  This   created an imbalance of 
power between the two bodies and was contrary to the close relationship espoused by the 
Articles. 
 
Whilst the senior executives and non-executive directors were privy to the General Council 
none of the employee representatives of Vivo-Co sat on the company’s operating board. This 
decision was taken by the Chief Executive Officer, it was not discussed at the General 
Council despite attempts from employee representatives. The Chief Executive Officer gave 
two reasons for his decision, one being that the operating board might be discussing 
disciplinary issues affecting an employee representative and the second that there was a risk 
of a representative breaching commercial confidentiality. The derogatory opinion of employee 
representatives notwithstanding, not having an employee representative on the operating 
board created an imbalanced governance structure. 
 
This imbalance however was peculiar to Vivo-Co rather than necessarily to the model, as 
noted above by the employee-ownership experts. There was nothing in the Articles to suggest 
that employee representatives either could or could not be on the operating board, rather, it 
was a matter of choice by senior executives. This meant a balance of power favouring the 
operating board as they had access to the General Council and the topics discussed but the 
same access was not afforded to the General Council, thus limiting the flow of 
communication as highlighted in figure 7.1 in the previous section. As with the other 
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examples, this resonates with a hard unitarist frame, which also manifested in animosity 
towards, and distrust of, the employee representatives. And, there was evidence that the senior 
executives prioritised the efficiency aspects of Vivo-Co. An example of this relates to 
questions being asked by senior executives concerning what the company was getting out of 
the role of employee representatives.  
 
Given their seniority, it might have been expected that senior executives would know what the 
company would get in return from the representatives. As it was, they displayed a lack of 
awareness of employee-ownership, this despite, or perhaps because of, their senior positions. 
Overwhelmingly the senior executives invoked the primacy of efficiency synonymous with 
Budd’s (2004) observation of the ‘rhetorical power of efficiency’. Furthermore, was their 
concern that the efficiency of Vivo-Co should not be hampered by the governance structure. 
On occasions, employee-ownership was an inconvenience that manifested in a lack of interest 
in, and knowledge of, it by the senior executives. Of more concern was the often adversarial 
way in which they challenged employee representatives and the derisory manner in which 
they spoke about the employee representatives and the social care employees.  
 
This was reflected in the language used by the Director of Engagement. Discussing 
recruitment, he stated how he wanted to attract ‘better quality’ social care employees and that 
Vivo-Co would have to act quickly or risk losing the ‘hot ones’ to competitors. The 
implication in the first part of the statement is that the current cohort of social care employees 
was not of sufficient quality which is then reinforced in the second part of the statement by 
raising the threat of losing the ‘hot ones’. Notably, the preferred arrangement referred to by 
the managers relied heavily on the existing networks of employees, a practice highlighted in 
chapter five that is common in social care (Hebson et al 2015). Nevertheless, the hard unitarist 
tone of employee-ownership had been set by the Chief Executive Officer and was then 
reflected by the other senior executives, such as in the language used by the Director of 
Engagement. There was also observed to be anxiety of the senior executives about challenges 
to their status such as was evidenced with the list brought to a General Council meeting by 
one of the representatives discussed earlier.  
 
The list presented a challenge to management’s authority due to the legitimacy vested in the 
social care employees, i.e. as employee-owners. Similarly, there was concern from the 
Director of Finance regarding the value brought to the company through the role; a concern 
similarly expressed by a manager to Susan, one of the employee representatives. Resistance 
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also manifested in the lack of gravitas afforded to the employee representatives by their 
managers. This point was powerfully made by some of the employee representatives who 
reported a lack of support for the role from managers. Some managers were reported to be 
openly opposed to the General Council though others were less explicit. These concerns were 
similar to the managers of Pendleton’s (2001) cases who saw ‘threats to efficiency’ or thought 
employees would not act like ‘responsible entrepreneurs’. The evidence contradicted these 
concerns. Similarly, employees demonstrated the capacity for innovation in the study by 
Brown et al (2019) and, as highlighted in earlier examples, employee representatives and 
social care employees in Vivo-Co were found to be capable of suggesting efficiencies and of 
being responsible entrepreneurs through their innovations. Yet, paradoxically, the suggested 
efficiencies in Vivo-Co went unheard.  
 
7.7 Unheard voices 
The contemporary debate concerning ‘unheard’ voice was discussed in chapter two. In 
contrast to some of the employee-owners in the research carried out by Brown et al (2019) 
whose voices were heard, the concept of unheard voice is provided through the work of 
Gunawardana (2014). In this study, though the organisation was not employee-owned, there 
were an abundance of mechanisms, which included a workers’ council and management 
encouraging upward communication. Nevertheless, the study concluded that employee voice 
often went unheard. Whilst part of the reason for this is attributed to cultural norms requiring 
respect for elders and those in senior positions, a point noted by Gunawardana (ibid), relates 
to the format of workers’ council meetings.  
 
The workers’ council meetings were operated for management to communicate to workers 
whilst workers had the opportunity to raise concerns at the end of the meeting. This meant 
workers were only able to speak when the meeting was coming to a close and those attending 
would more than likely have been wanting to leave to attend to other matters. This, it was 
noted in chapter two, bears similarities to the notion of ‘designing out’ some voices through 
processes such as agenda-setting described by Donaghey et al (2011a).  
 
Agenda-setting was noted to involve managers purposely including on the agenda items they 
wished to discuss whilst ensuring items which they knew employees wished to discuss being 
excluded. In other words whether it is the agenda or the format, it is managers who are 
controlling the meeting. The concept has more recently been developed by Wilkinson et al 
(2018) who conceived five types of unheard voice. Of the five types discussed in chapter two, 
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it is the fourth which Vivo-Co resembled. Characteristic of voice in this type of organisation 
was that, whilst there were voice structures in place, there was a climate of perpetual silence 
which had been created through ‘agenda-setting and institutional structures’ (Donaghey et al 
2011a) and employees not speaking up as they knew ‘the rules of the game’ (Kalfa et al 2017; 
cited in Wilkinson et al 2018). In other words a more conspiratorial environment that ensures 
the voice of employees is closed down whereas managers are able to express their voice. 
 
Efficiency concerns were how the senior executive voices in Vivo-Co were expressed. They 
regarded voice expressed in this way as valuable, i.e. the value it brought to Vivo-Co. Their 
main concern was profit via the mechanism of employee-ownership. An unremitting theme in 
Vivo-Co was the narrative of efficiency with employee-ownership used as an incentive to 
achieve greater efficiency and therefore higher profits achieved through employees going the 
extra mile. This corresponds to Cathcart’s (2014) findings whereby the John Lewis 
Partnership used co-ownership to legitimise an emphasis on profit and to stress that although 
decisions may not be in the interest of individuals, they were in the interests of owners, and as 
owners of the business, partners needed to agree. All of which presupposes that employees are 
not already committed to the organisation and are not already going the extra mile which 
suggests a particular view of employees.  
 
It also, condescendingly, suggests efficiency concerns in Vivo-Co were the preserve of the 
senior executives and not those of employee representatives or social care employees, the 
latter being a ‘tough audience’ according to the Director of Quality and Compliance. This has 
been shown not to be the case. Certainly there were challenges to the mechanism through 
hierarchy, compliance and resistance which meant employee voice often went unheard or was 
closed down. However, it is argued in the next section that this was not an outcome of the 
mechanism but the way employee-ownership was framed; whether it was part of the 
organisational fabric or merely a fabrication.  
 
7.8 Employee-ownership: fabric or fabrication? 
The themes of ‘fabric’ and ‘fabrication’ have emerged from the study of Vivo-Co. Some 
examples of voice forming part of the organisation’s fabric have been provided from the 
research findings whereby the voice of social care employees and their representatives were 
enabled through the mechanism of employee-ownership. Through employee-ownership they 
were, in theory at least, provided with the right to a voice and on occasions were able to 
exercise that right. The idea of voice being part of the fabric was also brought through the 
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embeddedness of the mechanism and its sophisticated voice processes. However, despite this, 
the voice of employee-owners in Vivo-Co often went unheard. In particular, voice was 
unheard when the subject was efficiency. 
 
The senior executives within the case had a specific understanding of efficiency. However, 
the way in which the concept of efficiency was understood by the senior executives provided 
one interpretation. The way it was conceived by other organisational actors was different, 
though, it is argued here, no less valid. Importantly, these different interpretations were 
weighted differently as they were not all afforded the same value. It was the interpretation of 
efficiency by the senior executives that took precedence. The suggestions and ideas from 
other organisational actors, i.e. social care employees and employee representatives, were 
either not afforded the same value or were simply not heard. This suggests employee voice 
was a fabrication. With the frames of reference providing the evaluative framework, these 
themes of fabric and fabrication are explored further in the next two sections. 
 
7.8.1 Collaborative pluralism and the fabric of employee voice 
The theme of voice as part of an organisation’s fabric reflects the frame of collaborative 
pluralism. The key aspects of collaborative pluralism were voice as a right and voice that is 
co-operative (Bray et al 2015). This frame is reflected in comments made by employee 
representatives. The figure below highlights the key points from this frame and words and 
phrases used by employee representatives. 
 
 
Collaborative pluralism Employee representatives 
Efficiency and equity focused; managers, 
employees and their representatives are 
legitimate parties to co-operative 
relationships with sometimes separate and 
sometimes shared goals; based on values 
of mutual respect, loyalty, trust and 
equity; employee voice is a moral 
imperative (Budd 2004) and regarded as 
the ‘right to be heard’ (Gollan 2013). 
Efficiency and equity focused; senior 
executives, social care employees and 
representatives are legitimate parties to 
co-operative relationships; based on 
values of mutual respect, loyalty and 
trust; employee voice is a moral 
imperative; voice is the right to be 
heard. 
Figure 7.2 Similarities to collaborative pluralism in Vivo-Co 
 
 
Employee representatives provided several examples, noted above, that reflected efficiency 
and equity concerns. They also showed ‘respect’ for their colleagues as well as for senior 
executives and non-executive directors, they regarded them all as ‘legitimate parties’ to 
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employee-ownership. They often expressed values of ‘mutual respect’, such as wanting to 
learn from one another, as well as loyalty and trust. Moreover, their urgency to be the voice of 
social care employees was suggestive of a ‘moral imperative’ to be able to express voice 
alongside their ‘right to be heard’ (Budd 2004). However, this was often challenged by the 
senior executives, an approach which can be attributed to the way employee-ownership 
evolved in Vivo-Co rather than being peculiar to the model, such as the John Lewis 
Partnership. 
 
For example, though also being indifferent to trade unions, the configuration of employee-
ownership in the Partnership did enable partners to discuss any matters of concern at whatever 
level within the organisation through an array of different mechanisms (Salaman and Storey 
2016). Partners were able to express their voice whether in relation to equity, efficiency or 
work-related concerns. In contrast, equity concerns were interpreted by the Chief Executive 
Officer and other senior executives as operational concerns and therefore, in their view, not 
the domain of the General Council.  
 
Whenever anyone tried to raise equity concerns at General Council meetings, such as the list 
of issues by social care employees which was brought by one of the representatives, they were 
either ignored or told such matters could not be discussed. As part of the organisational fabric, 
the mechanism of employee-ownership had enabled the representative to bring the list of 
concerns to the meeting. However, the list was not discussed given the weight of voice of the 
senior executives which was predicated on a different philosophy.  
 
7.8.2 Hard unitarism and the fabrication of employee voice  
The philosophy of the senior executives reflected the frame of hard unitarism. An emphasis 
on efficiency is a fundamental aspect of the hard unitarist frame. The use of the term 
efficiency by the Chief Executive, and its related subjects, was synonymous with this 
philosophy. Key terms used frequently by the CEO are summarised in figure 7.3 below which 
reflect many of the key aspects of hard unitarism. 
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Hard unitarist features Vivo-Co features 
Efficiency focused; resource-based; 
outcomes oriented; gaining competitive 
advantage; regards employees as calculative 
and driven by financial reward; emphasis on 
hierarchy and standardisation; direction and 
control is via a unified chain of command, 
close supervision and based on rewards; 
‘enforced compliance’ (Bray et al 2015); 
employee voice has a transactional value and 
relates to the ‘labour problem’ of 
absenteeism and turnover; key voice 
mechanisms are incentivisation and ‘exit’ 
and trade unions are unnecessary. 
Efficiency through growth, agility and 
leanness; gaining competitive 
advantage through commercial 
confidentiality and avoiding hostile 
take-overs and reputational damage; 
regarding employees as driven by 
financial reward; an emphasis on 
hierarchy and standardisation; 
direction and control is via a unified 
chain of command, close supervision 
and based on rewards and ‘employee 
compliance (Cathcart 2014); employee 
voice relates to the labour problem of 
staff turnover; key voice mechanisms 
are incentivisation and avoiding trade 
unions. 
Figure 7.3 Similarities to the hard unitarist frame in Vivo-Co 
 
Reflecting elements of a hard unitarist philosophy, efficiency and productivity were 
paramount to the Chief Executive Officer. His ‘solution’ to the ‘labour problem’ of employee 
turnover was ‘business focused’ (Kaufman 2015). To him, social care employees were 
regarded as a ‘resource’ that incur a ‘cost’ which precludes seeing them in another way. 
Furthermore, alternative strategies of reducing costs, such as reducing the layers of hierarchy, 
were not considered either.  
 
The need for the hierarchical organisation of work practices, again, reflected hard unitarism. 
An alternative is to regard social care employees, employee-owners as they were in Vivo-Co, 
as equal and legitimate actors within the organisation. In agreement with Bray et al (2015), 
this hard unitarist philosophy is predicated on what is regarded as the superior knowledge and 
expertise of managers and, important to this frame, that ‘employee compliance’ (Cathcart 
2014) is key.  
 
Employee-ownership, through a financial incentive, would, it was assumed in Vivo-Co, mean 
employee compliance. In relation to social care employees, this was akin to ‘ensured 
compliance’, ensured through, for example, the better terms and conditions of employment. In 
relation to employee representatives, compliance was akin to the ‘enforced compliance’ 
conceived by Bray et al (2015). Employee representatives in Vivo-Co had prescribed to them 
what could and could not be discussed in General Council meetings. By contrast, senior 
executives were always granted the space and time to speak, moreover, they were always 
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heard. Their voice was of value. The legitimacy of the senior executives’ voice was borne out 
of the hierarchical configuration of Vivo-Co and reinforced through employee-ownership 
ensuring the compliance of social care employees and their representatives. The importance of 
compliance to hard unitarism was evidenced further in the organisation’s stance toward trade 
unions. 
 
Hard unitarism does not recognise trade unions and so it is no surprise that employee-
ownership is typical in sectors where unions and ‘countervailing employee power’ are both 
weak according to Croucher et al (2010 p.852).  In Vivo-Co, this manifested in a view of 
trade unions as unnecessary by the senior executives and in hostility by the Chief Executive 
Officer suggestive of hard unitarism. However, this was in contrast to the view expressed by 
one of the founder members which reflected the soft unitarism frame.  
 
In this frame, trade unions are also unnecessary (Cullinane and Dundon 2014). Where they 
are present suggests there is a failing of Human Relations policies. The founder member 
stated that he found social care employees wanting to join a trade union ‘upsetting’ because it 
meant employee-ownership was not working. He considered it a failure of the model. Yet, 
paradoxically, despite this animosity towards trade unions, Vivo-Co senior executives 
commissioned the services of a consultancy to provide the organisation with protection 
against potential employment disputes. This seemed peculiar for two reasons.  
 
Firstly that it was acceptable for the senior executives to involve a third party though not for 
employees. This implies a disparity between the two groups despite having equal status via 
employee-ownership. Secondly, that the social care employees and senior executives are all 
owners of the company. Yet, the senior executives could use finance from the company to 
challenge the social care employees. Whether the latter were aware of this anomaly was 
questionable. The paradox that this created in Vivo-Co is that, on the one hand, employee-
ownership entitled every employee-owner the right to a voice whilst, on the other, it was 
apparent that some voices were more valued than others.  
 
More specifically, the voice of employee representatives and social care employees was 
subordinated, conceived as ‘voice without muscle’ (Kaufman and Taras 2010). This was in 
contrast to the senior executives whose voice, channelled through the organisational 
hierarchy, carried weight and therefore had value.  The view of the senior executives was that 
in Vivo-Co, there would be no need for trade unions as employees would be owners. Though 
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predominantly hard unitarist, a soft unitarist philosophy was also at times evidenced by the 
Chief Executive Officer. 
 
Soft unitarism was apparent in the Chief Executive Officer’s aim to secure ‘greater employee 
commitment’ from social care employees as well as their ‘identification with the organisation’ 
(Ackers 2011) and imploring them as employee-owners to ‘go the extra mile’ (Legge 2005; 
Piasna et al 2013). It was also evidenced in the example above of the founder member being 
disappointed that some social care employees wanted to join trade unions and in the language 
of Tom, one of the employee representatives who spoke about everyone being part of ‘one 
team’ reflecting the soft unitarist assumption of a ‘commonality of interests’ highlighted in 
table 7.1. However, as noted in the discussion above, more typical of employee 
representatives were comments that could be considered collaborative pluralism. Yet, despite 
the evidence of different frames at play, it was the hard unitarist frame which dominated and 
framed employee-ownership in a particular way. A different philosophy however may have 
yielded a different result. This point was first recognised through what was referred to as a 
grey area of employee-ownership in chapter two (Varieties of Voice).   
 
A grey area was highlighted regarding the different conceptualisations of employee-
ownership which was also noted earlier in this chapter (The Philosophy of Employee-
ownership). Through the escalator metaphor (Marchington et al 1992) and voice continuum 
(Gollan et al 2015), voice was conceived as yielding higher levels of strength in an employee-
owned enterprise compared to conventional businesses. This also revealed a disparity between 
the two with the escalator conceiving it higher than the continuum. Similarly, through using 
the frames of reference, employee-ownership in Vivo-Co reflected a mostly hard unitarist 
frame. However, it could also provide a mechanism which reflects the key aspects of 
collaborative pluralism. It could have been focused on efficiency and equity; it could have 
regarded managers, social care employees and employee representatives as legitimate parties 
to co-operative relationships; it could have been based on values of mutual respect, loyalty 
and trust. However, against a hard unitarist backdrop of the senior executives, the possibility 
of expressing equity concerns were not encouraging.  
 
It was the Chief Executive Officer and senior executives who set the parameters on what 
could be talked about and this was reinforced by some of the non-executive directors. This 
presented a paradox in Vivo-Co. The paradox being that employee representatives and senior 
executives alike were owners and as such the former had the right to challenge any decisions 
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made by the latter. However, the senior executives continued to assume the prerogative 
afforded to them in their organisational role and representatives did not challenge this status 
quo. Decisions made by senior executives could have been challenged by the representatives. 
That they did not serves to highlight a lack of confidence. 
 
The lack of confidence does not relate to employee representatives, rather, the senior 
executives. As expressed by Peter, an employee representative, to facilitate the full expression 
of voice takes ‘confidence’. Attempts to enable voice highlighted vulnerabilities, if not a fear, 
of voice amongst senior executives in Vivo-Co which seemed to be contradictory to their role 
as leaders. Further, closing down voices once again challenges the notion of meaningful voice 
which, as argued by Budd (2004), is achieved through free speech and the opportunity to 
challenge without any reprisal. Indeed, combined, the three themes of employee compliance, 
organisational hierarchy and management resistance suggested that, far from becoming part of 
the fabric of Vivo-Co, employee voice was a fabrication. This raises a more fundamental 
issue concerning the way in which voice is valued in an employee-owned enterprise. 
 
7.8.3 Fabric, fabrication and the value of employee voice 
This final part of the analysis argues that, though employee-ownership was part of the fabric 
in Vivo-Co through the governance structure, employee voice was a fabrication given the 
triple challenges of compliance, hierarchy and resistance. More fundamentally, given the 
pervasive hard unitarist philosophy of senior executives, employee voice was of no value.  
 
As noted in chapter two, employee-ownership can provide the opportunity for employee voice 
to become part of the organisational fabric. This is because of the governance processes which 
are an integral feature of such organisations. For example, the mechanism of an Annual 
General Meeting would enable employees to influence key decisions about the organisation. 
However, in Vivo-Co an Annual General Meeting had not been organised nor was it planned 
for the foreseeable future. Similarly, through the mechanism of the General Council, 
employee voice has the potential of being heard via the employee representatives who bring 
the thoughts, ideas and concerns of employee-owners to meetings for discussion. However, 
the capacity of employee representatives to represent the voice of social care employees was 
either restricted to certain subjects or, on several occasions, simply closed down. Employee 
voice, through the mechanism of employee-ownership, was determined by senior executives 
based on their own hard unitarist philosophy and was therefore a fabrication.  
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The fabrication of employee voice was evidenced in several ways and particularly through the 
words and actions of the Chief Executive Officer. Affected by the external pressures brought 
by a challenging social care environment, and shaped by his own beliefs which reflected a 
hard unitarist philosophy, the Chief Executive Officer argued the organisation needed to be 
‘efficient’ and ‘agile’. Along with other senior executives, he determined the meaning of 
efficiency which informed what was regarded as the purpose of employee-ownership.  
 
The purpose of employee-ownership, from their perspective, was to incentivise social care 
employees. This would, and reflecting soft unitarism, garner their commitment, encourage 
them to take responsibility and implore them to go the extra mile. It would be achieved 
through the employee representatives. Against this backdrop, it is perhaps unsurprising that 
employee representatives were constrained in what they could discuss and frequently had 
their voices either supressed or simply not heard. Yet, herein lay a paradox. Social care 
employees and employee representatives all made efficiency suggestions that went unheard. 
By not hearing the employee-owners, the senior management did not hear suggestions that 
may have brought efficiencies to the organisation.  
 
The argument here is that the suggestions made by employee-owners did not fit the narrow 
hard unitarist definition of efficiency, and therefore employee-ownership, as conceived by the 
senior executives. This is perhaps not a surprise given that employee-ownership was the result 
of a decision made by management, it was a management choice that did not consider the 
voice preferences of employee-owners. It was then deployed as a management tool to ensure 
employee compliance which was reinforced through the organisational hierarchy and resulted 
in the resistance of the voice of social care employees and employee representatives by senior 
executives. Employee-ownership did provide a mechanism that gave some opportunities for 
employee voice. However, it could have gone further had it been influenced by a 
collaborative pluralist frame which was reflected in the words of the social care employees 
and employee representatives rather than reflecting the hard unitarist philosophy of the senior 
executives. Moreover, it did provide the opportunity for social care employees to express their 
voice where, for them, their voice matters, the job that they do and the difference they make 
to the lives of service users. Unfortunately, in the studied case, no-one was listening, their 
voices were not heard. The reason for this is that employee voice was not valued.  
 
To conclude thus far, the evidence from Vivo-Co has suggested that employee voice is not 
something that will spontaneously appear through employee-ownership because of the right to 
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a voice, or the embeddedness of the mechanism or the sophisticated voice processes. Indeed, 
though these characteristics of employee-ownership can help to create the potential for voice 
to form part of an organisation’s fabric, it is also dependent on the philosophy of those who 
choose and implement it. As such, this thesis argues employee voice is a philosophy 
concerning the value placed on the right to be heard. It is this philosophy which will influence 
whether employee voice becomes part of the fabric or is merely a fabrication. This leads to 
the contribution of this thesis; the difference in employee voice is created not because of a 
mechanism, but because of the way in which it is valued. 
 
7.9 Summary  
This chapter has provided an evaluation of the research findings from the case presented in 
chapter six. It began by evaluating the context of employee voice in Vivo-Co. Vivo-Co was 
faced with pressures caused by reducing budgets and staff recruitment and retention which 
prevented it achieving its goal of efficiency. To address this, employee-ownership was 
introduced as it was assumed by senior executives that it would incentivise employees. This 
assumption was consistent with some of the employee-ownership literature which is 
underpinned by a hard unitarist philosophy that regards employees as calculative and 
motivated by financial gain. The evidence from this study has challenged this assumption. 
Social care employees were not motivated by financial gain but rather a love of the job. 
Moreover, the point was made that asking employees about their motivations and voice 
preferences are rarely alluded to in the literature. This thesis argues that by asking employees 
these questions, the choice of mechanism could be affected. 
 
It then evaluated how employee-ownership affects employee voice. Some of the literature 
suggested it can provide more sophisticated voice mechanisms compared to conventional 
businesses. This was because of factors such as conferring rights, embedding voice in the 
governance structure and voice expressed through sophisticated governance processes. The 
evidence here is consistent with this literature inasmuch as employee-ownership did provide 
the potential for voice to be heard. Employee representatives were able to express their voice 
on behalf of social care employees and to share ideas about working together co-operatively. 
Voice as a right and co-operative were noted to be akin to collaborative pluralism. This 
highlighted a grey area in the literature regarding the influence yielded by the mechanism. 
The argument here, drawn from the evidence, was that the degree of influence given to voice 
is yielded not because of the mechanism but rather the philosophy of those introducing it.  
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This was followed by an evaluation of the outcomes of employee voice through employee-
ownership. The employee-ownership literature suggested various factors that could impact 
negatively on employee voice. These being that it is used as a means of ensuring employee 
compliance, that the hierarchical configuration can be an impediment to it and that there could 
be resistance from management. These challenges were in evidence in Vivo-Co. Consistent 
with the hard unitarist philosophy of its senior executives, employee-ownership in the 
organisation was regarded as a management tool that would achieve the objective of 
efficiency. A key finding here, the focus of the penultimate section, has been that, even when 
voice reflected an efficiency objective, it was often counteracted and weakened by senior 
management meaning it often still went unheard.  
 
The final section discussed two themes which have recurred throughout this thesis regarding 
employee voice as either forming part of an organisation’s fabric or merely a fabrication. It 
was argued that, based on evidence from this study, it was a fabrication. However, it was also 
argued that such fabrication was not an outcome of the mechanism but rather the philosophy 
underpinning it. The chapter concluded that employee voice is not something that will 
spontaneously appear through employee-ownership because it yields the right to a voice, or 
because of the embeddedness of the mechanism or its sophisticated voice processes. Rather, 
employee voice is a philosophy concerning the value placed on the right to be heard. This 
leads to the contribution of this thesis; the difference in employee voice is created not because 
of a mechanism, but because of the way in which it is valued. 
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Chapter Eight: Conclusion  
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the conclusions of this thesis. It begins by summarising the key points 
which were discussed in the preceding chapters. It then considers the limitation in the extant 
literature which provided the motivation for this study and informed the research questions; 
which was the lack of evidence of alternative voice mechanisms. This is followed by a 
discussion of how the limitation was addressed by this study through exploring employee 
voice in an employee-owned enterprise. It then presents the main findings and conclusions of 
this study based on evidence presented in chapter six and the discussion in chapter seven.  
 
The evidence suggested that there were some opportunities for employee voice yielded 
through employee-ownership, such as being able to influence governance processes and the 
potential of it being part of the fabric of employee-ownership. However, there was also 
evidence that the pressures on, and dominance of, senior executives counteracted and 
weakened voice suggesting it was a fabrication. Employee-ownership was regarded as a tool 
to achieve the objective of efficiency through employee compliance, the organisational 
hierarchy and management resistance. A key finding was that even when employee voice 
reflected this objective it often still went unheard. The chapter then presents the final 
conclusion of this study: employee voice is not something that will spontaneously appear 
through employee-ownership because of the right to a voice, its embeddedness or because of 
sophisticated governance processes. Rather, employee voice is a philosophy concerning the 
value placed on the right to be heard. This leads to a discussion of the contribution to 
knowledge of this study: the difference in employee voice is created not because of a 
mechanism, but because of the way in which it is valued.  
 
8.2 Key points from preceding chapters 
Chapter one provided an introduction to, and overview of, the study. The overarching aim of 
the thesis was set out in that chapter: to explore whether employee voice in an employee-
owned enterprise is different compared to that of conventional businesses. This emerged 
because of a limitation in the employee voice literature which revealed our knowledge of it is 
drawn from conventional businesses which tend to use low-level voice mechanisms, affording 
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employees only limited opportunities to express their voice and be heard, whereas less is 
known about alternative voice mechanisms. 
 
Chapter two reviewed the literature on employee voice. It highlighted two academic 
disciplines dominate the study of employee voice: Employment Relations and HRM. It 
provided an overview of the traditional voice mechanism associated with the Employment 
Relations discipline - trade unions, and contemporary mechanisms which tend to be 
associated with HRM. This revealed that, whilst Employment Relations scholars tend to focus 
on equity concerns of employees, HRM scholars tend to focus on efficiency concerns of 
employers. HRM draws empirical evidence from conventional business where the purpose of 
employee voice is to contribute to efficiency, reflects ‘management choice’ and is expressed 
through ‘low-level’ mechanisms meaning some voices go unheard. This highlighted a 
limitation in the literature regarding alternative mechanisms that might enable voice to be 
heard. As an alternative, employee-ownership was discussed in this chapter which included 
identifying three strengths vis-à-vis employee voice: the ‘right’ to a voice, the 
‘embeddedness’ of voice and ‘sophisticated’ governance processes suggesting it could be part 
of the fabric of an organisation. However, challenges were also revealed: employee 
‘compliance’, ‘organisational hierarchy’ and ‘management resistance’ suggesting what might 
be little more than a fabrication.  
 
Chapter three discussed the theoretical framework which was used to evaluate employee 
voice in the studied case; the frames of reference. It began by highlighting the main 
characteristics of the three frames conceived by Fox (1966; 1974); unitarism, pluralism and 
radical. It then discussed developments to the unitarist frame (Storey 1989) and the pluralist 
frame (Bray et al 2015). This discussion revealed that HRM, which as noted in chapter two 
tends to influence much of the contemporary employee voice literature, is underpinned by 
what Storey (1989) conceived as ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ unitarism. Within these two frames the 
purpose of voice is to contribute to the efficiency of conventional businesses which is 
reflected in the choices of managers for low-level mechanisms. In contrast, the recent 
development to the frames; collaborative pluralism (Bray et al 2015), offered a different way 
to conceive employee voice. Whilst acknowledging the necessity of efficiency concerns, it re-
introduced equity concerns into the employee voice debate by conceiving it as a ‘right’ and 
‘co-operative’. These three frames were used to compare and contrast employee voice in the 
studied case.  
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Chapter four outlined how the methodological approach of this study would address the 
limitation in the employee voice literature. With the frames of reference as its theoretical 
framework, it would generate rich and in-depth data to evaluate the difference in employee 
voice through employee-ownership compared to conventional businesses. It had a subjectivist 
ontology, interpretivist epistemology and qualitative methodology through a single case study 
that was exploratory and explanatory. It emphasised the importance of understanding the 
context in which a case operated and therefore introduced the Context, Mechanism and 
Outcomes (CMO) configuration conceived by Pawson and Tilley (1997) that was used to 
organise data collection and analysis. It outlined the research process which included selecting 
and accessing the studied case, methods of data collection and data analysis.  Finally, some of 
the limitations of the research process were considered.  
 
Chapter five, discussed the social care sector in which the studied case operates. Given the 
intention of providing a rich and in-depth evaluation, an understanding of the context in 
which the case operates was considered necessary. It would help to evaluate the factors 
affecting decisions which were made and the outcomes for organisational actors. The chapter 
referenced a key policy turn, the 1990 National Health Services and Community Care Act, 
which led to the marketization of social care which increased the prevalence of for-profit 
social care organisations. It then considered the employee voice mechanisms used by for-
profit social care organisations; typically mechanisms which are chosen by management and 
tend to be regarded as low-level. It examined the outcomes of employee voice in social care 
which can lead to problems with recruitment and retention and poor employment conditions. 
Finally, it highlighted a paradox which was that despite the high numbers leaving their 
employing organisation, social care employees express a love of the job. 
 
Chapter six presented the findings of the case study, Vivo-Co, an employee-owned social care 
organisation. It provided a company profile and organisational detail, such as how space was 
occupied. It then discussed the contextual factors in which employee-ownership emerged in 
Vivo-Co. These were decreasing local authority funds, increasing company efficiency and the 
‘problem’ of employee recruitment and retention. The solution was based on an assumption 
about how social care employees are ‘incentivised’, through financial rewards. It then 
discussed the mechanism, employee-ownership and the ways in which it enables employee 
voice that is different to voice in conventional businesses. In particular, differences are 
yielded through the various governance processes which provide opportunities for employee 
voice to be part of the organisational fabric. The outcomes of employee-ownership vis-à-vis 
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employee voice were then discussed which revealed that whilst there were some positive 
outcomes, there were also challenges: compliance, hierarchy and resistance. These challenges 
often counteracted or weakened voice because employee-ownership was regarded by senior 
executives as a management tool that would achieve the objective of efficiency. A key finding 
was that even when employee reflected this objective it still went unheard. 
 
Chapter seven evaluated the findings from the case by comparing and contrasting these with 
the literature. It began by considering the contextual factors in which employee-ownership 
emerged. This revealed a contradiction between the empirical evidence and the academic 
literature. It was assumed in the studied case that social care employees would be incentivised 
by employee-ownership. This assumption was consistent with some of the employee-
ownership literature which is underpinned by a philosophy that regards employees as 
calculative and motivated by financial gain. The findings of this study challenge this 
assumption. Social care employees in Vivo-Co were motivated by such things as a love of the 
job. This served to highlight a key finding which is that employees are rarely asked questions 
about their motivation or their preferences for voice mechanisms. It then evaluated the 
mechanism, employee-ownership.  
 
Some of the employee-ownership literature suggests it is a more sophisticated way of 
providing voice compared to conventional mechanisms. Consistent with this literature, this 
study found employee-ownership did confer the right to a voice, embedded voice in the 
organisational structure and enabled voice through its governance processes suggesting it was 
part of the fabric in Vivo-Co. Additionally, this study found that the governance processes 
enabled employee representatives to work together co-operatively which reflected a different 
philosophy compared to that of senior executives. This difference helped to explain a grey 
area in the employee voice literature regarding employee-ownership relating to the degree of 
voice yielded through employee-ownership. The argument here, drawn from the evidence in 
Vivo-Co, is the difference is not yielded because of the mechanism but rather the philosophy 
of those introducing it. As such, the findings here are consistent with the literature inasmuch 
as employee-ownership provided the means for voice to be heard, however, this is dependent 
on the philosophy which underpins it. It then evaluated the outcomes.  
 
Again, consistent with the employee ownership literature, challenges to employee voice were 
revealed through ‘compliance’, ‘hierarchy’ and ‘resistance’. Consistent with the employee 
voice literature, employee-ownership was used as a management tool that would achieve the 
214 
 
objective of efficiency. However, a key finding of this research is that even when it reflected 
this objective, it often still went unheard. The pressures on, and dominance of the senior 
executives counteracted and weakened voice suggesting it was little more than a fabrication. 
Nevertheless, this was argued not to be an outcome of the mechanism but the way it was 
valued. Employee voice is a philosophy relating to the value we place on the right to be heard. 
The chapter concluded that the difference in employee voice is created, not because of a 
mechanism, but because of the way in which it is valued. 
 
8.3 Limitation in the employee voice literature 
A review of the literature on employee voice revealed that there are two principal academic 
disciplines which study employee voice: Employment Relations and HRM. It also revealed 
differences in the way both disciplines conceive employee voice. The study of employee 
voice by Employment Relations scholars has tended to be in relation to equity concerns and 
through the mechanism of trade unions. This was the case for much of the twentieth century.  
 
The focus of study for Employment Relations scholars was on whether employee voice 
mechanisms were achieving equity in the relationship between employees and employers. 
Within the discipline the employment relationship was regarded as skewed in favour of the 
employer. Trade unions were considered to provide a counter-balance to the power of 
employers. However, the literature review also revealed a change in employee voice 
influenced by two key factors. First, was a change in the political environment during the 
1980s and second the introduction of HRM to the UK. Through these two factors, employee 
voice changed. This change in employee voice helped to highlight the limitation in the 
literature. 
 
The limitation relates to the point that the study of contemporary employee voice has tended 
to be dominated by HRM which draws empirical evidence from conventional businesses. 
Characteristics of conventional businesses would include for example maximising shareholder 
value and, importantly, emphasising the primacy of efficiency. Employee voice in 
conventional businesses, and therefore HRM, is of value only inasmuch as it contributes to 
the business objective of efficiency. However, this means employees may have only limited 
opportunities to express their voice and when they do, it is through mechanisms which have 
been chosen by management that are considered to be low-level and over a restricted range of 
subjects. Moreover, this means employee voice is limited in its conception through an 
economic lens. A growing body of literature from Employment Relations scholars suggests a 
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consequence of the contemporary landscape is that employee voice can go unheard. It is 
against this backdrop that the limitation was revealed; less is known about employee voice 
through alternative mechanisms. 
 
This limitation in the literature formed the motivation for this study. To address the limitation, 
employee voice was explored in this study through an alternative mechanism, employee-
ownership. Employee-ownership was regarded as a potentially fruitful way to study employee 
voice as it offers the potential of an alternative to the low-level mechanisms typical of 
conventional businesses and the potential for employee voice to be heard rather than being 
restricted to specific topics.  
 
8.4 Addressing the limitation in the literature 
To address the limitation, this thesis focused on studying employee voice in an employee-
owned enterprise. The aim was to explore whether it differed to that in conventional 
businesses. The rationale was that there might be greater potential for voice to be heard 
through employee-ownership compared to conventional businesses. To further understand 
this, the ‘escalator metaphor’ (Marchington et al 1992) and the ‘voice continuum’ (Gollan et 
al 2015) helped to provide a comparison between employee-ownership as a mechanism of 
employee voice and other conventional voice mechanisms.  
 
The escalator conceived employee voice to be at a higher level in an employee-owned 
enterprise, a position conferred through its governance processes. These processes might 
include an Annual General Meeting and representatives who represent employees. In contrast 
to the escalator however, the Gollan et al’s (ibid) continuum placed employee-ownership at a 
lower level. The reason for this is that employee-owned enterprises lack voice that is 
independent from management. As such, the continuum placed employee-ownership lower 
than the escalator though still higher than conventional mechanisms. In so doing, the escalator 
and continuum revealed a disparity in how each regarded employee voice yielded through 
employee-ownership. To explore this disparity, the strengths and weaknesses of employee-
ownership were considered by drawing on the employee-ownership literature.  
 
Three positive characteristics of employee-ownership vis-à-vis employee voice were 
identified. The first was that voice is a right as it is enshrined in the organisation’s governing 
document. This is unusual given there is no legal requirement for companies to have 
employee voice mechanisms and provides weight in terms of how it is regarded by employees 
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compared to conventional mechanisms. This leads to the second which is that voice is 
embedded, again this is via the governing document. The reason this is a positive factor is that 
it means employee voice cannot easily be taken away. This is a key difference between 
employee-ownership and voice mechanisms in conventional businesses which gives the 
former a greater sense of permanence. The third factor is that voice is channelled through an 
array of sophisticated governance processes. As noted above, these can include Annual 
General Meetings and employee representatives which again give further strength to 
employee voice as it is enabled through these processes. However, concerns were also raised 
in the employee-ownership literature that could negatively impact on voice.  
 
The first concern related to employee compliance whereby employee-ownership is used as a 
means of incentivising and motivating employees in order that they comply with the key 
company goals. The second related to organisational hierarchy which preferences the voice of 
senior managers even though the governance structure of employee-ownership suggests a 
more equitable voice. A particular concern was when the organisational hierarchy and 
governance structure worked against one another. The third related to management resistance 
to employee-ownership and hence the effect on employee voice. This could be through such 
factors as managers’ concern about the time involved when decisions are made collectively. 
Combined, these three factors suggested employee voice in an employee-owned enterprise 
might be more akin to conventional voice mechanisms and little more than a fabrication.  
 
This study evaluated these strengths and challenges in terms of addressing whether employee 
voice in an employee-owned enterprise is different compared to that of conventional 
businesses. In so doing, the study also addressed the way in which employee voice has been 
conceptualised.  
 
As discussed above, contemporary employee voice is mostly influenced by HRM. By drawing 
on the frames of reference (Fox 1966, 1974; Storey 1989), revealed that HRM is underpinned 
by ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ unitarist frames. Hard unitarism views employees as ‘resources’ who are 
calculative and driven by financial gain. Reflecting this, voice mechanisms such as share-
ownership schemes are used as well as the option for employees of the ‘exit’ route. Soft 
unitarism, regards employees as ‘assets’ with psychological needs that can be satisfied 
through their employment. Reflecting this, employee voice mechanisms focus on 
‘engagement’ and ‘involvement’. The important point being that, regardless of whether hard 
or soft unitarism, employee voice is predicated on an efficiency argument. This means that 
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much of the extant literature on employee voice is limited in its conception of it through an 
economic lens. This study introduced a recent addition to the frames, a collaborative pluralist 
frame. 
 
Collaborative pluralism has been conceived by Employment Relations scholars Bray et al 
(2015) as a development on the original pluralist frame and an alternative to the hard and soft 
unitarist frames.  Retaining some of the original pluralist characteristics, key aspects of this 
re-conceptualised frame were that employee voice is a right and it is co-operative. By viewing 
employees as equals, collaborative pluralism (Bray et al 2015) offered a different way of 
conceiving employee voice whereby it is about efficiency and equity through the right to a 
voice and voice is expressed as both conflict and co-operation. The rationale of this particular 
thesis was to evaluate employee voice in an employee-owned enterprise using the three 
frames as its theoretical framework. 
 
8.5 Main findings and conclusions 
The conclusions of this study are drawn from the empirical findings of the case which were 
compared and contrasted to the academic literature. In so doing, they address the aim of the 
research and the research questions which were presented in chapter one. The findings and 
conclusion are organised around the context, mechanism and outcome configuration (Pawson 
and Tilley 1997).  
 
8.5.1 The context of employee voice 
The first research question was concerned with the contextual factors which influenced the 
choice of mechanism in the studied case. Various pressures were discussed concerning the 
environment in which Vivo-Co operated and how this impacted on the choice of mechanism, 
one of which was funding from local authorities. However, the key issue that drove the 
decision to implement employee-ownership was low staff retention.  
 
Low staff retention was a key concern for organisations in the social care sector. The 
challenges faced by the sector regarding the recruitment and retention of employees was 
highlighted by several academics (e.g. Hussein et al 2016). Similarly, Vivo-Co was facing 
considerable challenges of recruitment and retention, it was, according to the Chief Executive 
Officer, what kept him awake at night. These pressures shaped and influenced the decision to 
implement employee-ownership. The assumption was that it would act as a financial incentive 
to social care employees to stay with the organisation. This decision was influenced by the 
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philosophy of some of the senior executives, a philosophy which was also apparent in some of 
the employee-ownership literature.  
 
Based on a hard unitarist philosophy, employees are regarded as calculative and incentivised 
by financial gain. Through being financially incentivised, social care employees would remain 
with the organisation rather than leaving, thereby reducing ‘costs’ for Vivo-Co. The voice of 
social care employees in Vivo-Co regarding the choice of mechanism was never sought. Had 
it been, the Chief Executive Officer would have known that financial gain was not their 
motivation. A key finding from Vivo-Co was that social care employees are incentivised by a 
love of the job and wanting to make a difference to the lives of service users. This point is 
further borne out by the evidence from the social care literature that approximately one-third 
of social care employees remain in the social care sector once they have left their employing 
organisation. 
 
To conclude, the issue of retention and recruitment within the social care sector was a key 
reason for the decision to implement employee-ownership in Vivo-Co. Consistent with 
conventional businesses, the choice was made by senior figures within the organisation 
without including the voice of employees. Moreover, asking employees what does motivate 
them and what their voice preferences might be is rarely alluded to in the literature 
(Marchington 2007). This thesis argues that by asking employees these questions the choice 
of mechanism could be influenced. 
 
8.5.2 The mechanism of employee voice 
The second research question asked whether employee-ownership differed as an employee 
voice mechanism compared to those more typical of conventional businesses, including those 
in the social care sector. Some Employment Relations scholars argue that voice mechanisms 
in conventional businesses tend to be low-level affording employees limited opportunities to 
express their voice. Some also argue that, in contrast, employee voice through employee-
ownership was considered to be at a higher level given that voice is a right, it is embedded 
within the organisation and there are sophisticated governance processes. 
 
In Vivo-Co, the right to a voice was enshrined in the Articles of Association. This meant 
social care employees did have a right to express their voice, something which is not afforded 
to employees in conventional businesses. Similarly the Articles of Association meant that 
employee voice was embedded in the organisation. The Articles could not be easily removed 
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as is the case with some mechanisms in conventional businesses. Such embeddedness was 
also achieved through the related governance processes. In Vivo-Co these were an Annual 
General Meeting and the General Council.  
 
An Annual General Meeting would have provided an important opportunity for social care 
employees to express their voice. Such a meeting did not happen and therefore there was no 
opportunity for employee voice to be heard. 
 
The General Council meetings did provide a means for the voice of social care employees to 
be heard. This was achieved through employee representatives. Such a mechanism is 
untypical of conventional businesses. There were also opportunities for employee 
representatives to influence decision-making within the General Council as well as to broaden 
their knowledge of the organisation and develop skills they said they would otherwise not 
have developed. Moreover, employee representatives expressed a desire to co-operate with 
one another, for example, to explore ways of ensuring employee-ownership was accessible to 
social care employees. This reflected a different philosophy compared to that of senior 
executives. Exploring this difference as it concerned Vivo-Co, which related to the degree of 
voice influence yielded through employee-ownership, helped to explain a grey area in the 
employee voice literature regarding employee-ownership and led to a second conclusion.  
 
This conclusion is that employee-ownership did provide the potential for employee voice to 
be heard. This potential was created through the governance processes which suggests that 
employee voice could be part of the organisational fabric of employee-ownership. The 
empirical evidence from Vivo-Co suggested this potential was often not realised, voice was 
unheard. A key conclusion drawn from this study is consistent with the literature inasmuch as 
employee-ownership provided the means for voice to be heard, however, this is dependent on 
the philosophy which underpins it. 
 
8.5.3 Outcomes of employee voice 
The third research question was concerned with how employee voice operated through the 
mechanism and the consequences of this for key organisational actors. The findings were 
mixed, with some positive outcomes regarding employee voice resulting from employee-
ownership alongside, and outweighed by, a number of challenges.  
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The positive outcomes related to social care employees and employee representatives. An 
example of the former was Kevin requesting that the wages for employees in his branch be 
retained as weekly rather than monthly payments. Employee-ownership had provided the 
mechanism to address this issue in the meeting. An example of the latter was the 
representatives pointing to the skills they would develop through being a representative which 
could help them in their future career. They also saw it as an advantage to be part of what they 
described as an ‘elite’ group. It also led to some degree of influence of employee 
representatives at General Council meetings, such as changing the names on the Trust Deed. 
Examples such as this highlight that social care employees and their employee representatives 
were able to exercise their voice. However, there were also several challenges to it. 
 
Several factors were referred to in the employee-ownership literature which could have a 
negative effect on employee voice: employee compliance, organisational hierarchy and 
management resistance. These challenges were in evidence in Vivo-Co. Consistent with the 
hard unitarist philosophy of the senior executives, employee-ownership was regarded as a 
management tool that was used to ensure the efficiency objective was achieved through 
ensuring employee compliance through the primacy of the hierarchical configuration and 
through management resistance. The voice of employee representatives was often closed 
down in preference for the voice of senior executives and non-executive directors. An 
example of this was being told by senior executives and non-executive directors they could 
not discuss operational issues, or being told by the Chief Executive Officer they were not to 
act like shop stewards, or senior executives being derogatory about the role and questioning 
the capability of employee representatives. In so doing, the value, or rather lack of, afforded 
to employee voice was highlighted as an issue.  Indeed, a key finding is that even when 
employee voice did reflect an efficiency objective, it still went unheard. 
 
Social care employees and employee representatives made several suggestions of efficiency 
innovations, such as improving and increasing communications between representatives 
outside of General Council meetings. However, the conceptualisation of efficiency by the 
senior executives was confined to a hard unitarist definition regarding ‘cost’ and ‘profit’. 
Because the suggestions made by the social care employees and employee representatives did 
not fit this definition they were not heard. Further, the pressures on senior executives, such as 
reduced local authority funding, often counteracted and weakened voice which suggested it 
was little more than a fabrication. On balance, the challenges the employee representatives 
faced outweighed opportunities that had been provided by the mechanism.  
221 
 
 
To conclude, there were a number of opportunities for employees voice to be expressed which 
were yielded through employee-ownership. However, the challenges facing social care 
employees and employee representatives in expressing their voice suggested it was a 
fabrication. However, it is argued in this thesis that this was not an outcome of the mechanism 
but the way in which employee voice was valued. 
 
8.6 The fabric and fabrication of employee voice through employee-ownership 
Key features of employee-ownership discussed in the literature were employees having the 
right to a voice and the potential to embed employee voice within an organisation through the 
unconventional governance mechanism. The possibility existed for employee voice to be part 
of the fabric of Vivo-Co which would make it more difficult to discard in the future. The 
employee-ownership model did provide a mechanism in Vivo-Co through which voice could 
be expressed. However, several notable factors have been highlighted by this study that 
mitigated against employee voice and suggested it was merely a fabrication.  
 
The challenges to employee voice included the significance of management philosophy and 
organisational context in shaping decisions and the choice of voice mechanism and how these 
impacted on the outcomes of voice.  The voices of employee-owners in this organisation were 
supressed on several occasions. This study has also revealed that senior executives often used 
the organisational hierarchy, or their positions within that hierarchy, to close down voice. In 
so doing, the study highlights the challenges brought about by superimposing an 
unconventional governance structure, employee-ownership, onto a conventional, hierarchical, 
structure. However, it has also highlighted how the philosophy of key senior figures 
influences the choice of mechanism and the way in which the mechanism evolves. The 
philosophy in Vivo-Co was such that employee voice was a fabrication despite it being valued 
by the employee representatives. 
 
Significantly, the study has found that employees do value the opportunity to have a voice at 
work and revealed that when expressed, employees erred toward a collaborative and co-
operative voice. Through studying voice yielded as a right, a different dimension to voice has 
been uncovered that adds to the current literature. Employee voice studied through employee- 
ownership has helped to reveal that by not valuing voice its true potential is not realised with 
the, perhaps paradoxical, consequence of being detrimental to efficiency. In so doing, this 
thesis advances debates by presenting a more nuanced view of employee voice in an 
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unconventional organisation that highlights its value in and of itself as well as its potential for 
adding value to the organisation.  
 
If employees are given a voice, there is a good chance they will speak. However, as noted by 
Peter, an employee representative, it takes confidence and trust to have those conversations. 
Employees’ voices need to be heard and need to be valued. Employee voice is not something 
that will spontaneously appear through employee-ownership because of the right to a voice, or 
the embeddedness of the mechanism or the sophisticated voice processes, rather, it is a 
philosophy concerning the value we place on the right to be heard. All of which leads to the 
contribution to knowledge of this thesis which concerns the way that employee voice is 
valued.  
 
8.7 Contribution to knowledge: the value of voice 
This thesis has challenged the literature which assumes employee-ownership will result in 
voice being heard through being part of the organisational fabric. Far from it being part of the 
fabric, employee-ownership in Vivo-Co served only to constrain and coerce employee voice 
through the incentive of financial gain. Senior management did not value the voice of 
employee-owners whether social care employees or employee representatives. Despite there 
being opportunities afforded by employee-ownership these were outweighed by the prevailing 
unitarist environment that shaped and influenced the way in which employee voice evolved in 
the studied case and the outcomes it had on its key organisational actors, employee 
representatives and social care employees, meaning their voice often went unheard.  
 
Given the often hard unitarist philosophy of senior executives, unheard employee voice is 
perhaps unsurprising. However, by introducing a collaborative pluralist frame of reference, 
there was the potential that this could be altered, and the potential for voice to be heard 
realised. As it was in Vivo-Co, when such a voice surfaced it was frequently closed down or 
not heard. Thus this thesis complements the growing body of literature regarding ‘unheard’ 
employee voice (Gunawardana 2014; Wilkinson et al 2018). However, the key theoretical 
contribution made by this thesis is that employee voice is created not because of a 
mechanism, but as a result of the way in which it is valued. Employee voice in Vivo-Co was 
not heard because it was not valued. This is a significant addition to the current employee 
voice debate. The thesis also makes important empirical and methodological contributions.  
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Empirically, the frames of reference enabled insights into the studied case which may not 
have been possible if other approaches had been used. Though employee-ownership has been 
studied previously (e.g. Cathcart 2009, 2014; Salaman and Storey 2016), it has not been 
studied in relation to employee voice nor have the frames of reference been used in such a 
context. By using the frames, the researcher was able to evaluate use of different frames 
across organisational actors in Vivo-Co as well as amongst them. This served to highlight the 
nuances and overlaps between frames as evidenced by different organisational actors. As 
noted by Heery (2016): 
 
‘Frames of reference are broad perspectives on work and employment that overlap at 
their edges and individual researchers may move between them or locate themselves at 
the intersection of any two frames’ (p.257). 
 
Methodologically, the approach to this study was qualitative using a single case. By using this 
approach, richness and depth have been added to the concept of employee voice that is 
typically studied using quantitative methods. It has also provided an insight into how voice 
evolves in an employee-owned enterprise and in so doing, highlights how this differs to voice 
in a conventional business. However, the approach also helped to identify similarities.  
 
As with conventional businesses, it was senior management who determined who was 
allowed to speak and what could be discussed and, following a unitarist tradition, implored 
employee-owners to ‘take responsibility’ and ‘go the extra mile’. Significantly, a fear of 
hearing voice by senior executives was revealed that stifled its potential. Though employee-
owners spoke their voices were unheard or closed down. As such, voice in an employee-
owned enterprise, as with conventional enterprises, is dependent on management philosophy; 
their rationale and motivation for its introduction as well as the choice of processes used, and 
as a result, the way in which voice is evolved. The methodological approach enabled the 
differences and the similarities to be observed. Of course there are other ways that the 
research may have developed and areas for future research have been identified. 
 
8.8 Areas for future research  
During the course of this research, three areas for possible future research have been 
identified. The first relates to the subject of employee voice and its exploration in different 
organisational settings. As noted several times during this study, much of what we know 
about employee voice is drawn from conventional businesses. Further research into 
mechanisms in other settings would be useful, for example in public sector organisations and 
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third sector organisations. A possibility for a larger project would be to draw comparisons of 
voice mechanisms across different sectors. 
 
A second possible area of future research relates to greater use of the frames of reference as a 
theoretical framework. In this thesis, the frames were thought to provide the most suitable 
lens as they offered a more intricate and nuanced view of employee voice, particularly from 
the perspective of employees. This thesis has used the frames of reference to consider an 
alternative voice mechanism to enable employees to have a voice in the workplace. More 
research in this area, which puts employees back at the centre of employee voice research, 
could address the issue of it being regarded not as a means to an end, rather, as an end in 
itself.  
 
A third and related area for potential future research concerns the issue of the movement of 
social care employees between organisations as discussed in chapter five. Exploring this issue 
further would provide important evidence for future policy on social care and explore in 
greater detail the vehicles which are used to deliver social care. For example, a future question 
might be what is the rationale and motivation for providing social care through private for-
profit organisations given that the differences between those organisations are minimal? 
Finally, future research could explore further the thesis presented here, which is, in order to be 
heard, employee voice needs to be valued. 
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Appendix One: Access process  
 
The process of gaining access to Vivo-Co was protracted and full of trepidation. The request 
to the researcher’s contact was made in January 2015. He passed the request to the 
organisation’s Chief Executive Officer (CEO) who was also known to the researcher. A first 
access meeting between the researcher and the CEO was subsequently arranged for February 
2015.  
 
Access meeting one 
At this meeting an overall summary of the research was provided. This included the scope and 
purpose of the research, a rationale for approaching this organisation, the role of the 
researcher, the research methods, which people the researcher would like to speak to and the 
anticipated disturbance to the organisation. Specifically, the meeting was arranged to ensure 
the CEO: 
 
a) Understood the nature and implications of the research. 
 
b) Understood what the research would not do. 
 
Several other topics were discussed at this meeting. The researcher stressed that the research 
would be confidential and anonymous and she would be mindful of commercial sensitivities. 
Furthermore, she would adhere at all times to her university’s research ethics code of practice. 
In addition, she reassured the CEO that whilst she would carry out all of the research herself, 
she was being supported by an experienced and knowledgeable team at the university. The 
CEO used the meeting as an opportunity to provide an outline of the organisation.  
 
This outline included: there was no Human Resource Management (HRM) department, rather 
the organisation contracted out HRM functions to an HRM consultancy; there were no 
external shareholders; there were approximately 800 staff who constituted a disparate group; 
staff retention was an issue in the organisation and so they had developed an Engagement 
Strategy to deal with this; and, the majority of staff worked off-site.  He then made two 
specific requests at this initial meeting.  
 
Firstly, that a subsequent meeting was held between the researcher and the senior executive 
team (SET) made up of the CEO and three Directors: Finance, Quality and Compliance and 
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Operations. In preparation for this meeting the CEO requested a research brief from the 
researcher that could be shared with the SET. The second request was that the researcher gave 
some assistance to the organisation in developing a social impact framework they were 
developing on behalf of one of their funders. The CEO was aware that the researcher had 
previous experience of developing social impact frameworks; hence the request. 
 
Access meeting two 
Following the first meeting, a research brief was prepared as well as a letter to the CEO 
formally requesting a meeting with the SET. This led to the second access meeting which was 
held during April 2015 with all of the SET in attendance. After introductions, the researcher 
covered the following points: role of the researcher, nature and purpose of the research, 
confidentiality and anonymity, access as a continuously negotiated process, the level of access 
required and an anticipated research timescale. The SET, raised the following concerns: 
 
1. What’s in it for us? The SET were keen to know what the organisation would get from 
the research. The researcher stressed that given the research was academic, the 
findings would make a contribution to existing knowledge in relation to the issues 
being researched. However, more pragmatically, the researcher informed the meeting 
that she had agreed with the CEO to contribute to an area of work the organisation 
were undertaking relating to a social impact framework. 
 
2. Why focus on one branch? The researcher explained that though the whole 
organisation was part of the research there would be a focus on one of the six 
branches. The rationale was due to two reasons. Firstly, resources: the branches are 
spread geographically and one researcher would not have the time or financial 
capacity to cover the six branches. Secondly, and related, the researcher wanted to 
explore in great depth how voice manifested. This would be more achievable by 
focussing the available resources on one branch.  
 
3. What if we don’t like the results? The researcher explained that the purpose of the 
research was to learn about how voice unfolded in the organisation. There were no 
assumptions about a right or wrong way for this to happen, the aim was simply to 
study the process. Further, though the priority was to contribute to academic 
knowledge, there were perhaps some lessons the participating organisation could learn 
from the process that would, possibly, lead to improvements in terms of how it was 
managed in the organisation. 
 
4. How much time will you spend with us? The researcher explained this would be 
difficult to predict but no more than perhaps once a week over a period of 
approximately six months. However, this would be dependent on the amount of access 
given and to what activities. 
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At the end of this meeting the SET agreed they would consider the request and let the 
researcher know. However, some weeks went by without any further contact.  
 
Eventually the researcher contacted the CEO by telephone. He informed the researcher that 
the SET had decided they would permit access but with a number of caveats. Firstly, they 
requested copies of all documents relating to the ethics of the research that the researcher 
would be adhering to. Secondly, and given their concerns about commercial confidentiality 
and reputational damage, they would not allow access to meetings of the operating board; 
where key decisions about business and financial matters were discussed. Thirdly, the 
organisation could veto access at any time if they wished. The researcher suggested a meeting 
with the CEO to discuss these caveats in further detail. This meeting took place during May 
2015 and was attended by the CEO and the researcher. 
 
Access meeting three 
The purpose of this third access meeting was to discuss the concerns of the SET and hopefully 
provide some reassurances. At this meeting the researcher agreed that she would send the 
CEO a number of documents relating to ethical practices and guidelines to which she would 
adhere. Furthermore, having taken advice from the university in advance of this meeting, the 
researcher suggested putting in place a Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA) between herself 
and Vivo-Co. The CEO agreed to this. As such, it was agreed the researcher would send 
electronic copies of all ethical procedures and a draft NDA. It was agreed by both parties that 
access would be an on-going process during the period of the research. In addition, the 
researcher agreed to share key concepts that emerged from the research. Finally, it was 
requested that the researcher carry out an ‘Engagement Survey’ of all branch staff.  
 
Though the researcher agreed to do this, using her own time and resources, the results would 
not form part of the findings of this research. From the outset, this research purposely used a 
qualitative design. Agreement was on the basis that the survey acted as a gesture of 
appreciation for allowing access. In the meantime a further meeting would be arranged to 
discuss the aforementioned. Additionally, the CEO agreed to co-ordinate access on behalf of 
the researcher to speak to the branch manager and attend one of the organisation’s General 
Council, the main governing body of the organisation. This meeting was held during June 
2015. 
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Access meeting four 
The fourth access meeting with the CEO was held towards the end of July 2015. In other 
words, the research had begun. The previous month the researcher had attended the first 
meeting of the General Council whilst access had still not been fully agreed. Though 
predominantly focused on access, this meeting also began the process of interviewing the 
CEO. In advance of this meeting the researcher had sent the following to the CEO for 
discussion at the meeting: 
 
 Consent form 
 Draft non-disclosure agreement 
 Code of good practice 
 Policy and procedure ethics 
 
At this meeting the NDA was discussed and several points were discussed in relation to 
accessing other organisational actors, familiarisation with the organisation and the next steps.  
 
Access meeting five 
A fifth meeting was held during August 2015 when the NDA was finally signed off by the 
CEO. In total, the access process had taken six months and was still not fully guaranteed, it 
could have been revoked at any time during the research process. As it was, this did not 
happen. 
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Appendix Two: Six-S configuration 
 
 
Sovereignty  Employee voice conceived at the level of governance enshrined within the 
governing document. The governing document provides a framework for the 
organisation: firstly, in terms of the technicalities and regulations of an 
employee-owned organisation; secondly in terms of its aspirations and its 
purpose; and thirdly in terms of setting the parameters of what the organisation 
and its various bodies could and could not do: its organisational powers.  
Structure  Employee voice was conceived at the level of structure manifesting in relation 
to the organisational configuration. Vivo-Co has a traditional hierarchical 
structure with a CEO at the top, supported by an executive management group, 
branch managers, managers, co-ordinators, line managers, office staff and 
support workers.  
Strategy  Employee voice conceived at a strategic level incorporated several elements. 
The two main elements covered by this research discussed at the General 
Council meetings were a business plan and an engagement strategy.  
Systems  There were multiple systems in place in Vivo-Co potentially providing 
opportunities for employee voice, some of which were borne out of the 
organisation being an employee-owned enterprise, others borne out of the 
CEO’s desire for greater engagement.  
Shape The sixth organisational level is conceived as the ‘shape’ and refers to the size 
of the organisation, such as numbers of employees but also the physical space 
it occupies and its physical surroundings. 
Spirit  Spirit refers to the organisational climate, how it felt to be in the offices of 
Vivo-Co, how welcoming and open the organisation was. 
 
 
230 
 
 
Appendix Three: Schedule for observations 
 
What activity is being observed, e.g. meeting, training? 
 
How much notice of the activity was given to its participants? 
 
How are people notified? 
 
How frequently does the activity occur? 
 
Where is the observation taking place? 
 
Are there any spatial considerations, e.g. seating plans? 
 
What format is being used in terms of the activity? 
 
Who has given permission to observe the activity? 
 
Who is being observed, including demographics? 
 
Why are they being observed? 
 
Are any refreshments being provided? 
 
Have participants the relevant materials to take part in the activity, e.g. minutes of meetings? 
 
Are some people more engaged in the activity than others, why is this? 
 
What is covered by the activity? 
 
Who has decided what is covered by the activity? 
 
Is there anything that is not covered that possibly should be? 
 
How long is the activity? 
 
Are there action points from the activity, if so, do they need to be communicated to others and 
how and when will this be done? 
 
Could the information have been gathered using a different research method? 
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Appendix Four: Interview schedule  
 
Preamble 
Researcher introduction: name, role and institution 
Thank participant for giving their time to be interviewed 
Purpose of the interview: some people feel involved with the organisation they work; they feel 
they are a part of it; they feel like they belong. When people feel like that it can mean their 
time at work is more positive. I’m interested in finding out what helps someone feel that way 
or may stop them feeling that way. To find out, I’d like to ask you some questions about: 
 
a) Other places you have worked and what it was like at those other places  
b) Your job here and what it involves 
c) What it is like working in this organisation 
d) What it is like working in this organisation compared to other places you have worked 
e) Ways of working in this organisation to encourage people to feel they belong 
 
Format of the interview: give an estimated length of interview; assure participant they can 
skip questions if they wish and the interview can be stopped at any time. 
 
Research ethics 
Provide assurance in terms of confidentiality and anonymity; ask for permission to record the 
interview; and ask participant to complete consent form. 
 
Demographic data 
Age, gender, training 
 
a. Your work history 
 
To begin, I’m interested to know the type of work you did before you came to work here and 
what led you to coming to work here. 
 
Did you work at other places before you came here, if so, what kind of work did you do? 
 
How did you come to work here? 
 
How long have you worked here? 
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b. Your job 
For the next set of questions I’d like to ask you are about your job. 
 
I’d like to know about your job as a support worker, can you take me through a typical day? 
 
What does having a ‘good day at work’ mean for you? 
 
What would a ‘bad day at work’ mean? 
 
Can you tell me what you like most about your job? 
 
Can you tell me what you least like about your job? 
 
About working here 
Now I’d like to move on from talking about your job to asking you some questions about 
what it is like to work in this organisation. If you were talking to a friend about this 
organisation:  
 
- What would you say to them? 
- What would you tell them are the ‘good things’ about working here: why/examples? 
- Are there things you would say are not so good: what/why/examples? 
 
Comparing this organisation to your previous organisation/s 
Now I’d like to talk about any differences or similarities between the organisations you talked 
about earlier and this organisation. This will help me understand what is important to you. 
 
Was there anything particularly good about the previous employer/s that is not so good here? 
 
Was anything not so good about the previous employer/s that you have not come across here? 
 
Thinking about your previous employer/s, then thinking about here, what are the differences? 
 
Thinking about those previous employer/s and this organisation, what are the similarities? 
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Workplace engagement 
The last set of questions are more specific in terms of your experience of this organisation. 
 
How would you describe relationships with: other employees/co-ordinators/managers? 
 
If something was bothering you at work, what would you do? 
 
Do you feel you ‘have a say’ in this organisation: why; would you like more/less say; on 
what? 
 
Do you think your opinions and ideas are listened to/acted upon? 
 
Do you feel involved in this organisation: how/why/can you give me an example? 
 
Do you think social care employees should be involved in decisions about the organisation: 
how? 
 
What do you think prevents social care employees being involved? 
 
Are there ways social care employees can be involved in decisions that are made: how/what? 
 
This organisation has introduced some practices in recent months; I’ll go through them one at 
a time and ask whether you have heard of them and about your experience of each of them: 
newsletter, staff survey, employee ownership, engagement forum, General Council, ideas box 
and traffic lights. 
 
Summary 
So, just to sum up: before working here you worked at…you have been here…you 
particularly like…you are not so keen on…, overall you seem to be…have I heard you 
correctly? 
 
Is there anything you would like to include that I’ve not asked? 
 
You have my contact details if there is anything you think of later. 
 
If there is anything I think of is it alright to contact you again? 
 
The next steps are…Thank you so much again for giving your time to this piece of research. 
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Appendix Five: Informed Consent Form 
 
I, the undersigned, confirm that (please tick box as appropriate): 
 
1. I have read and understood the information about the project, as provided in the 
Information Sheet dated _______________. 
 
2. I have been given the opportunity to ask questions about the project and my 
participation. 
 
3. I voluntarily agree to participate in the project.  
4. I understand I can withdraw at any time without giving reasons and that I will not be 
penalised for withdrawing nor will I be questioned on why I have withdrawn. 
 
5. The procedures regarding confidentiality have been clearly explained (e.g. use of 
names, pseudonyms, anonymisation of data, etc.) to me. 
 
6. If applicable, separate terms of consent for interviews, audio, video or other forms of 
data collection have been explained and provided to me. 
 
7. The use of the data in research, publications, sharing and archiving has been explained 
to me. 
 
8. I understand that other researchers will have access to this data only if they agree to 
preserve the confidentiality of the data and if they agree to the terms I have specified 
in this form. 
 
9. Select only one of the following: 
 
 I would like my name used and understand what I have said or written as part 
of this study will be used in reports, publications and other research outputs so 
that anything I have contributed to this project can be recognised.  
 
 I do not want my name used in this project.   
 
 
 
10. I, along with the Researcher, agree to sign and date this informed consent form.   
 
Participant:   
 
________________________ ___________________________ ________________ 
Name of Participant  Signature    Date 
 
Researcher: 
 
____________________ __________________________ ________________ 
Name of Researcher  Signature    Date 
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Appendix Six: Analysis process 
 
Frame of reference Example themes (frames) Example themes 
(literature & in-vivo) 
Example codes  
Hard unitarist Efficiency 
Hierarchy  
Incentivisation  
Management control 
Trade union avoidance 
  
Fabrication of voice 
Compliance  
Hierarchy  
Resistance  
 
 
Calculative                  Anti-union      
Profit                           Suspicious  
Resistance                   Responsibility  
Fear                             Unheard  
Hostile  
Tension  
Soft unitarist Efficiency  
Harmony 
Unity  
Going the extra mile 
Individual  
Trade unions unnecessary 
Going the extra mile 
Anti-union 
Etiquette  
Culture  
Fabric of voice 
 
Right to a voice 
Embedded voice 
Sophisticated voice processes 
 
Collaborative pluralism Equity & efficiency 
Fairness  
Right  
Collaborative 
Legitimacy  
Moral imperative 
Heard voices 
Innovation  
Respect 
Loyalty 
Trust  
Representation  
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